Confined space deaths

[Guest guest]

In case any of you guys have not heard of this.

I know some of you will be interested:

Rod

Here is a recent incident briefing from UK P & I, it deals with an absolute

disaster of a confined space entry. I'm not going to even start listing the

failures both in the original incident and the response to the men down. A

very useful lesson for anyone involved in confined space entry or confined

space rescue.

Regards,

Tank Entry Fatality - Worldwide

Aug 2005

Two crewmembers died in a recent incident onboard a VLCC discharging crude

oil. Around midnight on the day of the incident, the chief officer (C/O)

encountered problems pumping cargo from the tanks and the vessel was

instructed to locate the reason for the loss in suction. The C/O suspected

this to be due to a leaking dresser coupling on the cargo line in the

centre

tank. Once the tank atmosphere was released onto the open deck and the tank

pressure reduced, a suction sound from within the tank indicated a leak in

the cargo line.

The inert gas blower was changed over to the fresh air mode for tank entry

and readings of the tank atmosphere were 1% by volume for Hydrocarbon gases

and 6.5% by volume for Oxygen. Emergency rescue equipment was prepared at

the tank entry point and an emergency team kept ready. The C/O instructed a

deck fitter to don a self contained breathing apparatus (SCBA) and go into

the tank but he refused because the tank was not gas free. The C/O woke

another fitter from his sleep but he also refused to enter the tank for the

same reason. The master donned a SCBA to enter the tank himself but the

chief engineer (C/E) suggested two engine fitters could enter the tank

instead and so woke them from their sleep. At around 04.50 hours the engine

fitters and assistant chief officer (Asst. C/O) entered the tank with two

torches, two radios and various spanners between them. The inert gas line

and cargo lines were not blanked and the entry party did not carry personal

gas detectors.

The coupling was approximately seven bays from the ladder section and the

crew were wading through 30cm of crude remaining in the tank where

visibility was estimated at two metres. Around 0554 hours the low pressure

alarm of one of the SCBA sets in the tank was heard and the master and

asst.

C/O ordered the fitters out of the tank. A voice was heard on the radio in

Hindi saying 'we cannot find the way out' followed by silence. The master

and C/E each donned an emergency escape breathing device (EEBD) and entered

the tank. By the time they exited the tank the asst. C/O exited too but the

fitters remained inside. At the same time the third officer had summoned

immediate assistance from ashore. The body of one of the fitters was

recovered at 1310 hours and the other at 1945. Setbacks to the fire/rescue

crew were due to low visibility, high temperatures and the crude sludge

restricting movement.

The investigation revealed that the fitters had vertically descended 22

metres, horizontally traversed 53 metres to reach the dresser coupling and

back to the location where their bodies were found. Air in the cylinders of

the two fitters had lasted 14-16 minutes. The company safety check list and

enclosed space entry permit clearly states that the oxygen reading in the

compartments should be 21% and hydrocarbon less than 1% lower flammable

limit. Only when the above criteria are satisfied can entry take place. A

permit was not produced at the point of investigation but at a later stage

and entered with 'ventilation of the tank in progress' - diluting the

essence and spirit of the enclosed space entry safety checklist and permit.

The master had signed the entry form in place of the leader of the team

entering the tank, suggesting that the form was completed after the

incident. SCBA should not have been used in this context and when the real

emergency arose only one SCBA was available.

The man entry by master and chief engineer into the tank with no clarity of

thought after the accident happened is a matter of serious concern as any

further accident would have left the vessel without command. Proceedings

were brought against the master, chief officer and chief engineer for

causing death by rash or negligent act not amounting to culpable homicide,

which is punishable by imprisonment, fine or both.

Source of information: Loss Prevention Department

UK P & I Club

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