Re: Hifi and falsifiability.

[Guest guest]

Dan, all,

> Your account of falsifiability reminds me of the " Consumer Reports "

> approach to hifi amplifiers

You never got around to falsifiability.

Falsifiability has to do with the problem of a theory that can posit a

truth claim under any possible circumstance.

In fact your theory of experience and expertise is not particularly

falsifiable so it can't give an explanatory account of who's explanation

would be superior should two experts both have similar bona fides.

The Analytic Psychology hasn't developed in the direction of scientific

theory-making--for the most part--because the theories about its core

constructs aren't falsifiable.

That just means that to take its model of the psyche as being implicate in

each and every psyche is an act of faith alone. This is okay because

'whatever floats your boat.' But, it's no different assuming that

everybody necessarily lives in a cosmos where there is (also) necessarily

a God; an assumption driven simply because those that hold it have faith

that it is so.

regards,

[Guest guest]

Dear ,

>

> Dan, all,

>

> > Your account of falsifiability reminds me of the " Consumer Reports "

> > approach to hifi amplifiers

>

> You never got around to falsifiability.

Sure, I did. But let me be more explicit.

The null hypothesis, the putatively falsifiable hypothesis, is that

there is no difference in sound between cheap, mass-produced amplifier

A and expensive, hand-crafted amplifier B (could also be solid state

amp A vs. tube amp B, or what have you). The Consumer Reports

scientist will attempt to reject the null hypothesis by playing amp A

and amp B for X-many subjects under double-blind conditions and with

peripherals (speakers, CD source, etc.) held constant, and see if the

subjects can tell the difference between the two amplifiers

consistently enough or often enough to be statistically significant.

When they can't, then the Consumer Reports scientist concludes that

the null hypothesis is retained, that both amps sound the same, and

tells the public not to waste their money. (This is akin to suggesting

that, if the local populace can't tell the difference between

chardonnay A and chardonnay B, then there is no difference.)

To repeat, there are so many things wrong with the Consumer Reports

approach that it is hard to know where to begin. The CR approach draws

no distinction between the expert listener and the ordinary listener.

It ignores the possibility (the fact, but we'll say possibility) that

different speakers and peripherals are more revealing of certain

amplifiers than are other speakers and peripherals, such that

amplifiers cannot be judged out of context (given a crap Cd source,

for example, all amplifiers will sound bad, and maybe also

artificially the same). It ignores the fact that the double-blind

listening situation itself is so weird and so different from how hifi

listening is done in the real world that it might (must) introduce its

own artifacts. It ignores the effect of practice, of long-term

listening experience with the particular amplifier or amplifiers in

question (you have to learn to listen to amplifiers in general, and

particular amplifiers in particular). The Consumer Reports approach

is, in a word (OK, two words), reductive and distorting. It can assess

the listening experience with the scientific method with its

falsifiable hypotheses only by ignoring crucially important facts, or

" data " if you like.

What's wrong with the CR approach to hifi is, mutatis mutandis, what's

wrong with most social science research in general. It is Consumer

Reports, but Jung is _The Absolute Sound_, if you take my meaning.

Hifi doesn't matter much, but some of the rest of it does.

>

> Falsifiability has to do with the problem of a theory that can posit a

> truth claim under any possible circumstance.

One wonders if there are any truth claims " under any possible

circumstances. " Perhaps the assumption that there are is one of the

problems with positivism. In any event, the CR approach typically does

and can assess only one or a very few circumstances, often highly

artificial and unusual circumstances that one encounters rarely or

never in the life-world. Who puts his hifi set behind a curtain and

asks his wife to A/B the music for him, without telling him what's

what? No one.

>

> In fact your theory of experience and expertise is not particularly

> falsifiable so it can't give an explanatory account of who's explanation

> would be superior should two experts both have similar bona fides.

At which point we call it about even, have some chardonnay, and fire

up the hifi. An insistence on mathematical precision all the time is,

to say the least, not necessary.

>

> The Analytic Psychology hasn't developed in the direction of scientific

> theory-making--for the most part--because the theories about its core

> constructs aren't falsifiable.

Why is this not a limitation of " scientific method " rather than a

limit of analytic psychology?

>

> That just means that to take its model of the psyche as being

implicate in

> each and every psyche is an act of faith alone.

Not faith alone, but observation. If I say that, with Klipsch

speakers, single-ended tube amps sound better than high powered solid

states amps (even very good ones - I once tried a Krell), this is not

a matter of faith but of my direct experience. Someone might object,

" But Dan, your very own brain and memories, your very own " wet-ware, "

may enter into it, such that you can't tell where the equipment leaves

off and you begin in creating the subjective experience. " To which

objection I reply, " Just so. What of it? There is no need to try to

'separate out' the wet-ware from the hardware by means of method, and

indeed to do so is to introduce distortion into the whole phenomenon. "

Hifi, good or bad, only " sounds " because sensate beings hear it. You

have to take account of the wet-ware.

>This is okay because

> 'whatever floats your boat.' But, it's no different assuming that

> everybody necessarily lives in a cosmos where there is (also)

necessarily

> a God;

I said nothing of God and know nothing of God.

best regards,

Dan wAtkins

an assumption driven simply because those that hold it have faith

> that it is so.

>

> regards,

>

>

>

[Guest guest]

Dan, all,

I have not the slightest idea about what your hi-fi example has to do with

falsifiability.

(1) Is [A] testable or observable?

(2) Can a test (or observation,) be imagined that falsifies it?

This has some neat utility in dividing up claims between claims ready to

be tested and those that are not, or, cannot be tested. Roughly...

Should biologists spend a lot of time on Intelligent Design? Sure, at such

times when ID generates falsifiable claims, it would be worth biologist's

time to see if those claims can actually be tested.

***

> The Analytic Psychology hasn't developed in the direction of scientific

theory-making--for the most part--because the theories about its core

constructs aren't falsifiable.

>> Why is this not a limitation of " scientific method " rather than a limit

of analytic psychology?

Why is 'what' a limitation? Scientific-theory making happens for the

purpose of doing science.

A concept such as 'the collective unconscious' isn't falsifiable. Analytic

Psychologists, for whatever reasons, haven't really spent much time

developing the classic concepts so that they can be researched

scientifically.

Analytic Psychology does fine--may be an effective therapy, has gifted

phenomenologically-minded disciplines with lots of rich categories and

concepts. That's all to the good. I'll settle for these gains.

regards,

[Guest guest]

Dear ,

>

> Dan, all,

>

> I have not the slightest idea about what your hi-fi example has to

do with

> falsifiability.

Falsifiable hypothesis: there are no audible differences between

amplifier A and amplifier B. This is the null hypothesis.

Experiment: double blind test requiring subjects to listen to

amplifier A and amplifier B, without knowing which is which, in order

to discover whether or not they can reliably distinguish one from the

other, solely on the basis of what they hear. If they can, then the

null hypothesis is falsified and rejected.

Consumer Reports actually runs such experiments, and reports the results.

The problems with such experiments and their conclusions are as I have

already outlined. Briefly, the fact that the subjects can't hear the

differences (they almost never can) doesn't mean that the differences

aren't there.

To repeat the wine example, if two dissipated winos can't tell the

difference between two chardonnays, it does not follow that the

difference does not exist.

>

> (1) Is [A] testable or observable?

> (2) Can a test (or observation,) be imagined that falsifies it?

>

> This has some neat utility in dividing up claims between claims ready to

> be tested and those that are not, or, cannot be tested.

What is the relationship between utility and the truth?

>Roughly...

>

> Should biologists spend a lot of time on Intelligent Design? Sure,

at such

> times when ID generates falsifiable claims, it would be worth

biologist's

> time to see if those claims can actually be tested.

Again, if ID cannot generate falsifiable hypotheses, that does not

prove that ID is false. It only serves to point up the inadequacy of

the scientific method to comprehend and describe nature or the whole.

If the tool can't do the job, the limitation is in the tool - it is

not the " fault " of the job.

>

> ***

>

> > The Analytic Psychology hasn't developed in the direction of

scientific

> theory-making--for the most part--because the theories about its core

> constructs aren't falsifiable.

>

> >> Why is this not a limitation of " scientific method " rather than a

limit

> of analytic psychology?

>

> Why is 'what' a limitation?

The fact that scientific method is inadequate to the job of

determining the truth or falsehood of analytic psychology.

If scientific " theory making " requires experimentally falsifiable

hypotheses, then scientific theory making is ipso fact not up to the

job of describing the whole, insofar as the life world does not

organize itself into scientifically falsifiable hypotheses. " Science "

is then shown to be at best a technology producer, and not philosophy.

>Scientific-theory making happens for the

> purpose of doing science.

This sounds like a mere tautology to me. What is " doing science " ?

Scientific theory making.

What is " doing science " really, and - more to the point - why do it if

it cannot comprehend complex phenomena (never mind the whole)?

>

> A concept such as 'the collective unconscious' isn't falsifiable.

What has that got to do with its being or its nature?

You observe that the mother archetype appears projected (that's the

UCS part) everywhere (that's the collective part) and Bob's your

uncle. Why isn't that enough?

> Analytic

> Psychologists, for whatever reasons, haven't really spent much time

> developing the classic concepts so that they can be researched

> scientifically.

Perhaps because " developing " them will break them down till

unrecognizable. You can't understand a cathedral by looking at the

individual stones.

>

> Analytic Psychology does fine--may be an effective therapy, has gifted

> phenomenologically-minded disciplines with lots of rich categories and

> concepts. That's all to the good. I'll settle for these gains.

But do you think that analytic psychology is true?

regards,

Dan Watkins

>

> regards,

>

>

>

[Guest guest]

Dan, all,

Okay okay, I get it.

Falsification has to do with the testability of of a claim. It doesn't

have anything to do with whether the claim is true or not.

ID may be true. So might the collective consciousness exist as a universal

structure or implicit operation of such a structure.

The question is, in making any claim under either 'field,' how is the

claim to be investigated? What are the then the requirements for a claim

being scientifically investigated?

***

The Hi Fi example is about a falsification is not concerned with

falsifiability.

> Falsifiable hypothesis: there are no audible differences between

> amplifier A and amplifier B.

Yes. Now, how to learn the truth of the matter.

***

> What is the relationship between utility and the truth?

As a matter of practicality, one relationship is that a useful tool might

make the investigation or experiment be more efficient.

> Again, if ID cannot generate falsifiable hypotheses, that does not

> prove that ID is false.

ID is not true or false in actual practice. The status of 'truth' vis a

vis ID is easy to state: proponents of ID believe ID is true, and now are

moved to demonstrate it is true.

Scientifically? No. But, some of the ID crowd is working to create a

post-naturalistic science that allows for inference to a cause without

needing to know anything about the operations of the cause. They may be

successful. I don't know. The ID hypothesis could be rendered in a

falsifiable manner.

But the curious thing is that there is, for this crowd, there is no

imaginable way that there could be not an intelligent designer. So, I

wonder why they waste time trying to provide a demonstration of something

they are 100% sure of.

***

> It only serves to point up the inadequacy of

> the scientific method to comprehend and describe nature or the whole.

Yes. This isn't even the scientific project to comprehend and describe the

'whole.'

***

> The fact that scientific method is inadequate to the job of

> determining the truth or falsehood of analytic psychology.

I agree. Science can only bite off what it can actually and fruitfully

investigate. Psychology writ as meta-psychology and philosophy of

psychology and systematic cognitive investigation of cognition, kind of

loops to the conundrum of the system looking into itself.

However, irrespective of those problems, many of which can be articulated

as not possibly solvable, and, granting all sorts useful claims that

cannot be rendered adequately for the purpose of being investigated using

scientific procedures, *a truth claim* must in some way be subject to some

criteria and procedure of verification and validation.

The best sometimes is this: there is intersubjective agreement; there is

utility; there is a provisional finding worthy of closer examination;

there is enough apparent truthfulness to warrant forging an evolution of

the claim to greater truthfulness.

***

> You observe that the mother archetype appears projected (that's the

> UCS part) everywhere (that's the collective part) and Bob's your

> uncle. Why isn't that enough?

You castigate science for pretending it is really ambitious when it can't

possibly comprehend the whole, and then you wonder why this claim isn't

enough?

You wish it both ways.

***

Let me address your example. It's entirely descriptive. You drop in:

" that's the UCS part. "

It changes the sense of your statement not a whit were I to drop in:

" that's the made-up part. "

Isn't the UC in a similar propositional relationship to the psyche as the

Godly designer is to nature? We can have faith in its existence, even in

its necessary existence, but all our inferential stories do is beg the

question of why it is that story, and not some other story.

***

I'm so thoroughly a post-modernist and fence sitter and anti-positivist

and deep relativist and pluralist and digger that the principal interest

this discussion presents is, once again, why people latch onto something

and then hold it with all their might as if something really essential

depended on its never be loosed from this grip.

***

Is the UC truly existant? It's true enough to be useful for some people.

That's most excellent in my book. ian, y'know.

Is it true enough for anybody to claim it is universally an existant

mental structure found in the psyche of all human beings? I'm not moved

much by the totality of evidence. The evidence is actually exceedingly

modest--to me. I wish there was scientific research being done on this

subject to nail behavioral pattern generation (of the type supposed by a

conception of the UC) to actual physiological structures. There isn't. So,

tis life.

regards,

[Guest guest]

Dear ,

>

> Dan, all,

>

> Okay okay, I get it.

>

> Falsification has to do with the testability of of a claim. It doesn't

> have anything to do with whether the claim is true or not.

That's not what scientists think. They think that if they falsify a

hypothesis (or not, either way), they have gripped a piece of the

truth. Otherwise, why do the experiment? The CR scientists think that

they are discovering truth, and by doing so helping people to avoid

wasting their money under the influence of spurious claims by hi-fi

snake-oil salesmen.

>

> ID may be true. So might the collective consciousness exist as a

universal

> structure or implicit operation of such a structure.

>

> The question is, in making any claim under either 'field,' how is the

> claim to be investigated?

If the field is psychology, one observes and works with the human

soul, ala Jung. There is no precise or mathematical method that can be

published in a text book and taught to mediocrities so as to make them

little Jungs. Maybe you can teach calculus to mediocrities by reducing

it to method, but not psychology or political science or a host of

other human things that matter. Hence the call on the part of some to

reject social science as it has existed since 1870 or so, and return

(as Jung did) to an earlier and more fruitful approach.

>What are the then the requirements for a claim

> being scientifically investigated?

Observe, analyze, integrate, I guess. It is best to cite examples,

though, I think. In the so-called human sciences, Aristotle. Plato. etc.

>

> ***

>

> The Hi Fi example is about a falsification is not concerned with

> falsifiability.

I'm sorry, I don't know what this means.

>

> > Falsifiable hypothesis: there are no audible differences between

> > amplifier A and amplifier B.

>

> Yes. Now, how to learn the truth of the matter.

>

> ***

>

> > What is the relationship between utility and the truth?

>

> As a matter of practicality, one relationship is that a useful tool

might

> make the investigation or experiment be more efficient.

Why do I care about that? What am I doing the investigation or

experiment for to begin with, such that I want it to be more efficient?

>

> > Again, if ID cannot generate falsifiable hypotheses, that does not

> > prove that ID is false.

>

> ID is not true or false in actual practice.

Every statement must be true, false or meaningless. ID is not

meaningless, so it must be either true or false. I don't know what

" actual practice' means here.

> The status of 'truth' vis a

> vis ID is easy to state: proponents of ID believe ID is true, and

now are

> moved to demonstrate it is true.

>

> Scientifically? No. But, some of the ID crowd is working to create a

> post-naturalistic science that allows for inference to a cause without

> needing to know anything about the operations of the cause.

Nature. Nature is the miracles we're used to (that formulation makes

as much sense as any).

> They may be

> successful. I don't know. The ID hypothesis could be rendered in a

> falsifiable manner.

>

> But the curious thing is that there is, for this crowd, there is no

> imaginable way that there could be not an intelligent designer. So, I

> wonder why they waste time trying to provide a demonstration of

something

> they are 100% sure of.

They do it for political reasons. They live in a post-enlightenment

world were the scientists are effectively in charge, and they are

savvy enough to know they have to deal. I will say that the scientists

often seem to be blind-sided, and even incensed, at the opposition.

They think they won the war once and for all 400 years ago, and are

now the unjustly attacked " good guys " who only want to protect us from

the hifi snake oil salesmen, and the Jungian analyst snake-oil

salesmen, and so on.

>

> ***

> > It only serves to point up the inadequacy of

> > the scientific method to comprehend and describe nature or the whole.

>

> Yes. This isn't even the scientific project to comprehend and

describe the

> 'whole.'

I know. I'm sayin'. That's what's wrong with it, and why it represents

a " debouchement " of philosophy.

>

> ***

>

> > The fact that scientific method is inadequate to the job of

> > determining the truth or falsehood of analytic psychology.

>

> I agree. Science can only bite off what it can actually and fruitfully

> investigate. Psychology writ as meta-psychology and philosophy of

> psychology and systematic cognitive investigation of cognition, kind of

> loops to the conundrum of the system looking into itself.

>

> However, irrespective of those problems, many of which can be

articulated

> as not possibly solvable, and, granting all sorts useful claims that

> cannot be rendered adequately for the purpose of being investigated

using

> scientific procedures, *a truth claim* must in some way be subject

to some

> criteria and procedure of verification and validation.

But not necessarily " textbookable " criteria and procedures.

The scientists at some point, following Machiavelli, said that the

truth of the whole is too hard to look for. Let's do the little bit

that we can, and establish some criteria and procedures of

verification and validation that anyone of ordinary intelligence can

learn and follow, and maybe we can at least cure some diseases or send

rockets to the moon or something. And so they did. But Jung, a

philosopher, rejects this approach as both too narrow and not leading

to relevant, and, following him, so do I. Procedures of verification

and validation? Jung says, read his books, though they are thick, and

learn Latin and Greek, and achieve some self-knowledge - if you can.

Experience guides by those who have had the experience - that, per his

" empiricism, " is the only way.

>

> The best sometimes is this: there is intersubjective agreement; there is

> utility; there is a provisional finding worthy of closer examination;

> there is enough apparent truthfulness to warrant forging an evolution of

> the claim to greater truthfulness.

If this is the best that science can do, then Nietzsche is right, it

is just another form of nihilism and there is, to say the least, no

reason for a philosopher or friend of philosophy to prefer it to the

approach of the ancients or the medievals.

>

> ***

>

> > You observe that the mother archetype appears projected (that's the

> > UCS part) everywhere (that's the collective part) and Bob's your

> > uncle. Why isn't that enough?

>

> You castigate science for pretending it is really ambitious when it

can't

> possibly comprehend the whole, and then you wonder why this claim isn't

> enough?

I don't castigate science for being too ambitious, but for not being

ambitious enough. " I know or care nothing of the whole, but I can say

that Prozac mitigated X, Y and Z symptoms of moderate major depression

in 68% of cases in a study of 238 outpatients in a major midwestern

city, as measure by the Zung depression scale " Is this noble? It is

narrow and cheeseparing. Let it be broader, even if less precise - and

the hell of it is, it usually isn't even very precise.

>

> You wish it both ways.

>

> ***

>

> Let me address your example. It's entirely descriptive. You drop in:

> " that's the UCS part. "

>

> It changes the sense of your statement not a whit were I to drop in:

> " that's the made-up part. "

>

> Isn't the UC in a similar propositional relationship to the psyche

as the

> Godly designer is to nature?

If you mean that it is a story or narrative that we use to describe or

explain to ourselves our observation, then yes. But not more so than

is the narrative - the twice told tale - of causality and science.

What is " the law of gravity " but a fairly tale that means no more or

less than another tale that says that things love each other and are

attracted to each other? We tell ourselves many pretty tales about the

" laws of nature. "

We can have faith in its existence, even in

> its necessary existence, but all our inferential stories do is beg the

> question of why it is that story, and not some other story.

>

> ***

>

> I'm so thoroughly a post-modernist and fence sitter and anti-positivist

> and deep relativist and pluralist and digger that the principal interest

> this discussion presents is, once again, why people latch onto something

> and then hold it with all their might as if something really essential

> depended on its never be loosed from this grip.

different question, all right. My opinion is that people believe what

they need to believe, and for the most part are not interested in the

truth. Since that is our nature, maybe it is not so good all the time

to be messing with it.

>

> ***

>

> Is the UC truly existant? It's true enough to be useful for some people.

> That's most excellent in my book. ian, y'know.

>

> Is it true enough for anybody to claim it is universally an existant

> mental structure found in the psyche of all human beings? I'm not moved

> much by the totality of evidence. The evidence is actually exceedingly

> modest--to me. I wish there was scientific research being done on this

> subject to nail behavioral pattern generation (of the type supposed by a

> conception of the UC) to actual physiological structures. There

isn't. So,

> tis life.

Perhaps there will, altho not sure why it matters.

regards,

Dan

>

> regards,

>

>

>