Mona LSR coercion was: New here

[Guest guest]

You mean proportionality in the whole thing, not just the 'cruel and unusual' part:

Excessive bail shall not be required, nor excessive fines imposed,

nor cruel and unusual punishments inflicted.

What Scalia is saying, is that the phrase is not "cruel OR unusual," and that a punishment must be both to run afoul of the 8th Amendment. Prison is not an unusual punishment, and thus no sentence, regardless of how disproportionate it may appear to be to the crime committed, violates the prohibition on cruel AND unusual punishment.

--Mona--

[Guest guest]

You've right about the Warner case, but what you havent adressed *at all* is my argument, which can be also based on the Free Exercise clause too. By an argument *** actually presented by an (AA!) ACLU lawyer *** in a case, coercion to LSR might *also* be deemed a violation of the of the First Amendment.

How? It isn't a religion. It isn't religious. What was the specific First Amendment argument made by this lawyer?

--Mona--

I think that argumetn used

the Establishmnent Clause, but it could also use the Free Exercise Clause imo, since if it contrevenes the latter in a coercion context it must surely also contravene the former.

[Guest guest]

If Justice Scalia's reasoning is correct, then we could impose the death sentence for a parking ticket. Please, folks, think this through.

Of course we could. Do you think this republic is going to do anything so silly anytime soon? Do we need nine unelected judges to prevent us from passing laws like that? If we were passing laws like that do you think anything these nine said would be of much value or effect?

--Mona--

--Mona--

[Guest guest]

So you do subscribe to the proportionality argument.

I think it may be a bad idea as a matter of judicial resources. Few people are more outraged by the Michigan "lifer" law mandating life in prison, no parole, for the "crime" of possessing 650 grams or more of cocaine. I believe, passionately, that such laws are obscene and immoral.

But I still, albeit reluctantly, tend to believe that that case was rightly decided as a matter of 8th Amendment law. However benighted legislatures may sometimes be, in a democracy they must be free to pass benighted laws.

Barring only clear contravention of the Bill of Rights. (And I would amend the Constitution to add an explicit right of personal privacy, including the right to control one's own body.)

--Mona---

[Guest guest]

I saw Steve's response and had some thoughts on it.

>The proportionality issue has been considered by the Supreme Court vis-a-vis

>the 8th Amendment, and IIRC the jaywalking example is precisely what they

>pondered. About a decade ago, the Supremes reviewed a mandatory life

>sentence applied in Michigan for possession of 650 grams or more of cocaine,

>and upheld the penalty against a challenge that it violated the 8th

>Amendment's prohibition of " cruel and unusual punishments. "

>

>Whether a " disproportionate " sentence may be considered cruel and unusual is

>a matter of murky precedent, and Scalia would reject completely that it ever

>is. He rejected the proportionality argument in the Michigan case

referenced

>above.

Of course I have no real clue, but it was my understanding that 'cruel

and unusual' were absolutes (as in torture is not an acceptable punishment)

and had no relation to what the crime was or its severity. If major

felons can get five years in prison, then theoretically anyone else

can too, as far as the 'cruel and unusual' phrase is concerned.

>An annotation at the Supreme Cour's web site states:

>

>>>''Severe, mandatory penalties may be cruel, but they are not unusual in

the

>constitutional sense.'' Id. at 994. The Court's opinion, written by Justice

>Scalia, then elaborated an understanding of ''unusual''--set forth elsewhere

>in a part of his opinion subscribed to only by Chief Justice Rehnquist--that

>denies the possibility of proportionality review altogether. Mandatory

>penalties are not unusual in the constitutional sense because they have

>''been employed in various form throughout our Nation's history.'' This is

an

>application of Justice Scalia's belief that cruelty and unusualness are to

be

>determined solely by reference to the punishment at issue, and without

>reference to the crime for which it is imposed.<<

>

>It is unclear to whether and to what extent proportionality survives at all

>as an 8th Amendment argument.

You mean proportionality in the whole thing, not just the 'cruel and

unusual' part:

Excessive bail shall not be required, nor excessive fines imposed,

nor cruel and unusual punishments inflicted.

While this might shock at first, what the

>High Court is trying to avoid is a flood of challenges every time a new

>sentencing scheme is passed by the legislature, state or federal.

So it seems they've made a ruling that gets them out of a lot of

potential work. This could be legitimate in a practical sense (they have

only so much time, and have a lot of other, 'more important' things to do),

but did they take the easy way out?

The first two clauses appear to be concerned specifically with

proportionality, and I would have thought, even though they don't

literally say it, that this would have been interpreted as applying to

'excessive' prison sentences also. But are you also saying that the first

two are not even being applied as written? It seems I've often heard of

high-profile arestees getting ten million dollars bail (perhaps the

judge was trying to make a point), then it gets reduced to 50,000 or

so and they get out. Is this the eight amendment being applied?

>To return to the point at hand, anyone arguing that coerced attendance at a

>non-religious recovery meeting is " cruel and unusual " is going to be laughed

>out of the courtroom, and the lawyers making the claim might possibly find

>themselves sanctioned for bringing a frivolous defense or claim.

>Probationers and parolees lose a lot of autonomy, and this is entirely

legal.

> They are criminals, after all, whose sentences are not yet expired and/or

>served. The *could* choose prison, if recovery meetings are so odious to

>them.

I apologize if these are a lot of of-topic questions to you. While it

doesn't apply to the topic at hand, I'm fascinated by law, especially this

Constitutional stuff, and similar things. It's amazing that something can

say a certain thing, and is (as far as anyone can tell) intended in a

certain way, yet the official rulings are quite unobvious.

Probably at many or most AA meetings, I knew more about the steps

and traditions than anyone else in the room. I usually just bit my

toungue when someone said " We can't have any controversy in AA, it's

against traditions. " I had recalled the 12&12 chapter where Bill wrote

something to the effect " we must refrain from outside controversy, lest

we tarrnish the name of AA, but we have all sorts of controversy inside

AA. "

There were many cases where I saw the traditions misinterpreted to a

group's advantage. There was a case of an organization wanting to donate

soft drinks to an AA function, but this would go against being " self-

supporting through our own contributions " . So they decided they had to

pay a 'token amount' for it so they could say they weren't receiving it

as a gift. It may have followed the tradition in some narrow literal

sense, but not as I would think the tradition intended.

But they always told me " knowldge doesn't get you sober. " And they're

absolutely right. Stopping drinking got me sober.

>This is not a recovery politics issue, and my views here are based on a

>proper (uncontroversial) understanding of the law, and of penal policy as

>reflected in the law.

>

>--Mona--

----------

http://listen.to/benbradley

[Guest guest]

You remind me of the story of a friend of mine. She always walked her

dog in a certain park, and that particular park was under watch by the

police for " unleashed dogs. " (Where but in a park do you unleash a

dog?) Inevitably, she got a ticket for it, so she read up on the

ordinance, and it said that dogs in parks " must be under the owner's

control. " So she went to court and beat the ticket, because she had

called her dog when the cop showed up and he came to her -- hence was

under her control.

Maybe your friend should have read about what your city ordinances say

about yielding to pedestrians. Hundreds of people had paid tickets

for unleashed dogs before my friend went to court.

>

> Hi Ben,

>

> My anecdotal 2 cents on this one...followed by a rant.

>

> Recently, they had a " sting " in my town for not stopping for

> pedestrians crossing at a walk that was clearly marked and crossed a

> highway with 2 lanes on each side and a traffic island in the

middle.

>

> My friend stopped for the pedestrians (hired by the Feds), and when

> they reached the middle island and had crossed his path, he went.

> Well, he got a $175.00 fine for it, because apparently he was

supposed

> to wait until the pedestrians crossed the other two lanes of traffic

> coming in the other direction as well. When he went to traffic

court

> over it, they said that they had noted his objections and " didn't

know

> the answer " and would write him a letter with their decision. FCS!!

> (For Christ's Sake!)

>

> This is called selective enforcement. This is what the WOD is *all

> about* and why it is so racist. These " crimes " aren't crimes unless

> they're made into crimes. And they're looking for the " criminals "

in

> certain places. At the same time, prohibition creates the

opportunity

> for people to make big money on illegal drugs. A shot of herion

that

> costs $100.00 on the street can be distributed for $6.00 if there

were

> a legal market. (According to my former Soc teacher, but I haven't

> found exacting corraborative statements...still, it would be much

> cheaper).

>

> IMHO, the legal system should get the hell out of people's private

> drug hells and stick to crimes against people that the people who

have

> been victimized agree are crimes instead of consensual crimes.

> Assault, Robbery, Rape, Murder. Even Burglary. To hell with " drug "

> crimes and prostitution.

>

>

>

[Guest guest]

You sidestepped Mona!

You've right about the Warner case, but what you havent adressed *at

all* is my argument, which can be also based on the Free Exercise

clause too. By an argument *** actually presented by an (AA!) ACLU

lawyer *** in a case, coercion to LSR might *also* be deemed a

violation of the of the First Amendment. I think that argumetn used

the Establishmnent Clause, but it could also use the Free Exercise

Clause imo, since if it contrevenes the latter in a coercion context

it must surely also contravene the former.

Now, I was slow out the blocks but you and Steve have had

your " alternate universe " jibes - it's time for " Tonite, on LSR

LAW... " .

P.

> Yes, but the ONLY reason the state cannot coerce AA is because

>doing so

> violates the Establishment Clause of the United States

>Constitution.

> Coercing criminals to attend SMART, LSR, RR, or the Rotary Club is

>fine,

> because there is no First Amendment violation in doing so. BUT FOR

>the First

> Amendment, Warner would not have been decided as it was. UNLESS

>DOING SO

> CONTRAVENES the First Amendment (and 8th), the state can coerce

>criminals.

[Guest guest]

A little more on this subject -- obviously, if we take your reasoning to the limit, we would think it was okay to cut off the hands of thieves. That was not at one time considered "cruel or unusual."

But it was considered cruel and unusual at the time the 8th Amendment was ratified. Also, it does not follow from my reasoning that we should think this barbarism is ok. My reasoning simply says that proportionality in prison sentences is not within the ambit of the 8th Amendment.

--Mona--

[Guest guest]

> NO! That's excluded by the Eight Amdt (no cruel and unusual

punishments), as

> I have noted in more than one previous post on this list.

> More DOOHH

There are those who might suggest that being coerced to a recovery

group (AA at any rate) is indeed cruel (not too serious folks) but

one thing is for certain it isnt unusual anymore. While discussing

this however, one must remember that the coercion can include very

bizarre situations which dont involve crime (like by an employer) or

using (like sitting in a car with ppl who are) which should be

remembered.

And now that I've pointed out why LSR coercion could in fact be

unconstitutional, you will have no need for the Homer Simpson

response any longer.

I have a grim irony about that " unusual " phrase. The terminology

seems to have been copied over to the UN charter of Human Rights. A

few years ago a Turkish man applied for asylum in Britain on the

grounds he had been tortured by the Police there, and the Home Office

sent him back. The reason? Because they said that torture was the

usual practice in police custody in turkey and hence it wasn't " Cruel

and *unusual* punishment " !

P.

[Guest guest]

If Justice Scalia's reasoning is correct, then we could impose the

death sentence for a parking ticket. Please, folks, think this

through.

> In a message dated 8/8/01 10:42:09 PM US Eastern Standard Time,

> benbradley@m... writes:

>

>

>

> > I was of the understanding that there are limits to what a judge

> > could do. If a first offence of jaywalking (to use an example for

all

> > those who have read the big book and are powerless over their

jaywalking)

> > carries a sentence of 30 to 90 days in jail (just making up some

numbers

> > here), then can a judge sentence a first-time jaywalker to five

years in

> > prison?

> >

>

>

>

> The proportionality issue has been considered by the Supreme Court

vis-a-vis

> the 8th Amendment, and IIRC the jaywalking example is precisely what

they

> pondered. About a decade ago, the Supremes reviewed a mandatory

life

> sentence applied in Michigan for possession of 650 grams or more of

cocaine,

> and upheld the penalty against a challenge that it violated the 8th

> Amendment's prohibition of " cruel and unusual punishments. "

>

> Whether a " disproportionate " sentence may be considered cruel and

unusual is

> a matter of murky precedent, and Scalia would reject completely that

it ever

> is. He rejected the proportionality argument in the Michigan case

referenced

> above.

>

> An annotation at the Supreme Cour's web site states:

>

> >>''Severe, mandatory penalties may be cruel, but they are not

unusual in the

> constitutional sense.'' Id. at 994. The Court's opinion, written by

Justice

> Scalia, then elaborated an understanding of ''unusual''--set forth

elsewhere

> in a part of his opinion subscribed to only by Chief Justice

Rehnquist--that

> denies the possibility of proportionality review altogether.

Mandatory

> penalties are not unusual in the constitutional sense because they

have

> ''been employed in various form throughout our Nation's history.''

This is an

> application of Justice Scalia's belief that cruelty and unusualness

are to be

> determined solely by reference to the punishment at issue, and

without

> reference to the crime for which it is imposed.<<

>

> It is unclear to whether and to what extent proportionality survives

at all

> as an 8th Amendment argument. While this might shock at first,

what the

> High Court is trying to avoid is a flood of challenges every time a

new

> sentencing scheme is passed by the legislature, state or federal.

>

> To return to the point at hand, anyone arguing that coerced

attendance at a

> non-religious recovery meeting is " cruel and unusual " is going to be

laughed

> out of the courtroom, and the lawyers making the claim might

possibly find

> themselves sanctioned for bringing a frivolous defense or claim.

> Probationers and parolees lose a lot of autonomy, and this is

entirely legal.

> They are criminals, after all, whose sentences are not yet expired

and/or

> served. The *could* choose prison, if recovery meetings are so

odious to

> them.

>

> This is not a recovery politics issue, and my views here are based

on a

> proper (uncontroversial) understanding of the law, and of penal

policy as

> reflected in the law.

>

> --Mona--

[Guest guest]

> In a message dated 8/9/01 1:11:08 PM US Eastern Standard Time,

> kayleighs@m... writes:

>

>

> > If Justice Scalia's reasoning is correct, then we could impose the

> > death sentence for a parking ticket. Please, folks, think this

> > through.

> >

>

> Of course we could. Do you think this republic is going to do

anything so

> silly anytime soon? Do we need nine unelected judges to prevent us

from

> passing laws like that? If we were passing laws like that do you

think

> anything these nine said would be of much value or effect?

>

> --Mona--

>

> --Mona--

So you do subscribe to the proportionality argument.

[Guest guest]

I guess we will have to agree to disagree about this.

> In a message dated 8/9/01 1:46:03 PM US Eastern Standard Time,

> kayleighs@m... writes:

>

>

> > So you do subscribe to the proportionality argument.

> >

>

> I think it may be a bad idea as a matter of judicial resources.

Few people

> are more outraged by the Michigan " lifer " law mandating life in

prison, no

> parole, for the " crime " of possessing 650 grams or more of cocaine.

I

> believe, passionately, that such laws are obscene and immoral.

>

> But I still, albeit reluctantly, tend to believe that that case was

rightly

> decided as a matter of 8th Amendment law. However benighted

legislatures may

> sometimes be, in a democracy they must be free to pass benighted

laws.

> Barring only clear contravention of the Bill of Rights. (And I

would amend

> the Constitution to add an explicit right of personal privacy,

including the

> right to control one's own body.)

>

> --Mona---

[Guest guest]

A little more on this subject -- obviously, if we take your reasoning

to the limit, we would think it was okay to cut off the hands of

thieves. That was not at one time considered " cruel or unusual. "

I don't know precisely what kind of punishments the crafters of the

Bill of Rights had in mind -- for all I know, they might have

considered perfectly normal something that we nowadays do consider

cruel and unusual.

I do also find it kind of troubling that an advocate of the free

market (in spades!) says that the legislature can do what it will, no

matter how wrong-headed, in defining certain things as crimes, instead

of leaving those behaviors to be regulated by the market (i.e.,

ownership of a certain amount of cocaine). Personally, I believe that

there are huge economic issues involved in such legislation -- and I

would assume, from stuff you have said before, that legislatures ought

not to interfere in the workings of the market.

> In a message dated 8/9/01 1:46:03 PM US Eastern Standard Time,

> kayleighs@m... writes:

>

>

> > So you do subscribe to the proportionality argument.

> >

>

> I think it may be a bad idea as a matter of judicial resources.

Few people

> are more outraged by the Michigan " lifer " law mandating life in

prison, no

> parole, for the " crime " of possessing 650 grams or more of cocaine.

I

> believe, passionately, that such laws are obscene and immoral.

>

> But I still, albeit reluctantly, tend to believe that that case was

rightly

> decided as a matter of 8th Amendment law. However benighted

legislatures may

> sometimes be, in a democracy they must be free to pass benighted

laws.

> Barring only clear contravention of the Bill of Rights. (And I

would amend

> the Constitution to add an explicit right of personal privacy,

including the

> right to control one's own body.)

>

> --Mona---

[Guest guest]

Am I to understand that "cruel and unusual" should be defined as it would have been when the Bill of Rights was passed? I'm sorry if I seem obtuse, but I really can't follow your reasoning.

As a starting point for applying it, that is how Scalia approaches it. If it were otherwise, one immediately runs into a problem: if a democratically elected legislature passes a law attaching a punishment to a crime, then how can it be said that in that society it is cruel and unusual? If it is so odious the electorate would turn out those who voted for it, and if it is not, the electorate will countenance it.

What other barometer of contemporary notions of cruel and unusual would be more proper than majority rule?

--Mona--

[Guest guest]

What seemed to have slipped Scalia's mind is the possibility that the *length* of a punishment, not merely the nature of the punishment, can give it "unusualness" just as much as it can make it "cruel".

Whatever you might want to say about Antonin Scalia, I wouldn't include that anything slips his mind. A life sentence is not unusual, since people are sentenced to it all the time. The only question is for what they may be sentenced to life, and Scalia says he isn't going to get into a proportionality review of legislative enactment's. Life sentences are standard, and thus are not cruel and unusual.

--Mona--

[Guest guest]

At 12:20 PM 8/9/01 EDT, MonaHolland1@... wrote:

>In a message dated 8/9/01 10:57:19 AM US Eastern Standard Time,

>benbradley@... writes:

>

>

>You mean proportionality in the whole thing, not just the 'cruel and

>unusual' part:

>

> Excessive bail shall not be required, nor excessive fines imposed,

> nor cruel and unusual punishments inflicted.

>

>

>

>What Scalia is saying, is that the phrase is not " cruel OR unusual, " and

that

>a punishment must be both to run afoul of the 8th Amendment. Prison is not

>an unusual punishment, and thus no sentence, regardless of how

>disproportionate it may appear to be to the crime committed, violates the

>prohibition on cruel AND unusual punishment.

I don't get why you're saying this. I already understood the 'cruel AND

unusual' part from your earlier explanation. I was asking if the

" proportionality " you had mentioned referred to the " Excessive bail shall

not be required, nor excessive fines imposed " part (which would make sense

to me) or to the " nor cruel and unusual punishments inflicted. " part.

>--Mona--

>

[Guest guest]

Am I to understand that " cruel and unusual " should be defined as it

would have been when the Bill of Rights was passed? I'm sorry if I

seem obtuse, but I really can't follow your reasoning.

> In a message dated 8/9/01 3:47:51 PM US Eastern Standard Time,

> kayleighs@m... writes:

>

>

> > A little more on this subject -- obviously, if we take your

reasoning

> > to the limit, we would think it was okay to cut off the hands of

> > thieves. That was not at one time considered " cruel or unusual. "

> >

>

> But it was considered cruel and unusual at the time the 8th

Amendment was

> ratified. Also, it does not follow from my reasoning that we should

think

> this barbarism is ok. My reasoning simply says that proportionality

in

> prison sentences is not within the ambit of the 8th Amendment.

>

> --Mona--

[Guest guest]

At 11:16 PM 8/9/01 +0000, you wrote:

>Am I to understand that " cruel and unusual " should be defined as it

>would have been when the Bill of Rights was passed? I'm sorry if I

>seem obtuse, but I really can't follow your reasoning.

I think she's saying that since prison is not unusual, a prison

sentence -- regardless of length -- can never be " cruel and

unusual. " Draconian sentences may be crummy on lots of

other grounds, but they aren't technically cruel and unusual.

>

> > In a message dated 8/9/01 3:47:51 PM US Eastern Standard Time,

> > kayleighs@m... writes:

> >

> >

> > > A little more on this subject -- obviously, if we take your

>reasoning

> > > to the limit, we would think it was okay to cut off the hands of

> > > thieves. That was not at one time considered " cruel or unusual. "

> > >

> >

> > But it was considered cruel and unusual at the time the 8th

>Amendment was

> > ratified. Also, it does not follow from my reasoning that we should

>think

> > this barbarism is ok. My reasoning simply says that proportionality

>in

> > prison sentences is not within the ambit of the 8th Amendment.

> >

> > --Mona--

>

>

>

>

>

>

[Guest guest]

> You remind me of the story of a friend of mine. She always walked

her

> dog in a certain park, and that particular park was under watch by

the

> police for " unleashed dogs. " (Where but in a park do you unleash a

> dog?)

If the majority of local ppl dont want you to - nowhere! OIf you

mmust have a dog keep on drivin' till you get where ppl don't object.

Regarding the particular case, then I would have to look at what

" under control " was interpreted as meaning locally. The fact that

hundreds had paid the fines without protest is imo strong indication

that local understanding meant " on a lead " . Either the fine payers

hadn't got the level of control shown by the protestor, or

alternatively, the common understanding was that that level of control

was insufficient. Either way, the fines were just.

P. (dog hater)

[Guest guest]

Sorry you're a dog hater, Pete, which means you probably won't get my

point. Which is -- most people will go along with the police without

finding out whether the police are correct. They're intimidated.

Local understanding is not legal understanding.

> > You remind me of the story of a friend of mine. She always walked

> her

> > dog in a certain park, and that particular park was under watch by

> the

> > police for " unleashed dogs. " (Where but in a park do you unleash

a

> > dog?)

>

> If the majority of local ppl dont want you to - nowhere! OIf you

> mmust have a dog keep on drivin' till you get where ppl don't

object.

>

> Regarding the particular case, then I would have to look at what

> " under control " was interpreted as meaning locally. The fact that

> hundreds had paid the fines without protest is imo strong indication

> that local understanding meant " on a lead " . Either the fine payers

> hadn't got the level of control shown by the protestor, or

> alternatively, the common understanding was that that level of

control

> was insufficient. Either way, the fines were just.

>

> P. (dog hater)

[Guest guest]

> > You've right about the Warner case, but what you havent adressed

*at

> > all* is my argument, which can be also based on the Free Exercise

> > clause too. By an argument *** actually presented by an (AA!)

ACLU

> > lawyer *** in a case, coercion to LSR might *also* be deemed a

> > violation of the of the First Amendment.

>

> How? It isn't a religion. It isn't religious. What was the

specific First

> Amendment argument made by this lawyer?

Rita, Tommy, anyone, can you field this one? You know the case

histories much better than I do.

P.

[Guest guest]

> I think she's saying that since prison is not unusual, a prison

> sentence -- regardless of length -- can never be " cruel and

> unusual. " Draconian sentences may be crummy on lots of

> other grounds, but they aren't technically cruel and unusual.

What seemed to have slipped Scalia's mind is the possibility that the

*length* of a punishment, not merely the nature of the punishment, can

give it " unusualness " just as much as it can make it " cruel " .

P.

[Guest guest]

> Sorry you're a dog hater, Pete, which means you probably won't get

my

> point. Which is -- most people will go along with the police

without

> finding out whether the police are correct. They're intimidated.

> Local understanding is not legal understanding.

Hi Kayleighs,

The situation with my friend and the pedestrian crossing is even

stranger. This wasn't a local deal, but a federal pedestrian crossing

" sting. " (!!!) Apparently, they set up video cameras at this point

and had people pose as pedestrians. Even stranger than " secret

shoppers, " IMO.

No one had ever been ticketed at that crossing for anything before.

And the judge did not know the answer and said he would " write a

letter " letting my friend know the decision once he had figured out

what " yielding right of way to a pedestrian " meant. said, can't

you just tell me your judgement now?, and the Judge said, " No. I'll

write you a letter. "

Right off the bat, they were watching the video of the wrong

vehicle and when tried to point it out they silenced him and

played it several times over. When they finally let him speak he told

him that the video they were watching wasn't his car and then they put

the other video on, where he clearly did wait, but not until they had

crossed the other two lines of traffic that he had no influence over

whatever.

The " law " mystifies me.

[Guest guest]

so let me ask this... when you say "cruel AND unusual" is that like:

chocolate AND milk = chocolate-milk?

I read it as a list, not a recipe... make sense?

Cruel AND unusual = cruelunusual (recipe)

Cruel AND unusual = cruel unusual (list)

seems subtle or nonexistent argumentatively, but I don't see that it isn't arguable to say that when viewed those two ways, you could have an occasion where one part of the list or the other part of the list is met which would be enough. Were our forefathers like, really super great at grammer, or like, what?

lisak

Re: Mona LSR coercion was: New here

You mean proportionality in the whole thing, not just the 'cruel and unusual' part: Excessive bail shall not be required, nor excessive fines imposed, nor cruel and unusual punishments inflicted. What Scalia is saying, is that the phrase is not "cruel OR unusual," and that a punishment must be both to run afoul of the 8th Amendment. Prison is not an unusual punishment, and thus no sentence, regardless of how disproportionate it may appear to be to the crime committed, violates the prohibition on cruel AND unusual punishment. --Mona--

[Guest guest]

>

> > > You've right about the Warner case, but what you havent adressed

> *at

> > > all* is my argument, which can be also based on the Free Exercise

> > > clause too. By an argument *** actually presented by an (AA!)

> ACLU

> > > lawyer *** in a case, coercion to LSR might *also* be deemed a

> > > violation of the of the First Amendment.

> >

> > How? It isn't a religion. It isn't religious. What was the

> specific First

> > Amendment argument made by this lawyer?

>

> Rita, Tommy, anyone, can you field this one? You know the case

> histories much better than I do.

>

> P.

----------------

I'm not certain of the details, but I think it had to do with a right to

self-definition -- I think that was presented as a Free Exercise thing

( " spiritual " and " religious " being deemed synonymous for constitutional

purposes) in that a person's understanding of himself as " alcoholic " / " powerless "

vs. " not-alcoholic " / " not powerless " is a personal spiritual belief. Something

like that.

I think Schaler made a brief reference to this case in " Addiction is a

Choice " .

~Rita