Re: Vote fraud proof---Die_bold $2.6 M fine, Tampered central computer

[Guest guest]

I resist the conspiracy thinking about the election and the programs used to

tabulate votes, BUT having read these posts, it does come to mind that the good

old " Grey Ladies " we use in Pennsylvania, are being phased out, and parts no

longer made for them. They are purely mechanical booths, to my knowledge, and

have been tabulating Pennsylvania votes for half a century or more. One walks

inside, and pulls the lever, which closes the curtain, and sets up the levers to

neutral position. Then the voter pulls down a lever beneath the name of each

individual or proposition. If a mistake is made, that lever can be pushed back

up, and another pulled down. When everything is as the voter wants it to be, he

pulls the large lever that opens the curtain, which records all his votes at the

same time. (Having grown up in Pennsylvania, I always assumed that everybody

voted on these things, until I moved to Georgia, and North Carolina, and New

York....) Their worst drawback is the large warehouse space needed to store

them between elections, and of course, they need MECHANICS, not electronic

software techies, and computer chips, to keep them operating. However, they

seem to be pretty impervious to scammed votes. I think in Philadelphia, where

vote fraud is most common, they have to steal votes the old fashioned way --

they have to work at it, by bringing in warm bodies to use dead people's names.

There was talk of a bus or two from New York over here in Easton on November 2.

These computers make it so much easier, if they are in fact doing what this

article suggests.

Vote fraud proof---Die_bold $2.6 M fine, Tampered

central computer

This group has previously discussed the relevance of some USA

politics concerning crusading against adverse drug reaction effects

of SSRI antidepressants...

Vote fraud proof---Diebold $2.6 M fine, Corrupted central computer

http://www.rense.com/general59/diebold.htm

http://www.rense.com/general59/fraud.htm

QUOTE:

Purposely Corrupted Diebold

Voting Terminals

By Bev

10-31-4

Manipulation technique found in the Diebold central tabulator --

1,000 of these systems are in place, and they count up to two million

votes at a time.

" By entering a 2-digit code in a hidden location, a second set of

votes is created. This set of votes can be changed, so that it no

longer matches the correct votes " !!!

The voting system will then read the totals from the bogus vote set.

It takes only seconds to change the votes, and to date not a single

location in the U.S. has implemented security measures to fully

mitigate the risks.

This program is not " stupidity " or sloppiness.

It was designed and tested over a series of a dozen version

adjustments.

Public officials: If you are in a county that uses GEMS 1.18.18, GEMS

1.18.19, or GEMS 1.18.23, your secretary or state may not have told

you about this. You're the one who'll be blamed if your election is

tampered with. Find out for yourself if you have this problem: Black

Box Voting will be happy to walk you through a diagnostic procedure

over the phone.

Whether you vote absentee, on touch-screens, or on paper ballot (fill

in the bubble) optical scan machines, all votes are ultimately

brought to the " mother ship, " the central tabulator at the county

which adds them all up and creates the results report.

These systems are used in over 30 states and each counts up to two

million votes at once.

The central tabulator is far more vulnerable than the touch screen

terminals.

Think about it: If you were going to tamper with an election, would

you rather tamper with 4,500 individual voting machines, or with just

one machine, the central tabulator which receives votes from all the

machines? Of course, the central tabulator is the most desirable

target. Findings:

The GEMS central tabulator program is incorrectly designed and highly

vulnerable to fraud. Election results can be changed in a matter of

seconds. Part of the program we examined appears to be designed with

election tampering in mind.

We have also learned that election officials maintain inadequate

controls over access to the central tabulator. We need to beef up

procedures to mitigate risks.

Much of this information, originally published on July 8, 2003, has

since been corroborated by formal studies (RABA) and by Diebold's own

internal memos written by its programmers.

Not a single location has yet implemented the security measures

needed to mitigate the risk. Yet, it is not too late. We need to

tackle this one, folks, roll up our sleeves, and implement corrective

measures.

In Nov. 2003, Black Box Voting founder Bev , and director Jim

March, filed a Qui Tam lawsuit in California citing fraudulent claims

by Diebold, seeking restitution for the taxpayer. Diebold claimed its

voting system was secure. It is, in fact, highly vulnerable to and

appears to be designed for fraud.

The California Attorney General was made aware of this problem nearly

a year ago. and Black Box Voting Associate Director Andy

son visited the Washington Attorney General's office in Feb.

2004 to inform them of the problem.

Yet, nothing has been done to inform election officials who are using

the system, nor have appropriate security safeguards been

implemented.

In fact, Gov. Swarzenegger recently froze the funds, allocated by

Secretary of State , which would have paid for increased

scrutiny of the voting system in California.

On April 21, 2004, appeared before the California Voting

Systems Panel, and presented the smoking gun document showing that

Diebold had not corrected the GEMS flaws, even though it had updated

and upgraded the GEMS program.

On Aug. 8, 2004, demonstrated to Dean how easy it is to

change votes in GEMS, on CNBC TV.

On Aug. 11, 2004, Jim March formally requested that the Calfornia

Voting Systems Panel watch the demonstration of the double set of

books in GEMS. They were already convened, and the time for

was already allotted. Though the demonstration takes only 3 minutes,

the panel refused to allow it and would not look. They did, however,

meet privately with Diebold afterwards, without informing the public

or issuing any report of what transpired.

On Aug. 18, 2004, and son, together with computer

security expert Dr. Hugh , and former King County Elections

Supervisor Anne Kempf, met with members of the California

Voting Systems Panel and the California Secretary of State's office

to demonstrate the double set of books. The officials declined to

allow a camera crew from 60 Minutes to film or attend.

The Secretary of State's office halted the meeting, called in the

general counsel for their office, and a defense attorney from the

California Attorney General's office. They refused to allow Black Box

Voting to videotape its own demonstration. They prohibited any

audiotape and specified that no notes of the meeting could be

requested in public records requests.

The undersecretary of state, Mark , left the meeting early, and

one voting panel member, Mott , appeared to sleep through

the presentation.

On Aug. 23, 2004, CBC TV came to California and filmed the

demonstration.

On Aug 30 and 31, and son will be in New York City to

demonstrate the double set of books for any public official and any

TV crews who wish to see it.

On Sept. 1, another event is planned in New York City, and on Sept.

21, and son intend to demonstrate the problem for

members and congress and the press in Washington D.C.

Diebold has known of the problem, or should have known, because it

did a cease and desist on the web site when originally

reported the problem in 2003. On Aug. 11, 2004, also offered

to show the problem to Marvin Singleton, Diebold's damage control

expert, and to other Diebold execs. They refused to look.

Why don't people want to look? Suppose you are formally informed that

the gas tank tends to explode on the car you are telling people to

use. If you KNOW about it, but do nothing, you are liable.

LET US HOLD DIEBOLD, AND OUR PUBLIC OFFICIALS, ACCOUNTABLE.

1) Let there be no one who can say " I didn't know. "

2) Let there be no election jurisdiction using GEMS that fails to

implement all of the proper corrective procedures, this fall, to

mitigate risk.

http://www.blackboxvoting.org/?q=node/view/78

http://www.rense.com

UNQUOTE:

QUOTE:

Diebold Pays $2.6 Million

In CA Voting Machine Fraud

The Sacramento Bee

11-11-4

Diebold Inc. agreed to a $2.6 million settlement over allegations it

sold the state faulty touch-screen voting machines, Attorney General

Bill Lockyer said Wednesday.

State and county prosecutors had sued the Texas maker of automated

teller machines over allegations Diebold used bait-and-switch tactics

in selling unreliable electronic voting systems that lacked federal

and state certification and were vulnerable to computer hackers and

software bugs.

Under the proposed settlement, Diebold will pay about $1.6 million to

the state, $475,000 to Alameda County and $500,000 to the University

of California Institute of Governmental Studies. The institute will

use the money to research ways to train poll workers on electronic

voting technology.

Diebold also will reimburse Alameda, Plumas, Kern, San Joaquin, San

Diego and Los Angeles counties for some of the costs to set up voting

backup measures in last week's general election.

UNQUOTE

[Guest guest]

I resist the conspiracy thinking about the election and the programs used to

tabulate votes, BUT having read these posts, it does come to mind that the good

old " Grey Ladies " we use in Pennsylvania, are being phased out, and parts no

longer made for them. They are purely mechanical booths, to my knowledge, and

have been tabulating Pennsylvania votes for half a century or more. One walks

inside, and pulls the lever, which closes the curtain, and sets up the levers to

neutral position. Then the voter pulls down a lever beneath the name of each

individual or proposition. If a mistake is made, that lever can be pushed back

up, and another pulled down. When everything is as the voter wants it to be, he

pulls the large lever that opens the curtain, which records all his votes at the

same time. (Having grown up in Pennsylvania, I always assumed that everybody

voted on these things, until I moved to Georgia, and North Carolina, and New

York....) Their worst drawback is the large warehouse space needed to store

them between elections, and of course, they need MECHANICS, not electronic

software techies, and computer chips, to keep them operating. However, they

seem to be pretty impervious to scammed votes. I think in Philadelphia, where

vote fraud is most common, they have to steal votes the old fashioned way --

they have to work at it, by bringing in warm bodies to use dead people's names.

There was talk of a bus or two from New York over here in Easton on November 2.

These computers make it so much easier, if they are in fact doing what this

article suggests.

Vote fraud proof---Die_bold $2.6 M fine, Tampered

central computer

This group has previously discussed the relevance of some USA

politics concerning crusading against adverse drug reaction effects

of SSRI antidepressants...

Vote fraud proof---Diebold $2.6 M fine, Corrupted central computer

http://www.rense.com/general59/diebold.htm

http://www.rense.com/general59/fraud.htm

QUOTE:

Purposely Corrupted Diebold

Voting Terminals

By Bev

10-31-4

Manipulation technique found in the Diebold central tabulator --

1,000 of these systems are in place, and they count up to two million

votes at a time.

" By entering a 2-digit code in a hidden location, a second set of

votes is created. This set of votes can be changed, so that it no

longer matches the correct votes " !!!

The voting system will then read the totals from the bogus vote set.

It takes only seconds to change the votes, and to date not a single

location in the U.S. has implemented security measures to fully

mitigate the risks.

This program is not " stupidity " or sloppiness.

It was designed and tested over a series of a dozen version

adjustments.

Public officials: If you are in a county that uses GEMS 1.18.18, GEMS

1.18.19, or GEMS 1.18.23, your secretary or state may not have told

you about this. You're the one who'll be blamed if your election is

tampered with. Find out for yourself if you have this problem: Black

Box Voting will be happy to walk you through a diagnostic procedure

over the phone.

Whether you vote absentee, on touch-screens, or on paper ballot (fill

in the bubble) optical scan machines, all votes are ultimately

brought to the " mother ship, " the central tabulator at the county

which adds them all up and creates the results report.

These systems are used in over 30 states and each counts up to two

million votes at once.

The central tabulator is far more vulnerable than the touch screen

terminals.

Think about it: If you were going to tamper with an election, would

you rather tamper with 4,500 individual voting machines, or with just

one machine, the central tabulator which receives votes from all the

machines? Of course, the central tabulator is the most desirable

target. Findings:

The GEMS central tabulator program is incorrectly designed and highly

vulnerable to fraud. Election results can be changed in a matter of

seconds. Part of the program we examined appears to be designed with

election tampering in mind.

We have also learned that election officials maintain inadequate

controls over access to the central tabulator. We need to beef up

procedures to mitigate risks.

Much of this information, originally published on July 8, 2003, has

since been corroborated by formal studies (RABA) and by Diebold's own

internal memos written by its programmers.

Not a single location has yet implemented the security measures

needed to mitigate the risk. Yet, it is not too late. We need to

tackle this one, folks, roll up our sleeves, and implement corrective

measures.

In Nov. 2003, Black Box Voting founder Bev , and director Jim

March, filed a Qui Tam lawsuit in California citing fraudulent claims

by Diebold, seeking restitution for the taxpayer. Diebold claimed its

voting system was secure. It is, in fact, highly vulnerable to and

appears to be designed for fraud.

The California Attorney General was made aware of this problem nearly

a year ago. and Black Box Voting Associate Director Andy

son visited the Washington Attorney General's office in Feb.

2004 to inform them of the problem.

Yet, nothing has been done to inform election officials who are using

the system, nor have appropriate security safeguards been

implemented.

In fact, Gov. Swarzenegger recently froze the funds, allocated by

Secretary of State , which would have paid for increased

scrutiny of the voting system in California.

On April 21, 2004, appeared before the California Voting

Systems Panel, and presented the smoking gun document showing that

Diebold had not corrected the GEMS flaws, even though it had updated

and upgraded the GEMS program.

On Aug. 8, 2004, demonstrated to Dean how easy it is to

change votes in GEMS, on CNBC TV.

On Aug. 11, 2004, Jim March formally requested that the Calfornia

Voting Systems Panel watch the demonstration of the double set of

books in GEMS. They were already convened, and the time for

was already allotted. Though the demonstration takes only 3 minutes,

the panel refused to allow it and would not look. They did, however,

meet privately with Diebold afterwards, without informing the public

or issuing any report of what transpired.

On Aug. 18, 2004, and son, together with computer

security expert Dr. Hugh , and former King County Elections

Supervisor Anne Kempf, met with members of the California

Voting Systems Panel and the California Secretary of State's office

to demonstrate the double set of books. The officials declined to

allow a camera crew from 60 Minutes to film or attend.

The Secretary of State's office halted the meeting, called in the

general counsel for their office, and a defense attorney from the

California Attorney General's office. They refused to allow Black Box

Voting to videotape its own demonstration. They prohibited any

audiotape and specified that no notes of the meeting could be

requested in public records requests.

The undersecretary of state, Mark , left the meeting early, and

one voting panel member, Mott , appeared to sleep through

the presentation.

On Aug. 23, 2004, CBC TV came to California and filmed the

demonstration.

On Aug 30 and 31, and son will be in New York City to

demonstrate the double set of books for any public official and any

TV crews who wish to see it.

On Sept. 1, another event is planned in New York City, and on Sept.

21, and son intend to demonstrate the problem for

members and congress and the press in Washington D.C.

Diebold has known of the problem, or should have known, because it

did a cease and desist on the web site when originally

reported the problem in 2003. On Aug. 11, 2004, also offered

to show the problem to Marvin Singleton, Diebold's damage control

expert, and to other Diebold execs. They refused to look.

Why don't people want to look? Suppose you are formally informed that

the gas tank tends to explode on the car you are telling people to

use. If you KNOW about it, but do nothing, you are liable.

LET US HOLD DIEBOLD, AND OUR PUBLIC OFFICIALS, ACCOUNTABLE.

1) Let there be no one who can say " I didn't know. "

2) Let there be no election jurisdiction using GEMS that fails to

implement all of the proper corrective procedures, this fall, to

mitigate risk.

http://www.blackboxvoting.org/?q=node/view/78

http://www.rense.com

UNQUOTE:

QUOTE:

Diebold Pays $2.6 Million

In CA Voting Machine Fraud

The Sacramento Bee

11-11-4

Diebold Inc. agreed to a $2.6 million settlement over allegations it

sold the state faulty touch-screen voting machines, Attorney General

Bill Lockyer said Wednesday.

State and county prosecutors had sued the Texas maker of automated

teller machines over allegations Diebold used bait-and-switch tactics

in selling unreliable electronic voting systems that lacked federal

and state certification and were vulnerable to computer hackers and

software bugs.

Under the proposed settlement, Diebold will pay about $1.6 million to

the state, $475,000 to Alameda County and $500,000 to the University

of California Institute of Governmental Studies. The institute will

use the money to research ways to train poll workers on electronic

voting technology.

Diebold also will reimburse Alameda, Plumas, Kern, San Joaquin, San

Diego and Los Angeles counties for some of the costs to set up voting

backup measures in last week's general election.

UNQUOTE

[Guest guest]

Constant vigilance from honest people is the only way to keep the vote safe.

All sides and viewpoints have a serious stake in keeping elections free and

honest. When that happens then even the losers can get behind the elected

officials.

>

> I resist the conspiracy thinking about the election and the programs used

to tabulate votes, BUT having read these posts, it does come to mind that

the good old " Grey Ladies " we use in Pennsylvania, are being phased out, and

parts no longer made for them. They are purely mechanical booths, to my

knowledge, and have been tabulating Pennsylvania votes for half a century or

more. One walks inside, and pulls the lever, which closes the curtain, and

sets up the levers to neutral position. Then the voter pulls down a lever

beneath the name of each individual or proposition. If a mistake is made,

that lever can be pushed back up, and another pulled down. When everything

is as the voter wants it to be, he pulls the large lever that opens the

curtain, which records all his votes at the same time. (Having grown up in

Pennsylvania, I always assumed that everybody voted on these things, until I

moved to Georgia, and North Carolina, and New York....) Their worst

drawback is the la!

> rge warehouse space needed to store them between elections, and of

course, they need MECHANICS, not electronic software techies, and computer

chips, to keep them operating. However, they seem to be pretty impervious

to scammed votes. I think in Philadelphia, where vote fraud is most common,

they have to steal votes the old fashioned way -- they have to work at it,

by bringing in warm bodies to use dead people's names. There was talk of a

bus or two from New York over here in Easton on November 2. These computers

make it so much easier, if they are in fact doing what this article

suggests.

> Vote fraud proof---Die_bold $2.6 M fine, Tampe

red central computer

>

>

>

> This group has previously discussed the relevance of some USA

> politics concerning crusading against adverse drug reaction effects

> of SSRI antidepressants...

>

> Vote fraud proof---Diebold $2.6 M fine, Corrupted central computer

>

> http://www.rense.com/general59/diebold.htm

> http://www.rense.com/general59/fraud.htm

>

> QUOTE:

>

> Purposely Corrupted Diebold

> Voting Terminals

> By Bev

> 10-31-4

>

> Manipulation technique found in the Diebold central tabulator --

>

> 1,000 of these systems are in place, and they count up to two million

> votes at a time.

>

> " By entering a 2-digit code in a hidden location, a second set of

> votes is created. This set of votes can be changed, so that it no

> longer matches the correct votes " !!!

>

> The voting system will then read the totals from the bogus vote set.

> It takes only seconds to change the votes, and to date not a single

> location in the U.S. has implemented security measures to fully

> mitigate the risks.

>

> This program is not " stupidity " or sloppiness.

>

> It was designed and tested over a series of a dozen version

> adjustments.

>

> Public officials: If you are in a county that uses GEMS 1.18.18, GEMS

> 1.18.19, or GEMS 1.18.23, your secretary or state may not have told

> you about this. You're the one who'll be blamed if your election is

> tampered with. Find out for yourself if you have this problem: Black

> Box Voting will be happy to walk you through a diagnostic procedure

> over the phone.

>

> Whether you vote absentee, on touch-screens, or on paper ballot (fill

> in the bubble) optical scan machines, all votes are ultimately

> brought to the " mother ship, " the central tabulator at the county

> which adds them all up and creates the results report.

>

> These systems are used in over 30 states and each counts up to two

> million votes at once.

>

> The central tabulator is far more vulnerable than the touch screen

> terminals.

>

> Think about it: If you were going to tamper with an election, would

> you rather tamper with 4,500 individual voting machines, or with just

> one machine, the central tabulator which receives votes from all the

> machines? Of course, the central tabulator is the most desirable

> target. Findings:

>

> The GEMS central tabulator program is incorrectly designed and highly

> vulnerable to fraud. Election results can be changed in a matter of

> seconds. Part of the program we examined appears to be designed with

> election tampering in mind.

>

> We have also learned that election officials maintain inadequate

> controls over access to the central tabulator. We need to beef up

> procedures to mitigate risks.

>

> Much of this information, originally published on July 8, 2003, has

> since been corroborated by formal studies (RABA) and by Diebold's own

> internal memos written by its programmers.

>

> Not a single location has yet implemented the security measures

> needed to mitigate the risk. Yet, it is not too late. We need to

> tackle this one, folks, roll up our sleeves, and implement corrective

> measures.

>

> In Nov. 2003, Black Box Voting founder Bev , and director Jim

> March, filed a Qui Tam lawsuit in California citing fraudulent claims

> by Diebold, seeking restitution for the taxpayer. Diebold claimed its

> voting system was secure. It is, in fact, highly vulnerable to and

> appears to be designed for fraud.

>

> The California Attorney General was made aware of this problem nearly

> a year ago. and Black Box Voting Associate Director Andy

> son visited the Washington Attorney General's office in Feb.

> 2004 to inform them of the problem.

>

> Yet, nothing has been done to inform election officials who are using

> the system, nor have appropriate security safeguards been

> implemented.

>

> In fact, Gov. Swarzenegger recently froze the funds, allocated by

> Secretary of State , which would have paid for increased

> scrutiny of the voting system in California.

>

> On April 21, 2004, appeared before the California Voting

> Systems Panel, and presented the smoking gun document showing that

> Diebold had not corrected the GEMS flaws, even though it had updated

> and upgraded the GEMS program.

>

> On Aug. 8, 2004, demonstrated to Dean how easy it is to

> change votes in GEMS, on CNBC TV.

>

> On Aug. 11, 2004, Jim March formally requested that the Calfornia

> Voting Systems Panel watch the demonstration of the double set of

> books in GEMS. They were already convened, and the time for

> was already allotted. Though the demonstration takes only 3 minutes,

> the panel refused to allow it and would not look. They did, however,

> meet privately with Diebold afterwards, without informing the public

> or issuing any report of what transpired.

>

> On Aug. 18, 2004, and son, together with computer

> security expert Dr. Hugh , and former King County Elections

> Supervisor Anne Kempf, met with members of the California

> Voting Systems Panel and the California Secretary of State's office

> to demonstrate the double set of books. The officials declined to

> allow a camera crew from 60 Minutes to film or attend.

>

> The Secretary of State's office halted the meeting, called in the

> general counsel for their office, and a defense attorney from the

> California Attorney General's office. They refused to allow Black Box

> Voting to videotape its own demonstration. They prohibited any

> audiotape and specified that no notes of the meeting could be

> requested in public records requests.

>

> The undersecretary of state, Mark , left the meeting early, and

> one voting panel member, Mott , appeared to sleep through

> the presentation.

>

> On Aug. 23, 2004, CBC TV came to California and filmed the

> demonstration.

>

> On Aug 30 and 31, and son will be in New York City to

> demonstrate the double set of books for any public official and any

> TV crews who wish to see it.

>

> On Sept. 1, another event is planned in New York City, and on Sept.

> 21, and son intend to demonstrate the problem for

> members and congress and the press in Washington D.C.

>

> Diebold has known of the problem, or should have known, because it

> did a cease and desist on the web site when originally

> reported the problem in 2003. On Aug. 11, 2004, also offered

> to show the problem to Marvin Singleton, Diebold's damage control

> expert, and to other Diebold execs. They refused to look.

>

> Why don't people want to look? Suppose you are formally informed that

> the gas tank tends to explode on the car you are telling people to

> use. If you KNOW about it, but do nothing, you are liable.

>

> LET US HOLD DIEBOLD, AND OUR PUBLIC OFFICIALS, ACCOUNTABLE.

>

> 1) Let there be no one who can say " I didn't know. "

>

> 2) Let there be no election jurisdiction using GEMS that fails to

> implement all of the proper corrective procedures, this fall, to

> mitigate risk.

>

> http://www.blackboxvoting.org/?q=node/view/78

> http://www.rense.com

>

> UNQUOTE:

>

>

>

> QUOTE:

>

>

> Diebold Pays $2.6 Million

> In CA Voting Machine Fraud

> The Sacramento Bee

> 11-11-4

>

> Diebold Inc. agreed to a $2.6 million settlement over allegations it

> sold the state faulty touch-screen voting machines, Attorney General

> Bill Lockyer said Wednesday.

>

> State and county prosecutors had sued the Texas maker of automated

> teller machines over allegations Diebold used bait-and-switch tactics

> in selling unreliable electronic voting systems that lacked federal

> and state certification and were vulnerable to computer hackers and

> software bugs.

>

> Under the proposed settlement, Diebold will pay about $1.6 million to

> the state, $475,000 to Alameda County and $500,000 to the University

> of California Institute of Governmental Studies. The institute will

> use the money to research ways to train poll workers on electronic

> voting technology.

>

> Diebold also will reimburse Alameda, Plumas, Kern, San Joaquin, San

> Diego and Los Angeles counties for some of the costs to set up voting

> backup measures in last week's general election.

>

>

> UNQUOTE

>

>

>

>

>

[Guest guest]

Constant vigilance from honest people is the only way to keep the vote safe.

All sides and viewpoints have a serious stake in keeping elections free and

honest. When that happens then even the losers can get behind the elected

officials.

>

> I resist the conspiracy thinking about the election and the programs used

to tabulate votes, BUT having read these posts, it does come to mind that

the good old " Grey Ladies " we use in Pennsylvania, are being phased out, and

parts no longer made for them. They are purely mechanical booths, to my

knowledge, and have been tabulating Pennsylvania votes for half a century or

more. One walks inside, and pulls the lever, which closes the curtain, and

sets up the levers to neutral position. Then the voter pulls down a lever

beneath the name of each individual or proposition. If a mistake is made,

that lever can be pushed back up, and another pulled down. When everything

is as the voter wants it to be, he pulls the large lever that opens the

curtain, which records all his votes at the same time. (Having grown up in

Pennsylvania, I always assumed that everybody voted on these things, until I

moved to Georgia, and North Carolina, and New York....) Their worst

drawback is the la!

> rge warehouse space needed to store them between elections, and of

course, they need MECHANICS, not electronic software techies, and computer

chips, to keep them operating. However, they seem to be pretty impervious

to scammed votes. I think in Philadelphia, where vote fraud is most common,

they have to steal votes the old fashioned way -- they have to work at it,

by bringing in warm bodies to use dead people's names. There was talk of a

bus or two from New York over here in Easton on November 2. These computers

make it so much easier, if they are in fact doing what this article

suggests.

> Vote fraud proof---Die_bold $2.6 M fine, Tampe

red central computer

>

>

>

> This group has previously discussed the relevance of some USA

> politics concerning crusading against adverse drug reaction effects

> of SSRI antidepressants...

>

> Vote fraud proof---Diebold $2.6 M fine, Corrupted central computer

>

> http://www.rense.com/general59/diebold.htm

> http://www.rense.com/general59/fraud.htm

>

> QUOTE:

>

> Purposely Corrupted Diebold

> Voting Terminals

> By Bev

> 10-31-4

>

> Manipulation technique found in the Diebold central tabulator --

>

> 1,000 of these systems are in place, and they count up to two million

> votes at a time.

>

> " By entering a 2-digit code in a hidden location, a second set of

> votes is created. This set of votes can be changed, so that it no

> longer matches the correct votes " !!!

>

> The voting system will then read the totals from the bogus vote set.

> It takes only seconds to change the votes, and to date not a single

> location in the U.S. has implemented security measures to fully

> mitigate the risks.

>

> This program is not " stupidity " or sloppiness.

>

> It was designed and tested over a series of a dozen version

> adjustments.

>

> Public officials: If you are in a county that uses GEMS 1.18.18, GEMS

> 1.18.19, or GEMS 1.18.23, your secretary or state may not have told

> you about this. You're the one who'll be blamed if your election is

> tampered with. Find out for yourself if you have this problem: Black

> Box Voting will be happy to walk you through a diagnostic procedure

> over the phone.

>

> Whether you vote absentee, on touch-screens, or on paper ballot (fill

> in the bubble) optical scan machines, all votes are ultimately

> brought to the " mother ship, " the central tabulator at the county

> which adds them all up and creates the results report.

>

> These systems are used in over 30 states and each counts up to two

> million votes at once.

>

> The central tabulator is far more vulnerable than the touch screen

> terminals.

>

> Think about it: If you were going to tamper with an election, would

> you rather tamper with 4,500 individual voting machines, or with just

> one machine, the central tabulator which receives votes from all the

> machines? Of course, the central tabulator is the most desirable

> target. Findings:

>

> The GEMS central tabulator program is incorrectly designed and highly

> vulnerable to fraud. Election results can be changed in a matter of

> seconds. Part of the program we examined appears to be designed with

> election tampering in mind.

>

> We have also learned that election officials maintain inadequate

> controls over access to the central tabulator. We need to beef up

> procedures to mitigate risks.

>

> Much of this information, originally published on July 8, 2003, has

> since been corroborated by formal studies (RABA) and by Diebold's own

> internal memos written by its programmers.

>

> Not a single location has yet implemented the security measures

> needed to mitigate the risk. Yet, it is not too late. We need to

> tackle this one, folks, roll up our sleeves, and implement corrective

> measures.

>

> In Nov. 2003, Black Box Voting founder Bev , and director Jim

> March, filed a Qui Tam lawsuit in California citing fraudulent claims

> by Diebold, seeking restitution for the taxpayer. Diebold claimed its

> voting system was secure. It is, in fact, highly vulnerable to and

> appears to be designed for fraud.

>

> The California Attorney General was made aware of this problem nearly

> a year ago. and Black Box Voting Associate Director Andy

> son visited the Washington Attorney General's office in Feb.

> 2004 to inform them of the problem.

>

> Yet, nothing has been done to inform election officials who are using

> the system, nor have appropriate security safeguards been

> implemented.

>

> In fact, Gov. Swarzenegger recently froze the funds, allocated by

> Secretary of State , which would have paid for increased

> scrutiny of the voting system in California.

>

> On April 21, 2004, appeared before the California Voting

> Systems Panel, and presented the smoking gun document showing that

> Diebold had not corrected the GEMS flaws, even though it had updated

> and upgraded the GEMS program.

>

> On Aug. 8, 2004, demonstrated to Dean how easy it is to

> change votes in GEMS, on CNBC TV.

>

> On Aug. 11, 2004, Jim March formally requested that the Calfornia

> Voting Systems Panel watch the demonstration of the double set of

> books in GEMS. They were already convened, and the time for

> was already allotted. Though the demonstration takes only 3 minutes,

> the panel refused to allow it and would not look. They did, however,

> meet privately with Diebold afterwards, without informing the public

> or issuing any report of what transpired.

>

> On Aug. 18, 2004, and son, together with computer

> security expert Dr. Hugh , and former King County Elections

> Supervisor Anne Kempf, met with members of the California

> Voting Systems Panel and the California Secretary of State's office

> to demonstrate the double set of books. The officials declined to

> allow a camera crew from 60 Minutes to film or attend.

>

> The Secretary of State's office halted the meeting, called in the

> general counsel for their office, and a defense attorney from the

> California Attorney General's office. They refused to allow Black Box

> Voting to videotape its own demonstration. They prohibited any

> audiotape and specified that no notes of the meeting could be

> requested in public records requests.

>

> The undersecretary of state, Mark , left the meeting early, and

> one voting panel member, Mott , appeared to sleep through

> the presentation.

>

> On Aug. 23, 2004, CBC TV came to California and filmed the

> demonstration.

>

> On Aug 30 and 31, and son will be in New York City to

> demonstrate the double set of books for any public official and any

> TV crews who wish to see it.

>

> On Sept. 1, another event is planned in New York City, and on Sept.

> 21, and son intend to demonstrate the problem for

> members and congress and the press in Washington D.C.

>

> Diebold has known of the problem, or should have known, because it

> did a cease and desist on the web site when originally

> reported the problem in 2003. On Aug. 11, 2004, also offered

> to show the problem to Marvin Singleton, Diebold's damage control

> expert, and to other Diebold execs. They refused to look.

>

> Why don't people want to look? Suppose you are formally informed that

> the gas tank tends to explode on the car you are telling people to

> use. If you KNOW about it, but do nothing, you are liable.

>

> LET US HOLD DIEBOLD, AND OUR PUBLIC OFFICIALS, ACCOUNTABLE.

>

> 1) Let there be no one who can say " I didn't know. "

>

> 2) Let there be no election jurisdiction using GEMS that fails to

> implement all of the proper corrective procedures, this fall, to

> mitigate risk.

>

> http://www.blackboxvoting.org/?q=node/view/78

> http://www.rense.com

>

> UNQUOTE:

>

>

>

> QUOTE:

>

>

> Diebold Pays $2.6 Million

> In CA Voting Machine Fraud

> The Sacramento Bee

> 11-11-4

>

> Diebold Inc. agreed to a $2.6 million settlement over allegations it

> sold the state faulty touch-screen voting machines, Attorney General

> Bill Lockyer said Wednesday.

>

> State and county prosecutors had sued the Texas maker of automated

> teller machines over allegations Diebold used bait-and-switch tactics

> in selling unreliable electronic voting systems that lacked federal

> and state certification and were vulnerable to computer hackers and

> software bugs.

>

> Under the proposed settlement, Diebold will pay about $1.6 million to

> the state, $475,000 to Alameda County and $500,000 to the University

> of California Institute of Governmental Studies. The institute will

> use the money to research ways to train poll workers on electronic

> voting technology.

>

> Diebold also will reimburse Alameda, Plumas, Kern, San Joaquin, San

> Diego and Los Angeles counties for some of the costs to set up voting

> backup measures in last week's general election.

>

>

> UNQUOTE

>

>

>

>

>