Why our troops will not be protected from a chemical attack by Iraq

[Guest guest]

I have sent this material around once, about 6 weeks ago, but it went unnoticed

in the rush to war. It is extremely important, so I am including it again. I

wrote a summary of the problems below. Ten documents that provide more detailed

background materials can be viewed on my website (www.anthraxvaccine.org) under

the tab " US soldiers unprepared for CBW. " For example, more than 50% of 20,000

masks tested by DOD had defects. But there was no plan in place to address this.

And no masks or suits currently available can protect against " dusty agents. "

--Meryl Nass MD

CBW Masks and protective outer garments

The masks are very effective against some, but not all, exposures (Wiener SL,

1996). They degrade troop performance while being worn, and cannot be slept in.

The seals are not reliable during sleep, and their degrading of sleep efficiency

leads to additional impairment of troop performance the next day (Vories AA,

1998). The canisters' life is limited, and during a heavy exposure, they may

need to be replaced every few hours. Specific agents may be used simply to clog

the masks. Canister types that are effective for one exposure may be

ineffective for another. Chemical mixtures are likely to be selected by the

enemy with this in mind.

" Dusty agents " including " dusty VX " may overwhelm all existing protective masks

and suits available for use on the battlefield, resulting in extremely high

casualty rates. 1 mg of VX contacting exposed skin is a lethal dose.

Existing chemical protective garments can only be realistically worn for short

periods (Levine L, 2001). Five JSLIST and three CBW overgarments were tested by

the Army recently. Subjects could not wear the suits for 100 minutes at 95

degrees Fahrenheit due to heat strain.

Sufficient high-quality suits needed for frequent changes are not available.

Methods for safely changing suits are inadequate. Chemical agents may retain

their lethality for weeks after release.

The following extracts are drawn from the testimony of Mancuso,[1]

(Deputy Inspector General, Department of Defense, to the House Committee on

Government Reform, National Security Subcommittee, June 21, 2000):

" Protective suits have specified shelf lives " [therefore] " the general lack of

adequate inventory control over protective suits was very surprising. "

During a follow-up audit in late FY 1999, " we also observed that the Defense

Logistics Agency had failed to separate potentially defective (Isratex) suits

from the active inventory. The potential defects were the focus of an on-going

criminal investigation. "

" The aforementioned Isratex criminal investigation was initiated in May 1993. "

" In January 1996, a quality inspection of the BDOs manufactured under the 1992

(Isratex) contract was conducted by the Defense Logistics Agency, at our

request. The inspection found significant defects, such as open seams, which by

contract specification called for the entire lot of BDOs to be withheld from

distribution to the field.However, three months later the Defense Logistics

Agency concluded that the BDOs were serviceable and returned them to regular

stock, leading to the audit finding that I discussed previously. "

" These protective suits were inspected again, at our request, in August 1999 by

the U.S. Army Soldier Systems Center, Natick, MA and critical defects were found

in addition to the defects already noted by the previous inspection. "

Testing of Masks (continued testimony of Mancuso):

" We selected and tested 376 M17 and 377 M40 protective masks. " " Our June 1994

report.generally substantiated the hotline allegations. "

" We found strong indications that soldiers were not following prescribed

procedures when performing preventive maintenance checks and services on

chemical protective masks, or reporting maintenance problems as required by the

Operator's Manual for Chemical-Biological Masks.We found that many masks were

not reassembled correctly. In addition, a visual inspection of the sampled

masks identified conditions, such as cracked eye lenses and missing parts, that

would not have existed if preventive maintenance checks had been done properly. "

" .but the Army comments and actions on the testing issues were nonresponsive. "

" In brief, results of this study released in November 1999 validated the

concerns that we had reported in 1994. Of 19,218 masks that were tested, 10,322

had critical defects. However, the Deputy Assistant for Chemical/Biological

Defense [Dr. -Winegar] informed us in March 2000 that 'there is no

indication of extensive mask degradation over time or through field usage other

than through wear and tear which is exacerbated by a lack of field/fleet

maintenance.' Furthermore, on those grounds, the Deputy Assistant rejected the

Working Group's recommendation for a centralized mask surveillance testing

program. As a result of these decisions, mask defects continue to be viewed as

a 'logistics sustainment' issue, thereby relying on the individual Services to

improve maintenance practices. "

" We were frankly disappointed that the Deputy Assistant was unable to provide us

the details of what the Services were doing to address the alarming test failure

rates and had taken the position that her office's responsibilities extended

only to new equipment acquisition, not readiness oversight. "

Finally, the DOD IG notes that " lack of agreed-upon criteria for the testing of

fielded masks has proven difficult for the Department to resolve. "

CBW Medical Prophylaxis

1. Anthrax

Anthrax vaccine - effectiveness

a.. Effectiveness against various strains uncertain; no human effectiveness

testing can be done; animal tests contradictory

b.. Not effective against genetically engineered strains lacking protective

antigen

c.. Degree of protection a function of inhaled spore counts and anthrax strain

in animals

Anthrax Vaccine - safety

a.. Six studies have shown the vaccine is a significant contributor to Gulf

War Illnesses (Nass M, 2002)

b.. Many autoimmune illnesses found at much higher rates after anthrax

vaccination, according to DOD's Defense Medical Surveillance System database

(information found in Chapter 6 and Appendix G of the IOM report on anthrax

vaccine safety and efficacy, March 2002)

c.. One in every thousand vaccine recipients (520 people) has had a reaction

reported to FDA, which FDA considers " serious " (As of July 2002: 528,000 people

had received one or more anthrax vaccine doses; over 2,000 adverse event reports

had been filed with FDA, of which 5 deaths were reported and 520 reports were

rated serious-Vaccine Adverse Event Reporting System data provided by FDA to

author through FOIA request)

Antibiotics to treat anthrax i) after exposure or ii) after symptoms develop

a.. Effective if begun soon after exposure, if the anthrax spores do not carry

antibiotic resistance genes; adverse effects relatively minor; will not affect

combat readiness

b.. Treatment after symptoms begin requires intensive medical approach not

available on the battlefield or for large numbers of casualties

Antiserum - antibodies derived from serum of vaccinated servicemembers

a.. Likely effective if anthrax strain used is susceptible to vaccine

b.. Potentially effective after exposure and even after symptoms develop

c.. Quantities limited

d.. Will likely be effective only in the setting of intensive medical care

Newer treatments

a.. Promising but not yet tested in humans, unlicensed, not available for use

in near future

2. Smallpox

Smallpox vaccine - effectiveness

a.. Excellent for 'native' smallpox outbreaks

b.. Efficacy for specially selected smallpox strains (eg " India " strain)

questionable

c.. Efficacy for genetically engineered smallpox likely to be poor (Addition

of one cytokine gene to mousepox made this milder cousin of smallpox vaccine

resistant; scientists fear the same could be true if cytokines were added to

smallpox)

Smallpox vaccine - safety

a.. Highly reactive, with high rates of fever and malaise; missed work, school

or sleep in over one third of vaccine recipients during trial of diluted Dryvax

b.. Rates of serious reactions unknown, but 1 - 15 deaths per million expected

if the entire country is vaccinated

c.. Vaccinia immune globulin can ameliorate many, but not all, serious

reactions

d.. Israeli and Japanese smallpox vaccines are probably safer than old US

stockpile

3. Toxins - known to be in Iraqi stockpile in 1991

a.. Ricin - lethal

b.. Aflatoxin - incapacitating, and a liver carcinogen

c.. Botulinum toxin - lethal

Toxin Countermeasures

a.. No vaccines available

b.. No effective drugs available

c.. Experimental treatments may be available for small numbers of affected

troops

--------------------------------------------------------------------------------

[1] http://www.house.gov/reform/ns/hearings/testimony/mancuso_june_21.htm