Re: RELIGION God and Empirical Evidence (was Religious and political sig li

[Guest guest]

--- Masterjohn <chrismasterjohn@...> wrote:

> > Excuse me, but I have to object. I am not an atheist because of

> > dogma or faith, I don't believe in gods because I see no evidence of

> > same.

>

> The reason I believe in God is not because of empirical evidence, but,

> humor me. If you would be willing, delineate the criteria you would

> use for a) evidence that suggests there is a god and evidence that

> conclusively demonstrates the existence of a god.

I think there is plenty of empirical evidence for a creative force

that constrains or directs this universe -> in the form of the four

primary forces recognized in physics as governing this universe -

strong nuclear force, electromagnetic force, weak nuclear force, and

gravitational force. Whether you want to call it the laws of Mother

Nature or the will of God or Allah or Shiva or Zeus or Whatever is

just a matter of semantics to me

[Guest guest]

On 6/24/07, <oz4caster@...> wrote:

> > The reason I believe in God is not because of empirical evidence, but,

> > humor me. If you would be willing, delineate the criteria you would

> > use for a) evidence that suggests there is a god and evidence that

> > conclusively demonstrates the existence of a god.

> I think there is plenty of empirical evidence for a creative force

> that constrains or directs this universe -> in the form of the four

> primary forces recognized in physics as governing this universe -

> strong nuclear force, electromagnetic force, weak nuclear force, and

> gravitational force. Whether you want to call it the laws of Mother

> Nature or the will of God or Allah or Shiva or Zeus or Whatever is

> just a matter of semantics to me

Just for anyone who isn't aware, Allah is the Arabic word for God. It

does not refer to a specific God or a specific religion.

Arabic-speaking Christians worship Allah, which means they worship

God.

It seems like there would be many people who would accept these four

forces, yet call themselves atheists. Are you saying that these

forces are evidence of a creative force above them that has created

them, or are you saying that they themselves constitute the ultimate

creative force that governs the universe, and you are fine with

someone calling *them* collectively the will of God? If you accept

them as the will of God, does this mean you consider them the will of

a God that is supreme over them and created them, or does this mean

that you don't care what words people use to describe them as long as

you can interpret those words as meaning these four physical forces?

This leads back to the problem raised of needing to define what

God is before one considers the evidence required to suggest or

conclude the existence of such.

Chris

[Guest guest]

>Just for anyone who isn't aware, Allah is the Arabic word for God.

This is true. I have had many friends of various faiths who are

Arabic. Allah is not the name for another God, in the Judeo-Christian

sense. I guess I would say that Christians, Muslims and Jews all

worship the same basic God. Siva is definitely another story

altogether in that He is one of many deities and considered one

incarnation of many in the Hindu faith. So there is monotheism and

polytheism. But then, some find Christianity to be polytheistic due

to its trinitarianism. Jews and Muslims appear to reject the

incarnation of God on earth in Jesus, which may be seen, at least in

the Torah, as an assault on the command from Deuteronomy 6:4: " Hear O

Israel: The Lord is our God, the Lord alone. " - The New Oxford

Annotated Bible with Apocrypha. Judaism and Islam remain strictly

monotheistic religions.

I would say that an explanation of just what and who is God(dess)(es)

is certainly in order before any evidence can be considered.

Deanna

[Guest guest]

> What you cite below isn¹t evidence, if we are using Œevidence¹ the way we

> normally use it. For the most part it serves as evidence only for those who

> already believe. Belief in God isn¹t based on evidence or proofs.

>

>

>

> --- Masterjohn <chrismasterjohn@...> wrote:

>>> > > Excuse me, but I have to object. I am not an atheist because of

>>> > > dogma or faith, I don't believe in gods because I see no evidence of

>>> > > same.

>> >

>> > The reason I believe in God is not because of empirical evidence, but,

>> > humor me. If you would be willing, delineate the criteria you would

>> > use for a) evidence that suggests there is a god and evidence that

>> > conclusively demonstrates the existence of a god.

>

>

>

> I think there is plenty of empirical evidence for a creative force

> that constrains or directs this universe -> in the form of the four

> primary forces recognized in physics as governing this universe -

> strong nuclear force, electromagnetic force, weak nuclear force, and

> gravitational force. Whether you want to call it the laws of Mother

> Nature or the will of God or Allah or Shiva or Zeus or Whatever is

> just a matter of semantics to me

>

>

>

>

[Guest guest]

Deanna,

> >Just for anyone who isn't aware, Allah is the Arabic word for God.

> This is true. I have had many friends of various faiths who are

> Arabic. Allah is not the name for another God, in the Judeo-Christian

> sense. I guess I would say that Christians, Muslims and Jews all

> worship the same basic God.

This is not what I meant to say -- I simply meant that Allah is not

the name of a God, but the Arabic word for God. That doesn't mean

that Christians and Muslims who both worship in Arabic worship the

same God -- although that is an issue of semantics obviously, whether

people who worship a God that they believe completely different things

about are worshipping the same God. As such, it seems a rather

pointless discussion really, as it hinges on either what the

interpreting person believes about God (for example one might believe

that there is one God who is worshipped in equal yet very different

ways; but this itself is an arbitrary judgment rather than an actual

argument) or on the entirely semantic issue of how many things in

common two conceptions of God have to have before they are considered

fundamentally the same but with differences versus fundamentally

different but with similarities.

> Siva is definitely another story

> altogether in that He is one of many deities and considered one

> incarnation of many in the Hindu faith. So there is monotheism and

> polytheism. But then, some find Christianity to be polytheistic due

> to its trinitarianism.

Many people consider the Jewish Scriptures themselves to be

polytheistic -- Noam Chomsky has said this -- and of course the fact

that some group of people consider something to be true has no bearing

on whether it is true or not (unless the the thing being discussed is

the very question of whether that group considers some other thing to

be true).

" Then God said, 'Let us make man in our image, after our likeness.' "

Genesis 1:26.

> Jews and Muslims appear to reject the

> incarnation of God on earth in Jesus,

They don't simply " appear " to reject it; they condemn it as

blasphemous. This is made abundantly evident in the Talmud and the

Qu'ran.

> which may be seen, at least in

> the Torah, as an assault on the command from Deuteronomy 6:4: " Hear O

> Israel: The Lord is our God, the Lord alone. " - The New Oxford

> Annotated Bible with Apocrypha. Judaism and Islam remain strictly

> monotheistic religions.

Isaiah prophecies that the Messiah (in Hebrew; in Greek, Christ) " will

be called, Wonderful Counselor, Mighty God. " (Isaiah 9:6).

> I would say that an explanation of just what and who is God(dess)(es)

> is certainly in order before any evidence can be considered.

I agree with you. But that is up to whoever it is, , or if others

would like to chim in they of course can, who is choosing to delineate

the requisite evidence for suggestion and conclusion of God. I am not

the one who stated there was or was not evidence for God, so I do not

have any statement on the matter to back up; therefore my definition

would not be meaningful.

Suffice it to say, however, that the statement " There is no evidence

for God " does not carry any meaningfulness whatsoever unless one

stipulates the evidence that one *could* observe to both suggest and

conclude there is a God.

Chris

[Guest guest]

--- Masterjohn <chrismasterjohn@...> wrote:

> It seems like there would be many people who would accept these four

> forces, yet call themselves atheists. Are you saying that these

> forces are evidence of a creative force above them that has created

> them, or are you saying that they themselves constitute the ultimate

> creative force that governs the universe, and you are fine with

> someone calling *them* collectively the will of God? If you accept

> them as the will of God, does this mean you consider them the will

> of a God that is supreme over them and created them, or does this

> mean that you don't care what words people use to describe them as

> long as you can interpret those words as meaning these four physical

> forces?

>

> This leads back to the problem raised of needing to define what

> God is before one considers the evidence required to suggest or

> conclude the existence of such.

I think the Hindu definition of the supreme being is closest to what I

believe:

http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Brahman

" This Supreme Cosmic Spirit or Absolute Reality called Brahman is said

to be eternal, genderless, omnipotent, omniscient, and omnipresent,

and ultimately indescribable in the human language. It can be at best

described as infinite Being, infinite Consciousness and infinite

Bliss. Brahman is regarded as the source and essence of the material

universe. It is pure being. Brahman manifests as Hiranyagarbha, the

" world soul " , which also can take many forms or manifestations of the

thousands of gods. Essentially, it is also beyond being and non-being

alike, and thus does not quite fit with the usual connotations of the

word God and even the concept of monism. For this reason, some authors

use the word 'Godhead' for Brahman, to distinguish it from the usual

usage of the word 'God'. It is said that Brahman cannot be known by

material means, that we cannot be made conscious of it, because

Brahman is our very consciousness. Brahman (Ryke) is also not

restricted to the usual dimensional perspectives of being, and thus

enlightenment, moksha, yoga, samadhi, nirvana, etc. do not merely mean

to know Brahman, but to realise one's 'brahman-hood', to actually

realise that one is and always was of Brahman nature. Indeed, closely

related to the Self concept of Brahman is the idea that it is

synonymous with jiva-atma, or individual souls, our atman (or soul)

being readily identifiable with the greater soul of Brahman. "

I believe that every being or consciousness in essence is the ONE

creator of all that exists. Individual creatures that have

consciousness are all manifestations of the same ONE consciousness -

just at a different space-time, each with their own unique

perspective. I don't believe that any consciousness residing in a

human body has or ever will know the full essence of this universal

consciousness. And that is why no human can ever know how it all

works out And this is why there are so many different religions,

each a little different, but none exactly correct.

[Guest guest]

>

>

>> > I would say that an explanation of just what and who is God(dess)(es)

>> > is certainly in order before any evidence can be considered.

>

> ³I agree with you. But that is up to whoever it is, , or if others

> would like to chim in they of course can, who is choosing to delineate

> the requisite evidence for suggestion and conclusion of God. I am not

> the one who stated there was or was not evidence for God, so I do not

> have any statement on the matter to back up; therefore my definition

> would not be meaningful.

>

> Suffice it to say, however, that the statement " There is no evidence

> for God " does not carry any meaningfulness whatsoever unless one

> stipulates the evidence that one *could* observe to both suggest and

> conclude there is a God.²

>

No, Chris. Let it not ³suffice it to say². I can both say that there is no

evidence for God AND that belief in God is not a matter of evidence. For

instance, someone on this list could say, Œyes, there is evidence for God¹,

and then I could say, ³well, no there isn¹t². And I would be making perfect

sense.

[Guest guest]

--- Deanna, " yoginidd " <WAPFbaby@...> wrote:

> Siva is definitely another story

> altogether in that He is one of many deities and considered one

> incarnation of many in the Hindu faith.

Deanna, I goofed when I used " Shiva " . I should have used " Brahman " .

I haven't read up on this stuff in a while

<I'll forever never be perfect>

[Guest guest]

,

> I think the Hindu definition of the supreme being is closest to what I

> believe:

> http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Brahman

> " This Supreme Cosmic Spirit or Absolute Reality called Brahman is said

> to be eternal, genderless, omnipotent, omniscient, and omnipresent,

> and ultimately indescribable in the human language.

Well this, so far, is the orthodox and patristic understanding of the

Christian God as well (not that that is our subject of discussion, but

a tangential point worth making).

> It can be at best

> described as infinite Being, infinite Consciousness and infinite

> Bliss. Brahman is regarded as the source and essence of the material

> universe. It is pure being. Brahman manifests as Hiranyagarbha, the

> " world soul " , which also can take many forms or manifestations of the

> thousands of gods. Essentially, it is also beyond being and non-being

> alike, and thus does not quite fit with the usual connotations of the

> word God and even the concept of monism.

I don't understand what it means to be beyond being and non-being.

> For this reason, some authors

> use the word 'Godhead' for Brahman, to distinguish it from the usual

> usage of the word 'God'.

I've always found the word " Godhead " to be rather annoying, but again,

I don't see how this distinguishes it from monotheistic religions,

which also use the word " Godhead " unless they choose to interchange

" divinity " for it.

It is said that Brahman cannot be known by

> material means, that we cannot be made conscious of it, because

> Brahman is our very consciousness. Brahman (Ryke) is also not

> restricted to the usual dimensional perspectives of being, and thus

> enlightenment, moksha, yoga, samadhi, nirvana, etc. do not merely mean

> to know Brahman, but to realise one's 'brahman-hood', to actually

> realise that one is and always was of Brahman nature. Indeed, closely

> related to the Self concept of Brahman is the idea that it is

> synonymous with jiva-atma, or individual souls, our atman (or soul)

> being readily identifiable with the greater soul of Brahman. "

And now we get into the differences. Nevertheless, what implication

does this have for the question of empirical evidence?

> I believe that every being or consciousness in essence is the ONE

> creator of all that exists. Individual creatures that have

> consciousness are all manifestations of the same ONE consciousness -

> just at a different space-time, each with their own unique

> perspective. I don't believe that any consciousness residing in a

> human body has or ever will know the full essence of this universal

> consciousness. And that is why no human can ever know how it all

> works out And this is why there are so many different religions,

> each a little different, but none exactly correct.

And you believe the four physical forces governing the universe

constitute empirical evidence for this? Or you believe they

constitute generic empirical evidence of a creator, and this is the

creative force you choose to believe in? Or...?

Chris

[Guest guest]

Gene,

> No, Chris. Let it not ³suffice it to say². I can both say that there is no

> evidence for God AND that belief in God is not a matter of evidence.

Something can be true and nevertheless of no consequence. If your

position is that knowledge of God cannot be ascertained with empirical

evidence, then if you are correct it would necessarily follow that

there is no empirical evidence for God. But this would not carry any

consequence for what we should believe. Rather, it would illustrate a

severe deficiency in the empirical model of epistemology.

What if knowledge of God is important? Your model of epistemology

would preclude obtaining it.

Chris

[Guest guest]

>

>

>

>

> Gene,

>

>> > No, Chris. Let it not ³suffice it to say². I can both say that there is no

>> > evidence for God AND that belief in God is not a matter of evidence.

>

> ³Something can be true and nevertheless of no consequence. If your

> position is that knowledge of God cannot be ascertained with empirical

> evidence, then if you are correct it would necessarily follow that

> there is no empirical evidence for God. But this would not carry any

> consequence for what we should believe. Rather, it would illustrate a

> severe deficiency in the empirical model of epistemology.²

>

> Wow. You claimed that the statement was meaningless, and I showed you quite

> conclusively that it was not meaningless. So, now you shift the ground a bit.

>

> There is so much bs in the above that I don¹t think that I have the time or

> inclination to address everything in depth. I would suggest some work in

> analytical philosophy, and especially some later Wittgenstein.

>

> Is Œknowing¹ that there is a God anything like knowing that Bush is the

> current president of the U.S? Is an Œempirical model of epistemology¹

> deficient because God is not a conclusion based on objective experience? Now,

> I do think that people can obtain Œknowledge¹ of God (it¹s hard for me to not

> put knowledge in quotes here since I am not a believer myself) based on

> experience, but it is subjective experience. And when we talk about EVIDENCE

> that¹s not what we are talking about.

>

> If there is a God in the deep sense that is written about in true spiritual

> texts, then we are not talking about miracles, or planets exploding, or any

> physical objective event. This is not like ŒThe Day the Earth Stood Still¹.

> Maybe a Stupid God Tricks segment on the Letterman show?

>

> ³What if knowledge of God is important? Your model of epistemology

> would preclude obtaining it.²

>

> We are not really talking about epistemology, and this is where the confusion

> lies. One talks about Œknowing God¹ in a very different sense that one talks

> about knowing Latin, and it is outside the realm of epistemology.

[Guest guest]

Chris-

> If your

> position is that knowledge of God cannot be ascertained with empirical

> evidence, then if you are correct it would necessarily follow that

> there is no empirical evidence for God. But this would not carry any

> consequence for what we should believe. Rather, it would illustrate a

> severe deficiency in the empirical model of epistemology.

So if I were locked in a room that was sealed against all

electromagnetic radiation, you'd consider it a deficiency in my model

of epistemology that I wouldn't believe I could remotely view outside

the room?

> What if knowledge of God is important? Your model of epistemology

> would preclude obtaining it.

And what if knowledge of the flying spaghetti monster is important?

My point is that any theory of knowledge must distinguish between

solid conjecture and wishful thinking.

-

[Guest guest]

On 6/25/07, Idol <Idol@...> wrote:

> So if I were locked in a room that was sealed against all

> electromagnetic radiation, you'd consider it a deficiency in my model

> of epistemology that I wouldn't believe I could remotely view outside

> the room?

You are assuming your conclusion in the nature of your analogy. Its

most obvious deficiency is that seeing inside and outside the room is

the same mode of obtaining knowledge -- seeing -- whereas our topic is

whether limiting oneself to one mode of epistemology when it has

inherent limitations is deficient, not whether it is deficient to

admit that a particular mode has limitations.

> And what if knowledge of the flying spaghetti monster is important?

> My point is that any theory of knowledge must distinguish between

> solid conjecture and wishful thinking.

That is what I am asking you to distinguish, and I believe what you

said you would do later when you have more time. Either one can can

observe evidence of God but one does not, or one cannot observe

evidence of God. You stated that one does not observe evidence of

God, but have not yet stated whether this is because one cannot, or

because one can yet nevertheless does not. Obviously if one can

observe such evidence but does not, this is a compelling reason to

abstain from belief in God, but if one cannot observe evidence of God

and one does not, then the absence of observation cannot be invoked

even to suggest that there is not a God.

Chris

[Guest guest]

Chris-

> > So if I were locked in a room that was sealed against all

> > electromagnetic radiation, you'd consider it a deficiency in my

> model

> > of epistemology that I wouldn't believe I could remotely view

> outside

> > the room?

>

> You are assuming your conclusion in the nature of your analogy. Its

> most obvious deficiency is that seeing inside and outside the room is

> the same mode of obtaining knowledge -- seeing -- whereas our topic is

> whether limiting oneself to one mode of epistemology when it has

> inherent limitations is deficient, not whether it is deficient to

> admit that a particular mode has limitations.

Not at all, though I can see why you misunderstood me, and I

should've been more clear and specific. People who claim to have the

ability of remote viewing describe the (alleged) experience in a

variety of different ways, many of which are not analogous to

'seeing' in the visual sense, and I was referring to 'viewing' in

that umbrella sense of being able to know what transpires outside the

locked and sealed room despite having no data in the standard sense

of the word entering the room. But consider my analogy revised for

clarity:

So if I were locked in a room that was sealed against the

transmission of all physical phenomena across its boundaries (IOW a

room into which no physical or energetic information could pass)

you'd consider it a deficiency in my model of epistemology that I

wouldn't believe I could know what transpires outside the room rather

than considering it a result of the physical conditions of the system?

> > And what if knowledge of the flying spaghetti monster is important?

> > My point is that any theory of knowledge must distinguish between

> > solid conjecture and wishful thinking.

>

> That is what I am asking you to distinguish, and I believe what you

> said you would do later when you have more time. Either one can can

> observe evidence of God but one does not, or one cannot observe

> evidence of God. You stated that one does not observe evidence of

> God, but have not yet stated whether this is because one cannot, or

> because one can yet nevertheless does not. Obviously if one can

> observe such evidence but does not, this is a compelling reason to

> abstain from belief in God, but if one cannot observe evidence of God

> and one does not, then the absence of observation cannot be invoked

> even to suggest that there is not a God.

Again, I think we'll have to start with a discussion of what

constitutes 'God' before returning to the issues you raise above. My

schedule may be changing, so it's not impossible I'll get to this

later today.

-

[Guest guest]

--- Masterjohn <chrismasterjohn@...> wrote:

> I don't understand what it means to be beyond being and non-being.

> I've always found the word " Godhead " to be rather annoying, but

> again, I don't see how this distinguishes it from monotheistic

> religions, which also use the word " Godhead " unless they choose to

> interchange " divinity " for it.

yes, I have trouble with " beyond being and non-being " and

" Godhead " as well and as you point out, these are tangential to this

discussion anyway.

--- wrote:

> > I believe that every being or consciousness in essence is the ONE

> > creator of all that exists. Individual creatures that have

> > consciousness are all manifestations of the same ONE consciousness

> > - just at a different space-time, each with their own unique

> > perspective. I don't believe that any consciousness residing in a

> > human body has or ever will know the full essence of this

> > universal consciousness. And that is why no human can ever know

> > how it all works out And this is why there are so many

> > different religions, each a little different, but none exactly

> > correct.

>

> And you believe the four physical forces governing the universe

> constitute empirical evidence for this? Or you believe they

> constitute generic empirical evidence of a creator, and this is the

> creative force you choose to believe in? Or...?

I guess my reasons for viewing force as the result of will are very

simple. When Gene willed to put the pig's head in the oven, he had to

us force to accomplish the task. Therefore, the force that he used

was the result of his will. In this generic sense, all forces can be

viewed as the result of will power. It's just semantics in my view.

That leads to the question of what will is responsible for the forces

that we see in nature that we as humans did not directly will. To me,

those forces are from the will of the universal consciousness or

divinity, or Whatever you want to call it. I believe that the human

aspect of our consciousness, by it's nature constrains and narrows our

perception of the universe, such that we are not aware of the basic

underlying will, other than it's effects. But it is this will that

directs the universe to work the way that it does. And there is very

clear physical evidence of these forces at work. Take something,

throw it in the air, and watch it fall. You have just demonstrated

one of these forces.

[Guest guest]

On 6/25/07, <oz4caster@...> wrote:

> That leads to the question of what will is responsible for the forces

> that we see in nature that we as humans did not directly will. To me,

> those forces are from the will of the universal consciousness or

> divinity, or Whatever you want to call it. I believe that the human

> aspect of our consciousness, by it's nature constrains and narrows our

> perception of the universe, such that we are not aware of the basic

> underlying will, other than it's effects. But it is this will that

> directs the universe to work the way that it does. And there is very

> clear physical evidence of these forces at work. Take something,

> throw it in the air, and watch it fall. You have just demonstrated

> one of these forces.

I agree that forces are evidence of a will or wills, and I would say

also that laws are evidence of a lawmaker, and I agree that this is

essentially self-evident. I'm not sure whether this is empirical

evidence per se, though. We do have the experience that when a law is

made, there is always a lawmaker to make it; but this is more an

argument from analogy that direct empirical experience, and I suspect

that the limitation and Gene are using wherein one can only gain

reliable knowledge through empirical evidence probably restricts the

use of this type of reasoning, though they can of course speak for

themselves better than I can speak for them.

Chris

[Guest guest]

>

> I guess my reasons for viewing force as the result of will are very

> simple. When Gene willed to put the pig's head in the oven, he had to

> us force to accomplish the task. Therefore, the force that he used

> was the result of his will. In this generic sense, all forces can be

> viewed as the result of will power. It's just semantics in my view.

Actually, I just put the pig's head in the freakin' oven. There was not a

separate thing called 'will' and then one of 'force' that accomplished this. It

may be 'just semantics' but you're using them to create a structure that doesn't

exist, really.

>

> That leads to the question of what will is responsible for the forces

> that we see in nature that we as humans did not directly will. To me,

> those forces are from the will of the universal consciousness or

> divinity, or Whatever you want to call it.

And this isn't evidence at all in the usual sense. You may take it as 'evidence'

that there is a god, but others may not. You may count it as evidence for your

FAITH, but not of any kind of knowedge, or it is a misuse of the term. The

problem with semantics is that sometimes they are important, and sometimes they

are abused.

> I believe that the human

> aspect of our consciousness, by it's nature constrains and narrows our

> perception of the universe, such that we are not aware of the basic

> underlying will, other than it's effects. But it is this will that

> directs the universe to work the way that it does. And there is very

> clear physical evidence of these forces at work. Take something,

> throw it in the air, and watch it fall. You have just demonstrated

> one of these forces.

>

It's fine that you believe this as you do. But, really - it isn't relevant to

the topic at hand as I can see it.

[Guest guest]

>

> I agree that forces are evidence of a will or wills, and I would say

> also that laws are evidence of a lawmaker, and I agree that this is

> essentially self-evident.

And so those who do not agree with this reasoning, or that it is self-evident

are sadly deluded? If the very discussion is about the universe is being

'willed', by arguing that forces presuppose will, you are simply begging the

question by declaration. It sounds like one of those old proofs of God's

existence, as if anyone ever believed in God as the result of a proof...

> I'm not sure whether this is empirical

> evidence per se, though. We do have the experience that when a law is

> made, there is always a lawmaker to make it; but this is more an

> argument from analogy that direct empirical experience, and I suspect

> that the limitation and Gene are using wherein one can only gain

> reliable knowledge through empirical evidence probably restricts the

> use of this type of reasoning, though they can of course speak for

> themselves better than I can speak for them.

>

You are so distorting what I am saying that it is laughable.

> Chris

[Guest guest]

> > I agree that forces are evidence of a will or wills, and I would say

> > also that laws are evidence of a lawmaker, and I agree that this is

> > essentially self-evident.

> And so those who do not agree with this reasoning, or that it is

> self-evident are sadly deluded? If the very discussion is about the universe

> is being 'willed', by arguing that forces presuppose will, you are simply

> begging the question by declaration. It sounds like one of those old proofs

> of God's existence, as if anyone ever believed in God as the result of a

> proof...

No, I just take it as self-evident, but that isn't why I believe in

God and I doubt it would convince anyone who didn't already believe in

God.

Chris

[Guest guest]

-------------- Original message ----------------------

From: " Masterjohn " <chrismasterjohn@...>

> > > I agree that forces are evidence of a will or wills, and I would say

> > > also that laws are evidence of a lawmaker, and I agree that this is

> > > essentially self-evident.

>

> > And so those who do not agree with this reasoning, or that it is

> > self-evident are sadly deluded? If the very discussion is about the universe

> > is being 'willed', by arguing that forces presuppose will, you are simply

> > begging the question by declaration. It sounds like one of those old proofs

> > of God's existence, as if anyone ever believed in God as the result of a

> > proof...

>

> No, I just take it as self-evident, but that isn't why I believe in

> God and I doubt it would convince anyone who didn't already believe in

> God.

So it isn't evidence, except in a sense that is wholly irrelevant to the

discussion (as in 'support for' an already existing belief but insufficient to

reach a conclusion), and it is only 'self-evident' to someone who already

believes in the supreme being willing nature. Cool.

[Guest guest]

> So if I were locked in a room that was sealed against the

> transmission of all physical phenomena across its boundaries (IOW a

> room into which no physical or energetic information could pass)

> you'd consider it a deficiency in my model of epistemology that I

> wouldn't believe I could know what transpires outside the room rather

> than considering it a result of the physical conditions of the system?

,

If you were locked in such a room, or a cave, say, you would dream

your whole life. With just as much complexity as your current life

contains. It's not a matter of seeing " inside or outside the room. "

tb

[Guest guest]

Gene,

> Wow. You claimed that the statement was meaningless, and I showed you

>quite conclusively that it was not meaningless. So, now you shift the ground a

> bit.

My position before was that it was not meaningful, and my position now

is that it is not meaningful. What ground have I shifted? You did

not show me that it was meaningful, you showed me that you " can " say

it and that you would " make sense. " That isn't the same thing as

being " meaningful. "

Here it is:

> > Suffice it to say, however, that the statement " There is no evidence

> > for God " does not carry any meaningfulness whatsoever unless one

> > stipulates the evidence that one *could* observe to both suggest and

> > conclude there is a God.²

>No, Chris. Let it not ³suffice it to say². I can both say that there is no

>evidence for God AND that belief in God is not a matter of evidence. For

>instance, someone on this list could say, Œyes, there is evidence for God¹,

>and then I could say, ³well, no there isn¹t². And I would be making perfect

>sense.

Of course the statement " Well, no there isn't [evidence for God] "

'makes sense' in that it is intelligible, and of course you can say

it, but I didn't mean " meaningful " in the broadest sense of carrying

an intelligible meaning; I meant " meaningful " as in contributing

something important to our understanding that has some import.

It is like if I say, " Well you cannot stand on top of something that

you are standing underneath, " and my sense would be intelligble and

legitimate, but you might reply " So what? " and I would not have any

answer, because I would be stating something that is obvious and of no

consequence.

It might be of significance to state " one cannot ascertain knowledge

of God through evidence, " but once this is taken as a premise, it

becomes a meaningless and tautological truism to add " there is no

evidence for God. "

> Is knowing that there is a God anything like knowing that Bush is

> the current president of the U.S?

The way one would obtain such knowledge is definitely different, and I

think the type of knowing is probably different too.

> Is an empirical model of epistemology deficient because God is not a

conclusion

> based on objective experience?

It would seem that, if you believe that one CANNOT ascertain knowledge

of God through empiricism (I am not supporting or challenging this

myself and I would like to see more discussion of it before I form an

opinion, especially 's position), then yes, a model whereby one

rejects all knowledge not gained through empiricism has a pretty

severe deficiency in that one is forced to reject belief in God,

regardless of whether said belief is materially important to one's

life. If belief in God has no importance, then the deficiency is

moot; insofar as belief in God is important, then an an

epistemological system that requires a priori rejection of belief in

God is seriously deficient.

> Now, I do think that people can obtain Œknowledge¹ of God (it¹s hard for me to

> not put knowledge in quotes here since I am not a believer myself) based on

> experience, but it is subjective experience. And when we talk about

> EVIDENCE that¹s not what we are talking about.

I am not claiming that there is empirical evidence for God. Rather, I

posed the question to what he thought was the potentially

observable evidence that would constitute a) suggestive and

conclusive evidence for God. You answered this question by saying

that one cannot obtain any such evidence. This essentially puts a cap

on my question as far as your answer is concerned. I have not been

claiming that there is empirical evidence for God.

> If there is a God in the deep sense that is written about in true spiritual

> texts, then we are not talking about miracles, or planets exploding, or

> any physical objective event. This is not like ŒThe Day the Earth Stood

> Still¹. Maybe a Stupid God Tricks segment on the Letterman show?

Well this is obviously loaded with your own presuppositions, is it

not? I doubt we agree on what a " true spiritual text " is.

> We are not really talking about epistemology, and this is where the confusion

> lies. One talks about Œknowing God¹ in a very different sense that one talks

> about knowing Latin, and it is outside the realm of epistemology.

To you it is, because you deny epistemological models for knowledge of

God that other people accept.

Chris

[Guest guest]

On 6/25/07, implode7@... <implode7@...> wrote:

> > No, I just take it as self-evident, but that isn't why I believe in

> > God and I doubt it would convince anyone who didn't already believe in

> > God.

> So it isn't evidence, except in a sense that is wholly irrelevant to the

> discussion (as in 'support for' an already existing belief but insufficient

> to reach a conclusion), and it is only 'self-evident' to someone who already

> believes in the supreme being willing nature. Cool.

Did I not add the following?

=====

I'm not sure whether this is empirical

evidence per se, though. We do have the experience that when a law is

made, there is always a lawmaker to make it; but this is more an

argument from analogy that direct empirical experience...

=====

Chris

[Guest guest]

-------------- Original message ----------------------

From: " Masterjohn " <chrismasterjohn@...>

> Gene,

>

> > Wow. You claimed that the statement was meaningless, and I showed you

> >quite conclusively that it was not meaningless. So, now you shift the ground

a

> > bit.

>

> My position before was that it was not meaningful, and my position now

> is that it is not meaningful. What ground have I shifted? You did

> not show me that it was meaningful, you showed me that you " can " say

> it and that you would " make sense. " That isn't the same thing as

> being " meaningful. "

>

> Here it is:

>

> > > Suffice it to say, however, that the statement " There is no evidence

> > > for God " does not carry any meaningfulness whatsoever unless one

> > > stipulates the evidence that one *could* observe to both suggest and

> > > conclude there is a God.²

I would generally equate 'not carry any meaningfulness whatsoever' with not

making sense. Not only did I show that it makes sense, but that it 'can be said'

in situations in which it is relevant and is understood. That's what is meant by

meaningful.

>

> >No, Chris. Let it not ³suffice it to say². I can both say that there is no

> >evidence for God AND that belief in God is not a matter of evidence. For

> >instance, someone on this list could say, Œyes, there is evidence for God¹,

> >and then I could say, ³well, no there isn¹t². And I would be making perfect

> >sense.

>

> Of course the statement " Well, no there isn't [evidence for God] "

> 'makes sense' in that it is intelligible, and of course you can say

> it, but I didn't mean " meaningful " in the broadest sense of carrying

> an intelligible meaning; I meant " meaningful " as in contributing

> something important to our understanding that has some import.

But it has lots of import, in that you are 'doing philosophy' in a very bad way,

and you need to be brought down to earth. You are misusing words, conflating

multiple uses into one, and in general, committing so many mistakes in any given

sentence, let along paragraph, that generally one just simply has to resign from

an argument with you.

>

> It is like if I say, " Well you cannot stand on top of something that

> you are standing underneath, " and my sense would be intelligble and

> legitimate, but you might reply " So what? " and I would not have any

> answer, because I would be stating something that is obvious and of no

> consequence.

But someone would not say, out of context, " well you cannot stand on top of

something that you are standing underneath " . it's hard to imagine when this

statement would be of any use.

so, I guess I'm agreeing with you, but ...

>

> It might be of significance to state " one cannot ascertain knowledge

> of God through evidence, " but once this is taken as a premise, it

> becomes a meaningless and tautological truism to add " there is no

> evidence for God. "

And that statement is correct, but again, a misunderstanding of the context of

what has been discussed and the points being made.

I gave some examples of when it might be meaningful. In the context of someone

stating that they only believe things that can be verified through empirical

evidence, it is very meaningful to say that they don't believe in god because

there is no evidence. I have no problems with someone saying that, and then,

say, saying for emphasis - there isn't any because there couldn't be.

>

> > Is knowing that there is a God anything like knowing that Bush is

> > the current president of the U.S?

>

> The way one would obtain such knowledge is definitely different, and I

> think the type of knowing is probably different too.

How about that one is 'knowledge' and one really isn't.

>

> > Is an empirical model of epistemology deficient because God is not a

> conclusion

> > based on objective experience?

>

> It would seem that, if you believe that one CANNOT ascertain knowledge

> of God through empiricism (I am not supporting or challenging this

> myself and I would like to see more discussion of it before I form an

> opinion, especially 's position), then yes, a model whereby one

> rejects all knowledge not gained through empiricism has a pretty

> severe deficiency in that one is forced to reject belief in God,

> regardless of whether said belief is materially important to one's

> life. If belief in God has no importance, then the deficiency is

> moot; insofar as belief in God is important, then an an

> epistemological system that requires a priori rejection of belief in

> God is seriously deficient.

Well, first of all, we have to agree (and I'm sure does) that it's absurd

to propose that all knowledge is gained through empiricism without recognizing

that what's really meant is that it is grounded in it - but one can make logical

inferences from experience and derive other knowledge...

Now I also don't agree that a belief in God is knowledge in the same sense at

all that we talk about knowledge gained through objectively verifiable

experience.

Again - a belief in God is not part of an epistemological system.

One could in theory believe that all knowledge is derived from objective

experience, but still believe in God because the belief is based on subjective

experience. But to call this belief 'knowledge' is a misuse of the word

'knowledge'.

The notion that a belief in God is important presupposes that God exists, I

think. So it's not an argument that you could make to , because he doesn't

believe in God. So, he would argue that his 'epistemological system' is not

deficient, because it doesn't permit such a huge delusion.

I also think that if God exists, and had the kind of experience, say, that

some mystics have had - well, he would probably come to believe in God. But it

would be a strange use of the word 'evidence' to claim it as such, since it

isn't a conclusion.

I do think that probably what 'really' means (and he is free to dissuade

me) is that he has never heard a compelling reason to believe in God, and so he

does not. In the absence of a mystical experience, I'd say that this is entirely

rational. I also think that most people who say that they 'believe' in God,

believe only in the sense that they answer affirmatively to the question. True

belief, I'd say, would have to be evident in one's behavior, and manifest in

many ways - behavior towards others, not fearing death, etc - and I think that

this is rare. But one can also accomplish these things without believing in God.

>

> > Now, I do think that people can obtain Œknowledge¹ of God (it¹s hard for me

to

> > not put knowledge in quotes here since I am not a believer myself) based on

> > experience, but it is subjective experience. And when we talk about

> > EVIDENCE that¹s not what we are talking about.

>

> I am not claiming that there is empirical evidence for God. Rather, I

> posed the question to what he thought was the potentially

> observable evidence that would constitute a) suggestive and

> conclusive evidence for God. You answered this question by saying

> that one cannot obtain any such evidence. This essentially puts a cap

> on my question as far as your answer is concerned. I have not been

> claiming that there is empirical evidence for God.

Well, I do kind of think that the discussion is silly. But I also understood

what meant.

>

>

> > If there is a God in the deep sense that is written about in true spiritual

> > texts, then we are not talking about miracles, or planets exploding, or

> > any physical objective event. This is not like ŒThe Day the Earth Stood

> > Still¹. Maybe a Stupid God Tricks segment on the Letterman show?

>

> Well this is obviously loaded with your own presuppositions, is it

> not? I doubt we agree on what a " true spiritual text " is.

Obviously not. but you're the expert.

>

> > We are not really talking about epistemology, and this is where the

confusion

> > lies. One talks about Œknowing God¹ in a very different sense that one talks

> > about knowing Latin, and it is outside the realm of epistemology.

>

> To you it is, because you deny epistemological models for knowledge of

> God that other people accept.

There are people who accept practically anything. I'm just trying to get you to

think a little.

[Guest guest]

>

> > > No, I just take it as self-evident, but that isn't why I believe in

> > > God and I doubt it would convince anyone who didn't already believe in

> > > God.

>

> > So it isn't evidence, except in a sense that is wholly irrelevant to the

> > discussion (as in 'support for' an already existing belief but insufficient

> > to reach a conclusion), and it is only 'self-evident' to someone who already

> > believes in the supreme being willing nature. Cool.

>

> Did I not add the following?

>

> =====

> I'm not sure whether this is empirical

> evidence per se, though. We do have the experience that when a law is

> made, there is always a lawmaker to make it; but this is more an

> argument from analogy that direct empirical experience...

> =====

>

But that is just a ridiculous analogy. A law in the sense of a legality is not

the same thing as what we refer to as a natural law. if that is what leads to

this being self-evident, that's just crazy. but, yes, you did add that.

You're starting to exhaust me again. I suppose you will emerge victorious.