Re: Re: A Different Look at Bird Flu and Pandemics

[Guest guest]

cbwillis9 wrote:

> Aphorism 141 from Hahnemann's ORGANON OF MEDICINE 6th edition

> deals with the physician's self- " provings " regarding

> a remedy for research purposes..........

> The last paragraph of Aphorism 141 speaks to physicial provers

> deliberately taking on these temporary specific " proving " symptoms,

> but that as an incidental result the provers would generally

> enhance their immunity to external threats. .......

> " His health becomes more invariable, he becomes

> more robust. All experience shows this. "

Carol, The part about " all experience shows this " includes prophylactic

use. You need to read Hahnemann's case books and the details of the use

of remedies in animals for prophylaxis since 1808 at least.

The 6th Ed was written in 1843 by which there was a lot of experience to

use.

So prophylaxis was already well established based on the PRINCIPLE

described where taking a remedy while healthy, builds resistance.

Taking it to the point of getting symptoms of a proving turns out to be

unnecessary to build resistance, though if you wanted to do that you

could :-)

> While some might construe #141 as a Hahnemannian blessing on

> prophylactic use of remedies such as the Oscillo. duck remedy

> as a preventive for bird flu, I find that interpretation

> a " stretch "

Only because you have not read the vast experience to which Hahnemann

refers in the Aph 141 - plus the vast subsequent prophylactic use of

remedies for more then 200 years since they were first used that way by

Hahnemann and his peers.

> since in intended prophylaxis one would be taking a

> remedy NOT for the purpose of " proving " it or possibly enhancing

> immunity generally, but to attain a SPECIFIC immunity

Now that's really trying to split hairs :-))

As Hahnemann explains, homeopathy works by increasing resistance to the

symptoms associated with the remedy. A proving goes a step further and

insults the individual's body by forcing an excessive amount of remedy

into the person and the individual's system objects by producing

" proving " symptoms till the insult is stopped.

If your read and understand the Organon in toto - this is very well

explained throughout, so any idea that one needs to overdo it for

prophylaxis to the point of getting proving symptoms, is not valid by

the principles explained. Aph 141 only explains the DISCOVERY that

prophylaxis is available to healthy people by taking a remedy. The ONLY

reason to *overdo* it, is to find out what symptoms the remedy can help

in a sick person - or prevent in a well one. There's no need to always

overdo it to the point of proving symptoms if all you need is to develop

resistance to getting the symptoms of the remedy - bird flu or whatever

remedy you like.

Homeoprophylaxis works with any remedy, it need not be a specific

disease like bird flu. For example I use it in cat breeding to prevent

uterine infections, by giving breeding queens a dose of Pyrogenium 200C

at parturition, and I use a dose of Aconite 200C to prevent their

picking up infections at cat shows or vet visits.

Prophylaxis in homeopathy is something that just comes with the

territory, since the entire system of homeopathy is all about resistance

to disease.

Those who do not choose to use remedies for prophylaxis have not

read Hahnemann's works with proper depth and understanding and seem to

have turned a blind eye to true principle of the system apart from the

results so evident in its use. (Not that I blame them - there is an

enormous amount of work output for one lifetime from this man; it's

amazing.)

Namaste,

Irene

--

Irene de Villiers, B.Sc AASCA MCSSA D.I.Hom. Box 4703 Spokane WA 99220.

www.angelfire.com/fl/furryboots/clickhere.html (Veterinary Homeopath.)

Proverb:Man who say it cannot be done should not interrupt one doing it.

[Guest guest]

cbwillis9 wrote:

> UK Homeopath (http://www.smeddum.net)

Ms on her website lists her credentials as LHom DHom(Ed). those

are not common ones, it would be interesting to know where they come

from and what they cover.

Homeopathy schools can offer courses from 4 weekends to many years

duration, which is why I ask. These credentials don't come from any of

the well known full-term education schools I know of.

Because a homeopath can be someone who sincerely thinks they are one

after their training or someone who is fully trained as one, this really

matters.

The other reason I ask, is due to statements like the one on bird flu

here which is taken seriously by all the full-term homeopathy schools

with which I am familiar, yet this person laughs off prophylaxis:

> In the case of infectious diseases

> which are largely an imaginary creation out of

> fear and supposition, and likely a generous slug of commercial

> exploitation into the bargain (eg.'avian flu'), definitely not.

> Generally I treat what is manifest. I would be much more inclined

> to treat the *fear* of infectious diseases (MIND, FEAR, disease of,

> impending (104 Rx) and the subrubric ... contagious, epidemic,

> infection (25 Rx)) than I would some spectre of the

> imagination. [...]

She claims with no data (as the data shows the opposite using

homeoprophylaxis):

> so if you treated

> the 'flu' prophylactically, it would have little effect

So we have a choice.

Believe this person or believe what history shows and what full-term

schools of homeopathy teach. The lack of prophylaxis teaching is typical

of short-term homeopathy education where there is not time to go into

depth on the principles.

Carol, you seem to WANT to promote such less-than-complete knowledge? I

hope not, but your private email to me also contains assumptions based

on less than complete knowledge.

> At base this scare is all about

> the terror of being overwhelmed by the unspeakably immense forces

> of nature as they manifest through the body, so consequently

> there is a desire to do something ... anything!

This is an irrational statement.

The 1918 pandemic did not have media to enforce panic, nor was there the

easy world travel that we have no to spread media hype or drug companies

to spread vaccine propaganda. Yet people died in droves. they were taken

by surprise.

Bird flu indeed has as much hype on TV as drug companies can whip up

to be sure their vaccines will be used, but that will not change the

rate of infection except adversely. History shows vaccines will increase

the death rate as it did in the 1918 pandemic. So this panic idea is

backwards. It's those who do NOT panic, who do NOT use vaccines or

aspirin, and those using homeoprophylaxis, that have the good survival rate.

In 1918 the flu took people by surprise. Knowing it may come this

time round may indeed add an extra factor of panic which is not great -

but to suggest that is a reason to avoid prophylaxis is backwards. To

use prophylaxis (homeoprophylaxis) is both efficacious as shown in

history of epidemics and will thus if anything lower fears incase that's

a significant factor.

To suggest not using homeoprophylaxis is thus counterproductive to

her own theory on fear being a factor.

> It's the fundamental fear

> of life -- very prevalent in the West. The snake remedies come up

> large here. [...]

The snake remedies are not a " fear " set of remedies. Homeopathy handles

ALL the symptoms, emotional and physical, and snake remedies are

unlikely to be useful in flu. The fright here is media-imposed, a

separate issue from the disease itself, which Ms has apparently

forgotten. Aconite 200C will allay that panic - which can be seen as a

separate dis-ease, but not as part of a syndrome that *results* from flu

susceptibility. Fear that *results* from getting a disease is not the

same as fear about getting it. Rubrics in homeopathy address them

separately.

True flu symptoms will not be helped by snake remedies. Flu symptoms are

helped by remedies such as Belladonna, Arsenicum album, Gelsemium,

Eupatorium perforatum, Rhus toxicodendron and Pulsatilla.

One of more remedies will be more specific than others for the

average epidemic/pandemic victim in a specific epidemic/pandemic, with a

few other remedies also in quite common use to address the different

ways different people respond to the infection.

To suggest that it is inappropriate to boost the resistance to avian flu

in people is not in my opinion a very responsible statement from a

properly trained homeopath.

> training course and treat people professionally, then I suspect

> that the majority of homeopaths don't treat prophylactically

> -- in India they have no time for such niceties in busy clinics

On the contrary, India is a place where homeoprophylaxis is used a lot.

When last was she there?

> COMMENT:

> I think is right-on here regarding fear of

> infection, fear of overwhelming natural forces, even fear of life,

> being a core issue here in regard to the spectre of bird flu.

It's one thing to point out that a fear-isue is being created BY THE

MEDIA - and quite another to suggest that a fear issue is part of avian

flu syndrome itself.

A suggestion to treat the fear of diseases would be sensible here - but

to jump to the wild conclusion that bird fly will respond to snake

remedies is nowhere near within homeopathy principles.

You would in any case not treat fear with snake remedies! You'd treat

with Aconitum napellus most likely, or Arnica montana depending on the

type of fear.

> A premier remedy for fear/terror/trauma/

> somaticized trauma to the body is ACONITE. Aconite 200C is

> my preferred " first hint of a flu bug " remedy

So what is her snake remedy idea all about - she's not making sense.

Aconite (aconitum napellus) is the remedy for getting a fright whether

the fright is seeing a terrible accident, being in one, or the body

getting an infection - which is also a fright to the body in first

stages before pathology sets in and when we just feel something coming on.

Aconite addresses all these initial fright situations and is well

known therefore to " nip infections in the bid " - but it does not help

the pathology so needs to be used *before* pathology sets in. PAthology

needs matched remedies.

Going back to the point of the discussion, I see nothing here that

remotely offers a reason to wait till one gets bird flu instead of using

homeoprophylaxis to build resistance to getting bird flu. If anything

media-cuased fear about it will reduce resistance and that is all the

more reason to build it up as opposed to the opposite.

Carol, why are you looking for people who do not use homeoprophylaxis

and trying to promote that view? Have you not seen the benefit

throughout history of having INCREASED resistance to illness before an

epidemic/pandemic arrives? Surely it is logical to want to be resistant

rather than being susceptible. Not to do that is like advocating

standing in the middle of the road when a car is coming, and saying

you'll use remedies to get well after the car hits you. How is that

smart planning?

Why not take the media hype, look at it logically, decide a flu

pandemic is indeed possible, and take the step (which cost me $1) to be

sure one has resistance if it does come along.

In terms of cost-benefit and risk ratio, heck let that one duck

provide help for the millions at a very tiny cost each. People spend

more on lottery tickets and pancake syrup with far less chance of benefit.

Namaste,

Irene

--

Irene de Villiers, B.Sc AASCA MCSSA D.I.Hom. Box 4703 Spokane WA 99220.

www.angelfire.com/fl/furryboots/clickhere.html (Veterinary Homeopath.)

Proverb:Man who say it cannot be done should not interrupt one doing it.

[Guest guest]

cbwillis9 wrote:

> Irene, you seem really stuck on [worldly] credentials

> and formal training programs and degrees.

On the contrary.

I am stuck on what homeopathy teaches, and I explained - in detail - why

the writings you posted do not contain those necessary teachings. I'm

sorry if you took offence when I suggested your private post also lacked

what you would have learned in formal training. There are some GOOD

reasons doctors may not practice medicine unless they have a license -

and the same should apply to homeopathy in my opinion - so yes in that

regard I am stuck on " being qualified " .

Credentials do not always equal qualifications worth heaving. It depends

where they come from. Alone they can mean anything - I have often been

offered a PhD for $10 by some spam post for example.

SO you may say I am stuck on people being properly *qualified* to

suggest homeopathy to other people, but the *credentials* alone are not

necessarily relevant.

> If you have a problem with W, her background, or the truth and

> usefulness of her ideas, you can take it up with her.

On the contrary - I have every right if nor obligation to take it up

with your post here on this list - as this is where the discussion is

and this is where my opinion if silent, might be taken for agreement -

and I would not like that to happen!

I've no obligation or inclination to take it up elsewhere. If I was to

take up every person writing inappropriate things on homeopathy on the

internet I'd have no time for practising it myself:-))

If you present someone's views here, you need to expect them to be seen

in a critical light right here where you send them :-)) It doesn't make

your intentions bad, nor those of the person you quote (hopefully you

had permission as what anyone writes is copyright.)

> Her website/

> writings, and years of conversations have convinced me otherwise.

That may be, but with respect your own views were led astray somewhere,

and if you build on an erroneous foundation it is not the best way to

benefit.

> Degrees/certifications/credentials/sheepskins are not the be-all

> and end-all

as I said above:-))

> though I could certainly see how one who has gone

> through formal programs and the hoops it takes to get a particular

> degree, that they would be very identified with it, since they had

> invested so much of their life in getting it.

Well you make two assumptions here:

* That someone studying for a degree made sure before signing up that it

was a good one and not just an available one.

* that the degree so obtained holds status in its field.

The credentials of Ms H fail both tests.

My own qualifications come from two sources, and the second is indeed

world-renowned. The British Institute of Homeopathy is the biggest

well-recognized homeopathy school in the world and one of VERY few

accepted for state registration as a qualified homeopath, in countries

where that sensible level of training is required before one may

prescribe remedies and charge insurance. I equally respect homeopaths

from other schools whose education meets a similar high standard, but

there are not too many.

If you do not feel the level of ability is relevant after training then

we have a difference of opinion of some significance. After all it is

the health of others that is to be affected, and in such cases, the

quality and depth of training is not a matter of individual choice as it

affects more than the individual who was trained. others take us on

trust as health professionals and that trust really matters to me. I was

well qualified before I sought out the most recognized qualification and

added it, specifically because of respect for those I would serve with it.

> (And why they were

> doing that, not everyone else was doing nothing or sitting on their

> hands. Others were learning, gaining valuable experience,

> and even inventing valuable things in the meantime.)

Are you assuming that training at well recognized schools involved

sitting on hands and no practical experience? Perhaps you should find

out what IS involved before criticizing?

> Many of us are on this list because we have seen far too much

> from other approaches such as conventional medicine where a person

> has lots of formal training and credentials yet gives little

> or no value,

This only makes it MORE important, not less important, to ensure the

qualifications of a homeopath are appropriate to serve the public:-)) So

it is doubly sad that so many homeopathy training places do *not* bring

their students to even the minimum level required to be registered where

that is an option.

> Unfortunately, we see the same thing much of the time in various

> alternative or complementary disciplines.

That is my point too.

And it is why I criticized the person whose writings you quoted.

> Formal programs

> and credentials don't ensure truth or effectiveness or lack of

> harm.

Some do. Some do not.

As a BIH tutor, I do not pass ANY students of homeopathy who will not be

proficient as homeopaths.

> Truth, effectiveness, lack of harm, being true to

> my own experience, and fair dialogue are my own values here.

We all have values and yours are fine for you. But a homeopath's values

as a practitioner need to be at a very high standard because they need

to meet the needs not only of their own values but those of others.

For example, if a client does not wish to have homeoprophylaxis because

of THEIR values, then it should not be used, but it is remiss of a

homeopath not to know, understand and offer, the option of

homeoprophylaxis and be able to explain it's appropriate use and

benefits, as those indeed are part of homeopathy practice and experience

and therefore should be part of any good homeopath's tool kit.

> What I've been saying is that that prophylactic use of homeopathic

> remedies/nosodes is to some degree controversial in the discipline

It is not.

It is called controversial ONLY by those not properly trained.

In fact if a homeopath will not use it, that would be a good sign of

lack of training, and time to find a properly qualified one :-))

> If it weren't controversial, all homeopaths would be doing it

All properly qualified homeopaths - including all 80,000 BIH graduates,

and all graduates of all the schools I know of with equivalent

qualifications world-wide, indeed are using homeoprophylaxis :-))

> Homeopathic prophylaxis should not be considered a slam dunk

Nowhere in any homeopathy training worth its salt is there any teaching

about " slam dunk " . Homeopathy is BASED on individual prescribing. It's

odd how you feel qualified to criticize the qualifications of homeopaths

without having attended a school yourself?

Whether to use homeoprophylaxis or not is the same way -

individualized like the rest of homeopathy. If one is healthy and

resistant and unlikely to be exposed, there is no need. But if a

homeopath's client is for example visiting sub-Saharan Africa and the

homeopath does not advise malaria prophylaxis, the homeopath should be

" hung and quartered " or sued for malpractice.

I am not a proponent of using homeoprophylaxis for everything under the

sun, nor is any good homeopath. There is a place for homeoprophylaxis,

and every individual case being different, it should be assessed as to

where it is or is not needed, in proportion to risk assessment - and

with client involvement in the decision.

> Further, a formal degree should not be used to jam this idea

> down people's throats.

Nobody here used a degree to jam anything - you are extremely rude to

suggest it.

There's a big difference between saying do it " because I have a degree "

- and explaining it as I did. Feel free to debate me on homeopathy

grounds - using homeopathy principles, experience, Hahnemann's

teachings, case books and Organon as I did - but don't just be rude.

> I see now that my 10 years

> of avid informal study and experience in classical homeopathy

> mentioned in PRIVATE email counts for nothing with you.

I did not say it counts for nothing, those are your words - but I did

say you have SOME ideas that are off track, and I regret you were misled

and that you feel being misled means it is okay for you to mislead

others too. Again there are GOOd reasons why formal advising of others

needs a specific level of proficiency and why half a loaf is NOT better

than nothing in many cases - it can be dangerous.

That said - nobody knows everything, and any good homeopath is a

perpetual student. But there needs to be a certain minimum level of

knowledge, understanding and experience achieved in my opinion before

advising the public - as also believed and achieved by the major schools

who also train students to that high level.

As with the medical profession, someone has to graduate at the bottom of

the class - but there still is a minimum proficiency requirement to get

there at least - and that level in my opinion needs to at least be attained.

> For PUBLIC disclosure, I do issue a disclaimer upfront on

> all of my articles and archive site top page that I am not a doctor,

> that my comments should be consider speculative

> and personal history only.

There was none in your posts here.

Pretending to be a professional when you lack formal training is not

excused by having a dsisclaimer in most USA states by the way. In other

words there is a principle of law that you " may not contract out of your

area of responsibility " - meaning you will be held responsible

regardless of any disclaimer, if you are the person responsible for the

situaiton.

> I underplay all of my varied background,

> and allow the ideas to stand on their own ground.

If you want to pretend to be a professional, (and I do not condone that

where it affects the health of others) then you need to be polite

instead of rude when those ideas are challenged - and debate the ideas

on their appropriate ground and not by getting personal :-)

Good intentions are not enough in the health care field.

Be well.

Namaste,

Irene

--

Irene de Villiers, B.Sc AASCA MCSSA D.I.Hom. Box 4703 Spokane WA 99220.

www.angelfire.com/fl/furryboots/clickhere.html (Veterinary Homeopath.)

Proverb:Man who say it cannot be done should not interrupt one doing it.

[Guest guest]

Hi Ondolinde:

's fear of infection is just the beginning. When we fear something

the first thought is the fear of it then when we think about it some

more we fear the fear of it then we fear the fear of thinking about the

fear.. So it gets compounded over time to be become that we are fearful

beings. We are fear. NOW figure out what THAT does to the body, mind and

Spirit.

There is an answer that involves possibly using a number of different

things. Certainly a part of the answer lies within ourselves and yet we

don't know how to activate it because we were never taught.

Blessings,

Ondolindë Westernesse wrote:

>cbwillis9 (Carol): I think is right-on here regarding

>fear of infection, fear of overwhelming natural forces, even fear of

>life, being a core issue here in regard to the spectre of bird flu.

>

>

>Fear, as Carol mentions above, is indeed an " overwhelming natural

>force(s) " . From my experience it is capable of creating illness,

>even death, through the mind's conviction. Meaning, if I am fearful

>that I will contract the Bird Flu, in all likelihood I will either

>do so or create a similar illness.

>

>My personal approach is to *not* discount the seriousness of this

>matter, but to view it like all other issues I encounter: from a

>holistic perspective.

>

>

>Ondolindë

>

>

>

[Guest guest]

B. Monier- wrote:

> There is an answer that involves possibly using a number of different

> things. Certainly a part of the answer lies within ourselves and yet we

> don't know how to activate it because we were never taught.

The predisposition to be fearful can be addressed with appropriate

homeopathy :-)

Aconitum napellus as first aid for example - and/or other remedies

matched to the individual and their fear/s.

Namaste,

IRene

--

Irene de Villiers, B.Sc AASCA MCSSA D.I.Hom. Box 4703 Spokane WA 99220.

www.angelfire.com/fl/furryboots/clickhere.html (Veterinary Homeopath.)

Proverb:Man who say it cannot be done should not interrupt one doing it.

[Guest guest]

Celeste:

I agree, fear can be overcome by education and/or therapy though I don't

think I'll be vaccinated. For those that want to, make sure there's no

Hg in it.

P.S. I seem to remember that someone in this group wrote that in the

1918 pandemic that deaths amongst those who were not vaccinated were

less than those that were... is this correct and if so what were the

figures and how do we know?

a1thighmaster wrote:

>Yes, and that's precisely why I believe that education is the best

>treatment for fear. For example, in the case of polio within the

>Minnesota Amish commununity (see

>http://www.mennoweekly.org/NOVEMBER/11-07-05/POLIO11-07.html ) the

>only reason those people wouldn't get vaccinated was because they

>didn't know what was in the vaccine. Education would have allowed

>those people to overcome their fear and get vaccinated. Then there

>would have been no polio victims.

>

>Best regards,

>Celeste

>

>

[Guest guest]

a1thighmaster wrote:

> Yes, and that's precisely why I believe that education is the best

> treatment for fear. For example, in the case of polio within the

> Minnesota Amish commununity (see

> http://www.mennoweekly.org/NOVEMBER/11-07-05/POLIO11-07.html ) the

> only reason those people wouldn't get vaccinated was because they

> didn't know what was in the vaccine. Education would have allowed

> those people to overcome their fear and get vaccinated. Then there

> would have been no polio victims.

Except such communities that remained unvaccinated had far LESS illness

than vaccinated communities. So they were the smart ones:-))

.....Irene

--

Irene de Villiers, B.Sc AASCA MCSSA D.I.Hom.

[Guest guest]

B. Monier- wrote:

> P.S. I seem to remember that someone in this group wrote that in the

> 1918 pandemic that deaths amongst those who were not vaccinated were

> less than those that were... is this correct and if so what were the

> figures and how do we know?

It's correct.

Detail here:

http://www.nesh.com/main/nejh/samples/winston.html

More in n Winston's book.

Namaste,

IRene

--

Irene de Villiers, B.Sc AASCA MCSSA D.I.Hom. Box 4703 Spokane WA 99220.

www.angelfire.com/fl/furryboots/clickhere.html (Veterinary Homeopath.)

Proverb:Man who say it cannot be done should not interrupt one doing it.

[Guest guest]

Irene:

Thanks for the good info.

Irene de Villiers wrote:

> B. Monier- wrote:

>

>

>>P.S. I seem to remember that someone in this group wrote that in the

>>1918 pandemic that deaths amongst those who were not vaccinated were

>>less than those that were... is this correct and if so what were the

>>figures and how do we know?

>>

>>

>

>It's correct.

>Detail here:

>http://www.nesh.com/main/nejh/samples/winston.html

>More in n Winston's book.

>

>Namaste,

> IRene

>

>

>

[Guest guest]

That did not answer your question! It is not good info!

I will reply when I have more time.

Steve

At 08:06 PM 11/9/2005 -0700, you wrote:

>Irene:

>Thanks for the good info.

>

>

>

>

>Irene de Villiers wrote:

>

> > B. Monier- wrote:

> >

> >

> >>P.S. I seem to remember that someone in this group wrote that in the

> >>1918 pandemic that deaths amongst those who were not vaccinated were

> >>less than those that were... is this correct and if so what were the

> >>figures and how do we know?

> >>

> >>

> >

> >It's correct.

> >Detail here:

> >http://www.nesh.com/main/nejh/samples/winston.html

> >More in n Winston's book.

> >

> >Namaste,

> > IRene

> >

> >

> >

>

>

>

>

[Guest guest]

>

>P.S. I seem to remember that someone in this group wrote that in the

>1918 pandemic that deaths amongst those who were not vaccinated were

>less than those that were... is this correct and if so what were the

>figures and how do we know?

Earlier there was a ridiculous post stating that

20,000,000 deaths were caused by vaccines

see

From: " Mark Sircus Ac., OMD " <director@...>

<electroherbalism >

Date: Fri, 21 Oct 2005 11:40:25 -0200

Subject: [electroherbalism] Natural Influenza

Protocol with Magneisum and Vitamin C

In that post it states 20,000,000 deaths were caused by see below:

Each and every year at this time medical officals come out to

remind us of our mortal danger yet advocate medical procedures

that do little to nothing to protect us but cost billions.

Dr. Eleanor McBean was an on-the-spot observer of the 1918

Influenza epidemic and said, " As far as I could find out, the

flu hit only the vaccinated. Those who had refused the shots

escaped the flu. My family had refused all the vaccinations

so we remained well all the time. We (who didn't take any

vaccines) seemed to be the only family which didn't get the

flu. It has been said that the 1918 flu epidemic killed

20,000,000 people throughout the world. But, actually, the

doctors killed them with their crude and deadly treatments

and drugs. This is a harsh accusation but it is nevertheless

true. "

IT IS NOT TRUE!!!!!!!!!!

WHAT PROOF? LUDICROUS NOT A FACT!

Just because the Flat Earth Society still insists the planet is Flat

does not make it true.... Writing it down does not prove it so!

THERE WAS NO WAY TO MANUFACTURE AND DELIVER 20,000,000 vaccines in 1918!

Clinical Infectious Diseases 2000;31:1409-1413

© 2000 by the Infectious Diseases Society of America. All rights reserved.

1058-4838/2000/3106-0015$03.00

----------

SPECIAL SECTION: CONFRONTING BIOLOGICAL WEAPONS

A. , V. Inglesby, Jr., and Tara O'Toole, Section Editors

Implications of Pandemic Influenza for Bioterrorism Response

Schoch-Spana

Center for Civilian Biodefense Studies, s

Hopkins University School of Public Health, Baltimore, land

Received 17 July 2000; revised 7 August 2000;

electronically published 17 November 2000.

The 1918

1919 influenza pandemic (Spanish flu) had

catastrophic effects upon urban populations in

the United States. Large numbers of frightened,

critically ill people overwhelmed health care

providers. Mortuaries and cemeteries were

severely strained by rapid accumulation of

corpses of flu victims. Understanding of the

outbreak's extent and effectiveness of

containment measures was obscured by the

swiftness of the disease and an inadequate health

reporting system. Epidemic controls such as

closing public gathering places elicited both

community support and resistance, and fear of

contagion incited social and ethnic tensions.

Review of this infamous outbreak is intended to

advance discussions among health professionals

and policymakers about an effective medical and

public health response to bioterrorism, an

infectious disease crisis of increasing

likelihood. Elements of an adequate response

include building capacity to care for mass

casualties, providing emergency burials that

respect social mores, properly characterizing the

outbreak, earning public confidence in epidemic

containment measures, protecting against social

discrimination, and fairly allocating health resources.

----------

Reprints or correspondence: Dr.

Schoch-Spana, s Hopkins Center for Civilian

Biodefense Studies, Candler Building, Ste. 850,

111 Market Pl., Baltimore, MD 21202

(<mailto:mschoch@...>mschoch@...).

----------

At its peak, the 1918

1919 influenza pandemic (Spanish flu)

incapacitated American cities and paralyzed the

health care system. A 20th century outbreak of

disease with calamitous effects in this country,

Spanish flu is an apt case to influence current

bioterrorism planning efforts. This article

presents a set of principles meant to assist

medical, public health, and government leaders as

they construct a response to the potential mass

casualties and social turmoil initiated by a bioterrorist attack.

Influenza: Evolving Pathogens and Profound Health Burden

Throughout human history, global influenza

outbreaks have sickened large numbers of people,

claimed many lives, and dramatically disrupted

social and economic relations [1, 2]. The most infamous episode is the 1918

1919 influenza pandemic, which altered World War

I battle plans and peace talks and made almost 1

billion people (one-half the world's population)

ill, killing from 21 to 40 million [3, 4]. In

interpandemic years, flu still exacts a harsh

toll: excess deaths, in the aggregate, approach

pandemic levels

[<http://www.journals.uchicago.edu/CID/journal/issues/v31n6/000949/#rf2>2,

5, 6]. Influenza's destructive capacity resides

in the pace and unpredictability of the evolution

of the virus, which can subvert the body's immune

response and outstrip society's efforts at containment [7, 8].

Influenza viruses infect human host cells

(typically, epithelial cells that line the

respiratory tract) and reproduce [9, 10]. Flu's

characteristic structure is a sphere that

contains RNA material and is studded with protein

surface antigens: hemagglutinin that binds the

virus to the host cell, initiating replication,

and neuraminidase that frees up newly

manufactured virions from the host cell,

facilitating virus spread. Three types of

influenza virus exist: type A, isolated from

humans, birds, pigs, horses, and sea mammals; and

types B and C, found only in humans. Influenza A

viruses are subtyped according to the unique

surface antigens that they manifest (e.g., H1N1

and H3N2). Fifteen different types of

hemagglutinin and 9 types of neuraminidase have been observed.

Influenza A and B viruses are genetically

and structurally more similar to each other than

either are to influenza C viruses, and they

contribute to a greater proportion of human

disease than does influenza C virus

[<http://www.journals.uchicago.edu/CID/journal/issues/v31n6/000949/#rf10>10,

11]. Epidemics of influenza A tend to affect all

age groups but especially children and the

elderly, spread widely across regions and

continents, and exhibit significant excess

mortality rates. About 1% of all US deaths from

1972 through 1992 could be attributed to

influenza (9.1 deaths per 100,000 population per

season), most occurring when influenza A (H3N2)

viruses were prevalent

[<http://www.journals.uchicago.edu/CID/journal/issues/v31n6/000949/#rf5>5].

Characteristic of influenza B outbreaks are mild

respiratory disease that tends to target

children, potentially high attack rates among

concentrated groups (e.g., schools), regional

distribution of cases, and limited excess

mortality despite high incidence. Influenza C

infrequently causes mild respiratory disease, mainly in young children.

Recurrent human influenza virus infection

and potential for severe outbreaks are a result

of the virus' penchant for change

[<http://www.journals.uchicago.edu/CID/journal/issues/v31n6/000949/#rf9>9

<http://www.journals.uchicago.edu/CID/journal/issues/v31n6/000949/#rf11>11].

In antigenic " drift, " simple genetic mutations

gradually transform the surface proteins

(primarily hemagglutinin) to which the host

produces antibodies. Vulnerability to infection

arises with the increasing " mismatch " between

antibodies and surface antigens: immunity

developed during one flu season to a particular

strain may have no or limited future value. In

antigenic " shift, " a profound change in surface

proteins occurs, rendering the virus

unrecognizable to the circulating antibodies in

most people. Influenza B viruses evolve slowly

through antigenic drift. Influenza A viruses

transform more quickly, through both antigenic drift and shift.

A new influenza A virus subtype, produced

through antigenic shift, sets the stage for a

possible pandemic. Two forms of genetic

reassortment have been hypothesized to generate

pandemic virus. First, a commingling of gene

segments from the prevailing human influenza

virus and an avian influenza virus may occur, as

is thought to have produced the 1957 Asian flu

and the 1968 Hong Kong flu

[<http://www.journals.uchicago.edu/CID/journal/issues/v31n6/000949/#rf10>10].

In some parts of Asia, pigs serve as animal

intermediaries facilitating the exchange of

viruses between bird and human hosts

[<http://www.journals.uchicago.edu/CID/journal/issues/v31n6/000949/#rf10>10,

12]. A second mechanism involves reassortment of

subtypes from prior human outbreaks within a

human host

[<http://www.journals.uchicago.edu/CID/journal/issues/v31n6/000949/#rf10>10,

13]. An alternate theory of emergence is that an

avian or mammalian virus becomes infectious for

humans and capable of person-to-person

transmission, a possible scenario for Spanish flu

[<http://www.journals.uchicago.edu/CID/journal/issues/v31n6/000949/#rf10>10].

A typical case of influenza causes

high-grade fever, cough, sore throat, rhinitis,

muscle ache, headache, and extreme fatigue with a

2-week recovery unless pneumonia or a secondary

medical condition develops; complications are

potentially fatal [14]. The collective burden of

influenza in a community can be substantial,

depending upon seasonal prevalence of infections,

proportions and virulence of circulating strains,

and population resistance [15]. Excess

hospitalizations averaged 50 per 100,000

Americans per season in the early 1970s to

mid-1990s

[<http://www.journals.uchicago.edu/CID/journal/issues/v31n6/000949/#rf5>5,

16]. The number of deaths beyond what is

typically expected during an outbreak of

influenza-like illness (i.e., " excess death " )

have been substantial during pandemics: 1918

Spanish flu, 218.4 deaths per 100,000 Americans;

1957 Asian flu, 22 deaths per 100,000 population;

1968 Hong Kong flu, 13.9 deaths per 100,000

population

[<http://www.journals.uchicago.edu/CID/journal/issues/v31n6/000949/#rf2>2].

Flu's direct costs (hospitalizations, medical

fees, drugs, tests, and equipment) were estimated

in 1986 at $1 billion annually; indirect costs

were estimated from $2 to $4 billion (lost

productivity and wages) [17]. Without a mass

vaccination campaign, the cost of the next

pandemic is projected at $71.3 to $166.5 billion

in 1995 US dollars (inpatient and outpatient

care, self-treatment, and lost work days and wages) [18].

Spanish Flu: Unparalleled Lethality and Social Distress

In early spring 1918, an influenza A (H1N1)

virus began a global campaign, producing a

moderate outbreak among US military recruits in

the Midwest and Southeast before moving into the

civilian population and then by troopships to

Europe and beyond

[<http://www.journals.uchicago.edu/CID/journal/issues/v31n6/000949/#rf3>3,

<http://www.journals.uchicago.edu/CID/journal/issues/v31n6/000949/#rf4>4,

19, 20]. By summer's end, this first wave had

circled the world and earned the name Spanish flu

after receiving much publicity in Spain, a

neutral country without news censorship. This

outbreak caused disproportionately high mortality

rates among young adults, presaging the

disastrous autumn when a related, more virulent

form of the virus began to circulate. By late

August, epidemics of unprecedented lethality had

broken out in ports in France (Brest), the United

States (Boston), and Sierra Leone (Freetown),

after which the pathogen blanketed the globe,

aided by ship, railroad, and by war-induced

migrations of civilians and military personnel.

Dispersed episodic outbreaks during winter and spring (1918

1919) comprised a third wave.

The course of disease during fall 1918 was

often swift. Convalescence in survivors was

protracted, with fatigue, weakness, and

depression frequently lasting for weeks

[<http://www.journals.uchicago.edu/CID/journal/issues/v31n6/000949/#rf3>3,

<http://www.journals.uchicago.edu/CID/journal/issues/v31n6/000949/#rf20>20

23]. Symptoms presented suddenly: high-grade

fever and rigors, severe headache and myalgias,

cough, pharyngitis, coryza, and in some cases

epistaxis. Some patients had mild illness and

recuperated without incident. Other patients were

stricken quickly and severely, with symptoms and

signs consistent with hemorrhagic pneumonia, and

died within days and sometimes hours. Autopsies

revealed inflamed hemorrhagic lungs. Still other

patients with more typical flu developed severe

superinfection with bacterial pneumonia,

resulting in death or a laborious recovery.

Unusually lethal, Spanish flu was also distinct

in killing what was typically the cohort least

vulnerable to influenza, 20- to 40-year-olds.

The disease's incidence, severity, and

pattern of spread baffled laypeople and experts

alike

[<http://www.journals.uchicago.edu/CID/journal/issues/v31n6/000949/#rf3>3,

<http://www.journals.uchicago.edu/CID/journal/issues/v31n6/000949/#rf4>4,

<http://www.journals.uchicago.edu/CID/journal/issues/v31n6/000949/#rf20>20,

<http://www.journals.uchicago.edu/CID/journal/issues/v31n6/000949/#rf21>21].

Doctors debated possible pathogens, with no final

consensus: Pfeiffer's bacillus (presumed cause of influenza since the 1889

1990 pandemic but rarely isolated from 1918

victims); Yersinia pestis (because of migrating

laborers from China, the site of pneumonic plague outbreaks in 1910

1917); Streptococcus species, Streptococcus

pneumoniae, and Staphylococcus species (cultured

from specimens from patients with Spanish flu);

and a hypothesized " filtrable virus " (based on

experiments that produced an infectious filtrate

after removing known microorganisms) were all

suggested as possible etiologies. Popular

explanations included the foul atmosphere

conjured by the war's rotting corpses, mustard

gas, and explosions; a covert German biological

weapon; spiritual malaise due to the sins of war

and materialism; and conditions fostered by the

European conflict and overall impoverishment.

During the fall, the disease moved swiftly

through US cities. Acute absenteeism among

critical personnel strained industrial

production, government services (e.g.,

sanitation, law enforcement, fire fighting,

postal delivery), and maintenance of basic

infrastructure (e.g., transportation,

communications, health care, food supply)

[<http://www.journals.uchicago.edu/CID/journal/issues/v31n6/000949/#rf3>3,

<http://www.journals.uchicago.edu/CID/journal/issues/v31n6/000949/#rf22>22,

24]. Given the incomplete disease reporting,

inaccurate diagnoses, and circumscribed census

practices of the day, morbidity and mortality

figures are conservative estimates

[<http://www.journals.uchicago.edu/CID/journal/issues/v31n6/000949/#rf3>3,

<http://www.journals.uchicago.edu/CID/journal/issues/v31n6/000949/#rf19>19].

Twenty-eight percent of Americans became ill, and

there were 550,000 deaths in excess of what is

normally expected during influenza season

[<http://www.journals.uchicago.edu/CID/journal/issues/v31n6/000949/#rf3>3].

The case-fatality rate associated with Spanish

flu has been estimated at 2.5%

[<http://www.journals.uchicago.edu/CID/journal/issues/v31n6/000949/#rf20>20],

but this rate more likely represents the

experience of the developed world. Africa and

Asia had fall death rates an order of magnitude

higher than those of Europe and North America (e.g., India, 4200

6700 deaths per 100,000 population; England, 490

deaths per 100,000 population)

[<http://www.journals.uchicago.edu/CID/journal/issues/v31n6/000949/#rf19>19].

Bioterrorism Response: Lessons from the 1918

1919 Influenza Pandemic

A catastrophic epidemic that would severely

tax society's ability to care for the sick and

dying and to contain disease is the scenario of

greatest concern to medical, public health, and

political leaders charged with developing a

response to bioterrorism [25]. Surveying the

prominent issues that arose during Spanish flu's

fall peak in 1918 provides a number of lessons on

how the suffering and social disruption caused by

a large-scale lethal epidemic might be reduced.

The following recommendations are meant to

advance conversations among health professionals

and policymakers about what constitutes an

effective medical and public health reaction to a

bioterrorist act and to inform planning for any

large-scale infectious disease emergency (e.g., pandemic flu).

Build capacity to care for mass

casualties. US cities sustained most influenza cases and deaths over 3

4 weeks in autumn 1918, crippling the health care

system. Baltimore incurred 2 of every 3

pandemic-related deaths (3110 people or 0.5% of

its population) in October alone

[<http://www.journals.uchicago.edu/CID/journal/issues/v31n6/000949/#rf3>3].

Acute demand for medical, nursing, hospital, and

pharmacy services exceeded supply. Over one-third

of physicians and even more nurses were serving

overseas

[<http://www.journals.uchicago.edu/CID/journal/issues/v31n6/000949/#rf4>4],

and hospitals found it difficult to fill every

position (e.g., orderlies, custodians, and cooks)

[<http://www.journals.uchicago.edu/CID/journal/issues/v31n6/000949/#rf3>3].

Influenza further reduced the pool of health care

workers by infecting caregivers, pharmacists, and

laboratory workers and other personnel

[<http://www.journals.uchicago.edu/CID/journal/issues/v31n6/000949/#rf3>3,

<http://www.journals.uchicago.edu/CID/journal/issues/v31n6/000949/#rf21>21,

<http://www.journals.uchicago.edu/CID/journal/issues/v31n6/000949/#rf24>24]

and by creating fear of contagion among some

[<http://www.journals.uchicago.edu/CID/journal/issues/v31n6/000949/#rf23>23].

Community doctors faced tremendous caseloads, and

public health nurses were frequently surrounded

by throngs of tenement dwellers requesting help

[<http://www.journals.uchicago.edu/CID/journal/issues/v31n6/000949/#rf22>22,

26]. Druggists struggled to fill demands for

prescription medications, and customers,

desperate for protection or relief, emptied

pharmacy shelves of over-the-counter remedies (author's unpublished data).

Few in number, nurses were critical in

alleviating the distress of Spanish flu: they

provided comfort measures and reassurance,

instructed families in basic care, and assisted

with daily needs (e.g., laundry and cooking)

[<http://www.journals.uchicago.edu/CID/journal/issues/v31n6/000949/#rf3>3,

<http://www.journals.uchicago.edu/CID/journal/issues/v31n6/000949/#rf22>22,

<http://www.journals.uchicago.edu/CID/journal/issues/v31n6/000949/#rf26>26].

Appealing to retired, private, and student nurses

and women with any nursing experience, the Red

Cross readied a network of professionals and

volunteers for deployment in collaboration with

the US Public Health Service and state health

chiefs

[<http://www.journals.uchicago.edu/CID/journal/issues/v31n6/000949/#rf3>3,

27]. To ameliorate the physician shortage, the US

Public Health Service dispatched its Volunteer

Medical Service Corps, a reserve of civilian

doctors unable to serve overseas

[<http://www.journals.uchicago.edu/CID/journal/issues/v31n6/000949/#rf3>3,

<http://www.journals.uchicago.edu/CID/journal/issues/v31n6/000949/#rf27>27].

States compensated for the lack of doctors by

authorizing dentists as physicians, graduating

medical students early, and expediting medical

board examinations

[<http://www.journals.uchicago.edu/CID/journal/issues/v31n6/000949/#rf4>4].

Without antibiotics or medical treatments for

flu, however, physicians had very little to offer

patients

[<http://www.journals.uchicago.edu/CID/journal/issues/v31n6/000949/#rf3>3,

<http://www.journals.uchicago.edu/CID/journal/issues/v31n6/000949/#rf4>4],

and conflicting reports about the effectiveness

of different vaccines made most practitioners hesitant to use them [28].

Already inundated with patients, hospitals

frequently turned people away for want of space

and personnel. Facing extraordinary demand,

hospitals lengthened staff hours, tasked student

doctors and nurses with professional duties,

discharged the least ill, accepted only urgent

admissions, and prepared makeshift accommodations

in halls, offices, porches, and tents

[<http://www.journals.uchicago.edu/CID/journal/issues/v31n6/000949/#rf3>3,

<http://www.journals.uchicago.edu/CID/journal/issues/v31n6/000949/#rf26>26].

Basic supplies (e.g., linens, mattresses,

bedpans, and gowns) were sometimes difficult to

obtain

[<http://www.journals.uchicago.edu/CID/journal/issues/v31n6/000949/#rf23>23].

Gymnasiums, state armories, parish halls, and

other spaces served as emergency hospitals

[<http://www.journals.uchicago.edu/CID/journal/issues/v31n6/000949/#rf3>3,

<http://www.journals.uchicago.edu/CID/journal/issues/v31n6/000949/#rf4>4,

<http://www.journals.uchicago.edu/CID/journal/issues/v31n6/000949/#rf26>26].

Many people languished at home, having neither

strength nor opportunity to go to the hospital;

social workers, visiting nurses, and Red Cross

volunteers provided home health care as well as

food, child care, and burial assistance to these

patients and their families

[<http://www.journals.uchicago.edu/CID/journal/issues/v31n6/000949/#rf26>26,

29].

Extrapolating from 1918, we can identify

several elements that are likely to be critical

to the capacity to handle mass casualties from a

bioweapon among civilians. Health care workers,

from least to most technically expert, would be a

critical asset that should be protected, at

minimum, by preventing secondary infection and by

educating and reassuring them about the

infectious disease outbreak. Hospitals, actual

and symbolic loci of care, should have

contingency plans in place and receive government

support to endure a period of crisis as people

converge on them. Decentralized delivery of aid

(e.g., home care) would be indispensable in the

context of overburdened health facilities or a

contagious disease whose management dictates home

isolation. In the context of a disease outbreak

for which limited or no curative or preventive

therapies were available, compassionate

supportive care of the sick would be one of the

few and most essential measures provided by the health care system.

Respect social mores relating to burial

practices. At the climax of the Spanish flu

pandemic, the numerous and rapid deaths

overwhelmed undertakers and gravediggers (many of

whom were ill) and exhausted supplies of caskets

and burial plots (author's unpublished data;

[<http://www.journals.uchicago.edu/CID/journal/issues/v31n6/000949/#rf3>3,

<http://www.journals.uchicago.edu/CID/journal/issues/v31n6/000949/#rf4>4,

<http://www.journals.uchicago.edu/CID/journal/issues/v31n6/000949/#rf23>23]).

Corpses remained unburied at home as relatives

searched for the virtually unobtainable: a

willing mortician, an affordable yet " decent "

coffin, and a prepared grave. Some funeral homes

and cemeteries were accused of price gouging, and

local leaders were accused of not doing enough to

help the bereaved. With body disposal

interrupted, city and hospital morgues exceeded

capacity, in some cases 10-fold, prompting a

search for auxiliary space. Cities took desperate

measures: Philadelphia commissioned coffins from

local woodworkers, Buffalo produced its own, and

Washington, DC, seized railroad cars with coffins

en route to Pittsburgh, where the demand was

equally desperate. Emergency internment measures

such as mass graves and families digging graves

themselves undermined the prevailing sense of

propriety. Bodies stranded at home and coffins

accumulating at cemeteries provided powerful

symbols of the country's inability to function

normally during the fall of 1918. Proper

treatment of the dead during an infectious

disease emergency would require expeditious

handling of corpses to prevent public health

threats while avoiding mortuary practices seen to be dehumanizing.

Characterize outbreak accurately and

promptly. Poor disease reporting systems

seriously hampered the ability of public health

officials to keep the public informed and to

manage the outbreak. Influenza was not a

reportable condition before the outbreak, and no

well-developed system existed through which

federal, state, and local health entities could

sketch the course of the disease

[<http://www.journals.uchicago.edu/CID/journal/issues/v31n6/000949/#rf3>3].

With a crisis evident, the US Surgeon General

urged weekly reports from state and municipal

health departments

[<http://www.journals.uchicago.edu/CID/journal/issues/v31n6/000949/#rf27>27].

Preoccupied with vast patient loads, doctors did

not register cases quickly

[<http://www.journals.uchicago.edu/CID/journal/issues/v31n6/000949/#rf3>3,

<http://www.journals.uchicago.edu/CID/journal/issues/v31n6/000949/#rf19>19],

and public health officers recognized their own

inability to evaluate efforts to prevent

influenza's spread (author's unpublished data).

Death certificates poorly reflected flu's impact:

physicians frequently cited preexisting

conditions (e.g., heart disease) as the cause of

death

[<http://www.journals.uchicago.edu/CID/journal/issues/v31n6/000949/#rf3>3,

<http://www.journals.uchicago.edu/CID/journal/issues/v31n6/000949/#rf19>19],

and overworked health departments could not

analyze the multitude of death reports at the

outbreak's peak (author's unpublished data).

Despite the uncertainty of official counts, some

newspapers relentlessly reported new cases and

deaths, fueling public speculation as to whether

the epidemic was retreating or advancing (author's unpublished data).

Faced with the uncertainties that accompany

an epidemic (e.g., whom will it claim and when

and how will it end), people need a way to

measure and describe it. Health officials and

clinicians need the means to judge the efficacy

of interventions. Communities must have a way to

make sense of individual and collective losses.

An effective medical and public health response

to bioterrorism would include the capacity to

count cases and deaths accurately and promptly,

measure the success of epidemic controls, and

communicate with the public as the epidemic unfolds.

Earn public confidence in emergency

measures. Some community members embraced

public health measures to control Spanish flu;

others resisted orders seen as inconsistent,

burdensome, or contrary to common sense or deeply

held values. At the US Surgeon General's October

behest, state and local health officials

suspended public gatherings: entertainment

centers, schools, and churches were closed,

meetings were postponed, funerals were banned,

and retail hours were curtailed

[<http://www.journals.uchicago.edu/CID/journal/issues/v31n6/000949/#rf3>3,

<http://www.journals.uchicago.edu/CID/journal/issues/v31n6/000949/#rf4>4,

<http://www.journals.uchicago.edu/CID/journal/issues/v31n6/000949/#rf27>27].

Gauze masks and sanitation ordinances (e.g.,

hosing of walkways and prohibition of spitting)

complemented closures

[<http://www.journals.uchicago.edu/CID/journal/issues/v31n6/000949/#rf4>4,

<http://www.journals.uchicago.edu/CID/journal/issues/v31n6/000949/#rf27>27].

Health department directives evoked strong

criticism in Baltimore. The public argued that

the order to keep streetcar windows open in the

cold fall weather was promoting disease and not

preventing it. Closed churches and open saloons

revealed the arbitrariness of closures. Lay and

religious observers loudly protested church

closures, arguing that an exclusively medical

perspective of human suffering ignored a more

spiritual one, depriving residents of solace

(author's unpublished data). Most San Franciscans

ignored a mandate to redon masks during the

winter/spring wave: civil libertarians railed

against the tyranny of compulsory behavior;

business owners, about a veiled public afraid to

shop; and Christian Scientists, about trampled

personal liberties

[<http://www.journals.uchicago.edu/CID/journal/issues/v31n6/000949/#rf3>3].

Neither support nor resistance to public

health recommendations by the community, a

critical ally, should be taken for granted. A

successful plan for managing an epidemic would

convey consistent and meaningful messages, serve

audiences with diverse beliefs and languages, and

acknowledge citizen concerns and grievances.

Guard against discrimination and allocate

resources fairly. Spanish flu fostered both

social cohesion and distance. Through a common

enemy and shared sacrifices of war, many

Americans had a well-developed sense of

fellowship when the epidemic struck

[<http://www.journals.uchicago.edu/CID/journal/issues/v31n6/000949/#rf3>3].

At risk to themselves, neighbors nursed one

another, fed the sick, helped with daily tasks,

and joined the volunteer ranks

[<http://www.journals.uchicago.edu/CID/journal/issues/v31n6/000949/#rf4>4].

Nonetheless, fear of contagion interrupted normal

displays of intimacy (e.g., kissing, shaking

hands, and huddling to gossip)

[<http://www.journals.uchicago.edu/CID/journal/issues/v31n6/000949/#rf4>4]

and pitted groups against one another in an

effort to assign blame or to protect access to

limited resources. Rumors circulated in the

United States that German spies, some disguised

as doctors and nurses, were spreading flu and

that Bayer aspirin, a German product, was

infected with flu germs

[<http://www.journals.uchicago.edu/CID/journal/issues/v31n6/000949/#rf3>3,

<http://www.journals.uchicago.edu/CID/journal/issues/v31n6/000949/#rf27>27].

Baltimore hospitals, during Jim Crow segregation,

were closed to blacks at their moment of dire

need, and once the epidemic passed, an official

defended the city's poor public health record by

attributing high mortality rates to the number of

black residents (author's unpublished data).

As evident during Spanish flu and other

historic outbreaks, explanations of disease often

convey prejudice and serve to reinforce existing

social schisms and inequalities. In a

bioterrorist scenario, medical, public health,

and political leaders should protect against

social discrimination and assure fair allocation of resources.

Conclusion: Signs of Unpreparedness in 2000

Influenza's lessons for bioterrorism

planners do not end with an 80-year-old crisis. The 1999

2000 flu season, which the Centers for Disease

Control and Prevention did not consider unusually

severe, stymied US hospitals in ways that

parallel 1918. At the season's peak, hospitals

faced acute shortages of staff, beds, and

equipment; patients confronted long delays in

care. The disruption was the result, not of an

especially virulent virus, but a health care

system unable to cope with a nominal upswing in

demand [30]. Hospitals have had to employ

strategies (e.g., fewer staffed acute beds) to

assure survival in a harsh fiscal climate (e.g.,

slim profit margins, managed care demands for

cost reduction, and mandated yet uncompensated

care for the uninsured), leaving the country

ill-prepared to deal with a mass casualty scenario [31, 32].

Research and development needs in the

control of influenza virus, a familiar if elusive

pathogen, are substantial (e.g., accelerated

manufacturing processes and development of

alternate vaccines and antivirals)

[<http://www.journals.uchicago.edu/CID/journal/issues/v31n6/000949/#rf6>6,

<http://www.journals.uchicago.edu/CID/journal/issues/v31n6/000949/#rf8>8],

raising the question as to the vast research and

development challenges posed by the more unusual

pathogens identified as likely bioterrorist

agents [33]. The logistics and time frame for

manufacture and administration of the

conventional killed influenza virus vaccine (6

months from identification of a strain to vaccine

production and distribution and 1

2 months for delivery en masse) would inhibit the

availability of vaccine before the first wave of

a pandemic

[<http://www.journals.uchicago.edu/CID/journal/issues/v31n6/000949/#rf2>2,

<http://www.journals.uchicago.edu/CID/journal/issues/v31n6/000949/#rf6>6,

<http://www.journals.uchicago.edu/CID/journal/issues/v31n6/000949/#rf8>8].

A comparably long production timetable

characterizes the new live attenuated virus

vaccines, which nonetheless promise broader

immune response as well as easier administration

and social acceptance through intranasal delivery

[<http://www.journals.uchicago.edu/CID/journal/issues/v31n6/000949/#rf9>9].

Antiviral compounds may have limited value amidst

pandemic conditions due to costs associated with

prolonged use, the potential for drug resistance,

and the short time in which demand would exceed

supply

[<http://www.journals.uchicago.edu/CID/journal/issues/v31n6/000949/#rf6>6,

<http://www.journals.uchicago.edu/CID/journal/issues/v31n6/000949/#rf8>8].

Medical, public health, and policy

communities should attend to the warnings of

influenza, in its pandemic form and during

interpandemic years, about the potential frailty

of populations and institutions in the face of an

infectious disease emergency, particularly one

initiated by a deliberately released pathogen.

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citation in article

[Guest guest]

The Chinese have a saying that if a thousand people say something

foolish, it is still foolish. Also a majority vote is no substitute

for good science.

Steve

At 06:21 PM 11/9/2005 -0800, you wrote:

> B. Monier- wrote:

> > P.S. I seem to remember that someone in this group wrote that in the

> > 1918 pandemic that deaths amongst those who were not vaccinated were

> > less than those that were... is this correct and if so what were the

> > figures and how do we know?

>

>It's correct.

>Detail here:

>http://www.nesh.com/main/nejh/samples/winston.html

>More in n Winston's book.

>

>Namaste,

> IRene

>

>--

>Irene de Villiers, B.Sc AASCA MCSSA D.I.Hom. Box 4703 Spokane WA 99220.

>www.angelfire.com/fl/furryboots/clickhere.html (Veterinary Homeopath.)

>Proverb:Man who say it cannot be done should not interrupt one doing it.

>

>

>

>

>

>Note: This forum is for discussion of health related subjects but

>under no circumstances should any information published here be

>considered a substitute for personal medical advice from a qualified

>physician. -the owner

>

[Guest guest]

One more thought.... I am not pro flu shot.... I am for rational

thinking and good science.

There is a lot of pseudo science sneaking in on this discussion....

Hey keep it up... people

need to think...... say what you will.... just watch for fake science.

This may be interesting to some....

note http://michellemalkin.com/archives/000672.htm

Steve

At 10:49 PM 11/9/2005 -0500, you wrote:

>The Chinese have a saying that if a thousand people say something

>foolish, it is still foolish. Also a majority vote is no substitute

>for good science.

>

>Steve

>

>

> > B. Monier- wrote:

> > > P.S. I seem to remember that someone in this group wrote that in the

> > > 1918 pandemic that deaths amongst those who were not vaccinated were

> > > less than those that were... is this correct and if so what were the

> > > figures and how do we know?

> >

> >It's correct.

> >Detail here:

> >http://www.nesh.com/main/nejh/samples/winston.html

> >More in n Winston's book.

> >

> >Namaste,

> > IRene

> >

> >--

> >Irene de Villiers, B.Sc AASCA MCSSA D.I.Hom. Box 4703 Spokane WA 99220.

> >www.angelfire.com/fl/furryboots/clickhere.html (Veterinary Homeopath.)

> >Proverb:Man who say it cannot be done should not interrupt one doing it.

> >

> >

> >

> >

> >

> >Note: This forum is for discussion of health related subjects but

> >under no circumstances should any information published here be

> >considered a substitute for personal medical advice from a qualified

> >physician. -the owner

> >

[Guest guest]

Steve:

I haven't the time or inclination to read such verbosity.

Steve Culpepper wrote:

>>P.S. I seem to remember that someone in this group wrote that in the

>>1918 pandemic that deaths amongst those who were not vaccinated were

>>less than those that were... is this correct and if so what were the

>>figures and how do we know?

>>

>>

>

>

>Earlier there was a ridiculous post stating that

>20,000,000 deaths were caused by vaccines

>see

> From: " Mark Sircus Ac., OMD " <director@...>

> <electroherbalism >

> Date: Fri, 21 Oct 2005 11:40:25 -0200

> Subject: [electroherbalism] Natural Influenza

>Protocol with Magneisum and Vitamin C

>

>In that post it states 20,000,000 deaths were caused by see below:

> Each and every year at this time medical officals come out to

> remind us of our mortal danger yet advocate medical procedures

> that do little to nothing to protect us but cost billions.

> Dr. Eleanor McBean was an on-the-spot observer of the 1918

> Influenza epidemic and said, " As far as I could find out, the

> flu hit only the vaccinated. Those who had refused the shots

> escaped the flu. My family had refused all the vaccinations

> so we remained well all the time. We (who didn't take any

> vaccines) seemed to be the only family which didn't get the

> flu. It has been said that the 1918 flu epidemic killed

> 20,000,000 people throughout the world. But, actually, the

> doctors killed them with their crude and deadly treatments

> and drugs. This is a harsh accusation but it is nevertheless

> true. "

>

>IT IS NOT TRUE!!!!!!!!!!

>WHAT PROOF? LUDICROUS NOT A FACT!

>Just because the Flat Earth Society still insists the planet is Flat

>does not make it true.... Writing it down does not prove it so!

>

>THERE WAS NO WAY TO MANUFACTURE AND DELIVER 20,000,000 vaccines in 1918!

>

>Clinical Infectious Diseases 2000;31:1409-1413

>© 2000 by the Infectious Diseases Society of America. All rights reserved.

>1058-4838/2000/3106-0015$03.00

>

>----------

>SPECIAL SECTION: CONFRONTING BIOLOGICAL WEAPONS

>

> A. , V. Inglesby, Jr., and Tara O'Toole, Section Editors

>

>Implications of Pandemic Influenza for Bioterrorism Response

>

> Schoch-Spana

>

>Center for Civilian Biodefense Studies, s

>Hopkins University School of Public Health, Baltimore, land

>

>Received 17 July 2000; revised 7 August 2000;

>electronically published 17 November 2000.

>The 1918

>

>1919 influenza pandemic (Spanish flu) had

>catastrophic effects upon urban populations in

>the United States. Large numbers of frightened,

>critically ill people overwhelmed health care

>providers. Mortuaries and cemeteries were

>severely strained by rapid accumulation of

>corpses of flu victims. Understanding of the

>outbreak's extent and effectiveness of

>containment measures was obscured by the

>swiftness of the disease and an inadequate health

>reporting system. Epidemic controls such as

>closing public gathering places elicited both

>community support and resistance, and fear of

>contagion incited social and ethnic tensions.

>Review of this infamous outbreak is intended to

>advance discussions among health professionals

>and policymakers about an effective medical and

>public health response to bioterrorism, an

>infectious disease crisis of increasing

>likelihood. Elements of an adequate response

>include building capacity to care for mass

>casualties, providing emergency burials that

>respect social mores, properly characterizing the

>outbreak, earning public confidence in epidemic

>containment measures, protecting against social

>discrimination, and fairly allocating health resources.

>

>

>----------

>

> Reprints or correspondence: Dr.

>Schoch-Spana, s Hopkins Center for Civilian

>Biodefense Studies, Candler Building, Ste. 850,

>111 Market Pl., Baltimore, MD 21202

>(<mailto:mschoch@...>mschoch@...).

>

>

>----------

> At its peak, the 1918

>

>1919 influenza pandemic (Spanish flu)

>incapacitated American cities and paralyzed the

>health care system. A 20th century outbreak of

>disease with calamitous effects in this country,

>Spanish flu is an apt case to influence current

>bioterrorism planning efforts. This article

>presents a set of principles meant to assist

>medical, public health, and government leaders as

>they construct a response to the potential mass

>casualties and social turmoil initiated by a bioterrorist attack.

>

>Influenza: Evolving Pathogens and Profound Health Burden

>

> Throughout human history, global influenza

>outbreaks have sickened large numbers of people,

>claimed many lives, and dramatically disrupted

>social and economic relations [1, 2]. The most infamous episode is the 1918

>

>1919 influenza pandemic, which altered World War

>I battle plans and peace talks and made almost 1

>billion people (one-half the world's population)

>ill, killing from 21 to 40 million [3, 4]. In

>interpandemic years, flu still exacts a harsh

>toll: excess deaths, in the aggregate, approach

>pandemic levels

>[<http://www.journals.uchicago.edu/CID/journal/issues/v31n6/000949/#rf2>2,

>5, 6]. Influenza's destructive capacity resides

>in the pace and unpredictability of the evolution

>of the virus, which can subvert the body's immune

>response and outstrip society's efforts at containment [7, 8].

>

> Influenza viruses infect human host cells

>(typically, epithelial cells that line the

>respiratory tract) and reproduce [9, 10]. Flu's

>characteristic structure is a sphere that

>contains RNA material and is studded with protein

>surface antigens: hemagglutinin that binds the

>virus to the host cell, initiating replication,

>and neuraminidase that frees up newly

>manufactured virions from the host cell,

>facilitating virus spread. Three types of

>influenza virus exist: type A, isolated from

>humans, birds, pigs, horses, and sea mammals; and

>types B and C, found only in humans. Influenza A

>viruses are subtyped according to the unique

>surface antigens that they manifest (e.g., H1N1

>and H3N2). Fifteen different types of

>hemagglutinin and 9 types of neuraminidase have been observed.

>

> Influenza A and B viruses are genetically

>and structurally more similar to each other than

>either are to influenza C viruses, and they

>contribute to a greater proportion of human

>disease than does influenza C virus

>[<http://www.journals.uchicago.edu/CID/journal/issues/v31n6/000949/#rf10>10,

>11]. Epidemics of influenza A tend to affect all

>age groups but especially children and the

>elderly, spread widely across regions and

>continents, and exhibit significant excess

>mortality rates. About 1% of all US deaths from

>1972 through 1992 could be attributed to

>influenza (9.1 deaths per 100,000 population per

>season), most occurring when influenza A (H3N2)

>viruses were prevalent

>[<http://www.journals.uchicago.edu/CID/journal/issues/v31n6/000949/#rf5>5].

>Characteristic of influenza B outbreaks are mild

>respiratory disease that tends to target

>children, potentially high attack rates among

>concentrated groups (e.g., schools), regional

>distribution of cases, and limited excess

>mortality despite high incidence. Influenza C

>infrequently causes mild respiratory disease, mainly in young children.

>

> Recurrent human influenza virus infection

>and potential for severe outbreaks are a result

>of the virus' penchant for change

>[<http://www.journals.uchicago.edu/CID/journal/issues/v31n6/000949/#rf9>9

>

><http://www.journals.uchicago.edu/CID/journal/issues/v31n6/000949/#rf11>11].

>In antigenic " drift, " simple genetic mutations

>gradually transform the surface proteins

>(primarily hemagglutinin) to which the host

>produces antibodies. Vulnerability to infection

>arises with the increasing " mismatch " between

>antibodies and surface antigens: immunity

>developed during one flu season to a particular

>strain may have no or limited future value. In

>antigenic " shift, " a profound change in surface

>proteins occurs, rendering the virus

>unrecognizable to the circulating antibodies in

>most people. Influenza B viruses evolve slowly

>through antigenic drift. Influenza A viruses

>transform more quickly, through both antigenic drift and shift.

>

> A new influenza A virus subtype, produced

>through antigenic shift, sets the stage for a

>possible pandemic. Two forms of genetic

>reassortment have been hypothesized to generate

>pandemic virus. First, a commingling of gene

>segments from the prevailing human influenza

>virus and an avian influenza virus may occur, as

>is thought to have produced the 1957 Asian flu

>and the 1968 Hong Kong flu

>[<http://www.journals.uchicago.edu/CID/journal/issues/v31n6/000949/#rf10>10].

>In some parts of Asia, pigs serve as animal

>intermediaries facilitating the exchange of

>viruses between bird and human hosts

>[<http://www.journals.uchicago.edu/CID/journal/issues/v31n6/000949/#rf10>10,

>12]. A second mechanism involves reassortment of

>subtypes from prior human outbreaks within a

>human host

>[<http://www.journals.uchicago.edu/CID/journal/issues/v31n6/000949/#rf10>10,

>13]. An alternate theory of emergence is that an

>avian or mammalian virus becomes infectious for

>humans and capable of person-to-person

>transmission, a possible scenario for Spanish flu

>[<http://www.journals.uchicago.edu/CID/journal/issues/v31n6/000949/#rf10>10].

>

> A typical case of influenza causes

>high-grade fever, cough, sore throat, rhinitis,

>muscle ache, headache, and extreme fatigue with a

>2-week recovery unless pneumonia or a secondary

>medical condition develops; complications are

>potentially fatal [14]. The collective burden of

>influenza in a community can be substantial,

>depending upon seasonal prevalence of infections,

>proportions and virulence of circulating strains,

>and population resistance [15]. Excess

>hospitalizations averaged 50 per 100,000

>Americans per season in the early 1970s to

>mid-1990s

>[<http://www.journals.uchicago.edu/CID/journal/issues/v31n6/000949/#rf5>5,

>16]. The number of deaths beyond what is

>typically expected during an outbreak of

>influenza-like illness (i.e., " excess death " )

>have been substantial during pandemics: 1918

>Spanish flu, 218.4 deaths per 100,000 Americans;

>1957 Asian flu, 22 deaths per 100,000 population;

>1968 Hong Kong flu, 13.9 deaths per 100,000

>population

>[<http://www.journals.uchicago.edu/CID/journal/issues/v31n6/000949/#rf2>2].

>Flu's direct costs (hospitalizations, medical

>fees, drugs, tests, and equipment) were estimated

>in 1986 at $1 billion annually; indirect costs

>were estimated from $2 to $4 billion (lost

>productivity and wages) [17]. Without a mass

>vaccination campaign, the cost of the next

>pandemic is projected at $71.3 to $166.5 billion

>in 1995 US dollars (inpatient and outpatient

>care, self-treatment, and lost work days and wages) [18].

>

>Spanish Flu: Unparalleled Lethality and Social Distress

>

> In early spring 1918, an influenza A (H1N1)

>virus began a global campaign, producing a

>moderate outbreak among US military recruits in

>the Midwest and Southeast before moving into the

>civilian population and then by troopships to

>Europe and beyond

>[<http://www.journals.uchicago.edu/CID/journal/issues/v31n6/000949/#rf3>3,

><http://www.journals.uchicago.edu/CID/journal/issues/v31n6/000949/#rf4>4,

>19, 20]. By summer's end, this first wave had

>circled the world and earned the name Spanish flu

>after receiving much publicity in Spain, a

>neutral country without news censorship. This

>outbreak caused disproportionately high mortality

>rates among young adults, presaging the

>disastrous autumn when a related, more virulent

>form of the virus began to circulate. By late

>August, epidemics of unprecedented lethality had

>broken out in ports in France (Brest), the United

>States (Boston), and Sierra Leone (Freetown),

>after which the pathogen blanketed the globe,

>aided by ship, railroad, and by war-induced

>migrations of civilians and military personnel.

>Dispersed episodic outbreaks during winter and spring (1918

>

>1919) comprised a third wave.

>

> The course of disease during fall 1918 was

>often swift. Convalescence in survivors was

>protracted, with fatigue, weakness, and

>depression frequently lasting for weeks

>[<http://www.journals.uchicago.edu/CID/journal/issues/v31n6/000949/#rf3>3,

><http://www.journals.uchicago.edu/CID/journal/issues/v31n6/000949/#rf20>20

>

>23]. Symptoms presented suddenly: high-grade

>fever and rigors, severe headache and myalgias,

>cough, pharyngitis, coryza, and in some cases

>epistaxis. Some patients had mild illness and

>recuperated without incident. Other patients were

>stricken quickly and severely, with symptoms and

>signs consistent with hemorrhagic pneumonia, and

>died within days and sometimes hours. Autopsies

>revealed inflamed hemorrhagic lungs. Still other

>patients with more typical flu developed severe

>superinfection with bacterial pneumonia,

>resulting in death or a laborious recovery.

>Unusually lethal, Spanish flu was also distinct

>in killing what was typically the cohort least

>vulnerable to influenza, 20- to 40-year-olds.

>

> The disease's incidence, severity, and

>pattern of spread baffled laypeople and experts

>alike

>[<http://www.journals.uchicago.edu/CID/journal/issues/v31n6/000949/#rf3>3,

><http://www.journals.uchicago.edu/CID/journal/issues/v31n6/000949/#rf4>4,

><http://www.journals.uchicago.edu/CID/journal/issues/v31n6/000949/#rf20>20,

><http://www.journals.uchicago.edu/CID/journal/issues/v31n6/000949/#rf21>21].

>Doctors debated possible pathogens, with no final

>consensus: Pfeiffer's bacillus (presumed cause of influenza since the 1889

>

>1990 pandemic but rarely isolated from 1918

>victims); Yersinia pestis (because of migrating

>laborers from China, the site of pneumonic plague outbreaks in 1910

>

>1917); Streptococcus species, Streptococcus

>pneumoniae, and Staphylococcus species (cultured

>from specimens from patients with Spanish flu);

>and a hypothesized " filtrable virus " (based on

>experiments that produced an infectious filtrate

>after removing known microorganisms) were all

>suggested as possible etiologies. Popular

>explanations included the foul atmosphere

>conjured by the war's rotting corpses, mustard

>gas, and explosions; a covert German biological

>weapon; spiritual malaise due to the sins of war

>and materialism; and conditions fostered by the

>European conflict and overall impoverishment.

>

> During the fall, the disease moved swiftly

>through US cities. Acute absenteeism among

>critical personnel strained industrial

>production, government services (e.g.,

>sanitation, law enforcement, fire fighting,

>postal delivery), and maintenance of basic

>infrastructure (e.g., transportation,

>communications, health care, food supply)

>[<http://www.journals.uchicago.edu/CID/journal/issues/v31n6/000949/#rf3>3,

><http://www.journals.uchicago.edu/CID/journal/issues/v31n6/000949/#rf22>22,

>24]. Given the incomplete disease reporting,

>inaccurate diagnoses, and circumscribed census

>practices of the day, morbidity and mortality

>figures are conservative estimates

>[<http://www.journals.uchicago.edu/CID/journal/issues/v31n6/000949/#rf3>3,

><http://www.journals.uchicago.edu/CID/journal/issues/v31n6/000949/#rf19>19].

>Twenty-eight percent of Americans became ill, and

>there were 550,000 deaths in excess of what is

>normally expected during influenza season

>[<http://www.journals.uchicago.edu/CID/journal/issues/v31n6/000949/#rf3>3].

>The case-fatality rate associated with Spanish

>flu has been estimated at 2.5%

>[<http://www.journals.uchicago.edu/CID/journal/issues/v31n6/000949/#rf20>20],

>but this rate more likely represents the

>experience of the developed world. Africa and

>Asia had fall death rates an order of magnitude

>higher than those of Europe and North America (e.g., India, 4200

>

>6700 deaths per 100,000 population; England, 490

>deaths per 100,000 population)

>[<http://www.journals.uchicago.edu/CID/journal/issues/v31n6/000949/#rf19>19].

>

>Bioterrorism Response: Lessons from the 1918

>

>1919 Influenza Pandemic

>

> A catastrophic epidemic that would severely

>tax society's ability to care for the sick and

>dying and to contain disease is the scenario of

>greatest concern to medical, public health, and

>political leaders charged with developing a

>response to bioterrorism [25]. Surveying the

>prominent issues that arose during Spanish flu's

>fall peak in 1918 provides a number of lessons on

>how the suffering and social disruption caused by

>a large-scale lethal epidemic might be reduced.

>The following recommendations are meant to

>advance conversations among health professionals

>and policymakers about what constitutes an

>effective medical and public health reaction to a

>bioterrorist act and to inform planning for any

>large-scale infectious disease emergency (e.g., pandemic flu).

>

> Build capacity to care for mass

>casualties. US cities sustained most influenza cases and deaths over 3

>

>4 weeks in autumn 1918, crippling the health care

>system. Baltimore incurred 2 of every 3

>pandemic-related deaths (3110 people or 0.5% of

>its population) in October alone

>[<http://www.journals.uchicago.edu/CID/journal/issues/v31n6/000949/#rf3>3].

>Acute demand for medical, nursing, hospital, and

>pharmacy services exceeded supply. Over one-third

>of physicians and even more nurses were serving

>overseas

>[<http://www.journals.uchicago.edu/CID/journal/issues/v31n6/000949/#rf4>4],

>and hospitals found it difficult to fill every

>position (e.g., orderlies, custodians, and cooks)

>[<http://www.journals.uchicago.edu/CID/journal/issues/v31n6/000949/#rf3>3].

>Influenza further reduced the pool of health care

>workers by infecting caregivers, pharmacists, and

>laboratory workers and other personnel

>[<http://www.journals.uchicago.edu/CID/journal/issues/v31n6/000949/#rf3>3,

><http://www.journals.uchicago.edu/CID/journal/issues/v31n6/000949/#rf21>21,

><http://www.journals.uchicago.edu/CID/journal/issues/v31n6/000949/#rf24>24]

>and by creating fear of contagion among some

>[<http://www.journals.uchicago.edu/CID/journal/issues/v31n6/000949/#rf23>23].

>Community doctors faced tremendous caseloads, and

>public health nurses were frequently surrounded

>by throngs of tenement dwellers requesting help

>[<http://www.journals.uchicago.edu/CID/journal/issues/v31n6/000949/#rf22>22,

>26]. Druggists struggled to fill demands for

>prescription medications, and customers,

>desperate for protection or relief, emptied

>pharmacy shelves of over-the-counter remedies (author's unpublished data).

>

> Few in number, nurses were critical in

>alleviating the distress of Spanish flu: they

>provided comfort measures and reassurance,

>instructed families in basic care, and assisted

>with daily needs (e.g., laundry and cooking)

>[<http://www.journals.uchicago.edu/CID/journal/issues/v31n6/000949/#rf3>3,

><http://www.journals.uchicago.edu/CID/journal/issues/v31n6/000949/#rf22>22,

><http://www.journals.uchicago.edu/CID/journal/issues/v31n6/000949/#rf26>26].

>Appealing to retired, private, and student nurses

>and women with any nursing experience, the Red

>Cross readied a network of professionals and

>volunteers for deployment in collaboration with

>the US Public Health Service and state health

>chiefs

>[<http://www.journals.uchicago.edu/CID/journal/issues/v31n6/000949/#rf3>3,

>27]. To ameliorate the physician shortage, the US

>Public Health Service dispatched its Volunteer

>Medical Service Corps, a reserve of civilian

>doctors unable to serve overseas

>[<http://www.journals.uchicago.edu/CID/journal/issues/v31n6/000949/#rf3>3,

><http://www.journals.uchicago.edu/CID/journal/issues/v31n6/000949/#rf27>27].

>States compensated for the lack of doctors by

>authorizing dentists as physicians, graduating

>medical students early, and expediting medical

>board examinations

>[<http://www.journals.uchicago.edu/CID/journal/issues/v31n6/000949/#rf4>4].

>Without antibiotics or medical treatments for

>flu, however, physicians had very little to offer

>patients

>[<http://www.journals.uchicago.edu/CID/journal/issues/v31n6/000949/#rf3>3,

><http://www.journals.uchicago.edu/CID/journal/issues/v31n6/000949/#rf4>4],

>and conflicting reports about the effectiveness

>of different vaccines made most practitioners hesitant to use them [28].

>

> Already inundated with patients, hospitals

>frequently turned people away for want of space

>and personnel. Facing extraordinary demand,

>hospitals lengthened staff hours, tasked student

>doctors and nurses with professional duties,

>discharged the least ill, accepted only urgent

>admissions, and prepared makeshift accommodations

>in halls, offices, porches, and tents

>[<http://www.journals.uchicago.edu/CID/journal/issues/v31n6/000949/#rf3>3,

><http://www.journals.uchicago.edu/CID/journal/issues/v31n6/000949/#rf26>26].

>Basic supplies (e.g., linens, mattresses,

>bedpans, and gowns) were sometimes difficult to

>obtain

>[<http://www.journals.uchicago.edu/CID/journal/issues/v31n6/000949/#rf23>23].

>Gymnasiums, state armories, parish halls, and

>other spaces served as emergency hospitals

>[<http://www.journals.uchicago.edu/CID/journal/issues/v31n6/000949/#rf3>3,

><http://www.journals.uchicago.edu/CID/journal/issues/v31n6/000949/#rf4>4,

><http://www.journals.uchicago.edu/CID/journal/issues/v31n6/000949/#rf26>26].

>Many people languished at home, having neither

>strength nor opportunity to go to the hospital;

>social workers, visiting nurses, and Red Cross

>volunteers provided home health care as well as

>food, child care, and burial assistance to these

>patients and their families

>[<http://www.journals.uchicago.edu/CID/journal/issues/v31n6/000949/#rf26>26,

>29].

>

> Extrapolating from 1918, we can identify

>several elements that are likely to be critical

>to the capacity to handle mass casualties from a

>bioweapon among civilians. Health care workers,

>from least to most technically expert, would be a

>critical asset that should be protected, at

>minimum, by preventing secondary infection and by

>educating and reassuring them about the

>infectious disease outbreak. Hospitals, actual

>and symbolic loci of care, should have

>contingency plans in place and receive government

>support to endure a period of crisis as people

>converge on them. Decentralized delivery of aid

>(e.g., home care) would be indispensable in the

>context of overburdened health facilities or a

>contagious disease whose management dictates home

>isolation. In the context of a disease outbreak

>for which limited or no curative or preventive

>therapies were available, compassionate

>supportive care of the sick would be one of the

>few and most essential measures provided by the health care system.

>

> Respect social mores relating to burial

>practices. At the climax of the Spanish flu

>pandemic, the numerous and rapid deaths

>overwhelmed undertakers and gravediggers (many of

>whom were ill) and exhausted supplies of caskets

>and burial plots (author's unpublished data;

>[<http://www.journals.uchicago.edu/CID/journal/issues/v31n6/000949/#rf3>3,

><http://www.journals.uchicago.edu/CID/journal/issues/v31n6/000949/#rf4>4,

><http://www.journals.uchicago.edu/CID/journal/issues/v31n6/000949/#rf23>23]).

>Corpses remained unburied at home as relatives

>searched for the virtually unobtainable: a

>willing mortician, an affordable yet " decent "

>coffin, and a prepared grave. Some funeral homes

>and cemeteries were accused of price gouging, and

>local leaders were accused of not doing enough to

>help the bereaved. With body disposal

>interrupted, city and hospital morgues exceeded

>capacity, in some cases 10-fold, prompting a

>search for auxiliary space. Cities took desperate

>measures: Philadelphia commissioned coffins from

>local woodworkers, Buffalo produced its own, and

>Washington, DC, seized railroad cars with coffins

>en route to Pittsburgh, where the demand was

>equally desperate. Emergency internment measures

>such as mass graves and families digging graves

>themselves undermined the prevailing sense of

>propriety. Bodies stranded at home and coffins

>accumulating at cemeteries provided powerful

>symbols of the country's inability to function

>normally during the fall of 1918. Proper

>treatment of the dead during an infectious

>disease emergency would require expeditious

>handling of corpses to prevent public health

>threats while avoiding mortuary practices seen to be dehumanizing.

>

> Characterize outbreak accurately and

>promptly. Poor disease reporting systems

>seriously hampered the ability of public health

>officials to keep the public informed and to

>manage the outbreak. Influenza was not a

>reportable condition before the outbreak, and no

>well-developed system existed through which

>federal, state, and local health entities could

>sketch the course of the disease

>[<http://www.journals.uchicago.edu/CID/journal/issues/v31n6/000949/#rf3>3].

>With a crisis evident, the US Surgeon General

>urged weekly reports from state and municipal

>health departments

>[<http://www.journals.uchicago.edu/CID/journal/issues/v31n6/000949/#rf27>27].

>Preoccupied with vast patient loads, doctors did

>not register cases quickly

>[<http://www.journals.uchicago.edu/CID/journal/issues/v31n6/000949/#rf3>3,

><http://www.journals.uchicago.edu/CID/journal/issues/v31n6/000949/#rf19>19],

>and public health officers recognized their own

>inability to evaluate efforts to prevent

>influenza's spread (author's unpublished data).

>Death certificates poorly reflected flu's impact:

>physicians frequently cited preexisting

>conditions (e.g., heart disease) as the cause of

>death

>[<http://www.journals.uchicago.edu/CID/journal/issues/v31n6/000949/#rf3>3,

><http://www.journals.uchicago.edu/CID/journal/issues/v31n6/000949/#rf19>19],

>and overworked health departments could not

>analyze the multitude of death reports at the

>outbreak's peak (author's unpublished data).

>Despite the uncertainty of official counts, some

>newspapers relentlessly reported new cases and

>deaths, fueling public speculation as to whether

>the epidemic was retreating or advancing (author's unpublished data).

>

> Faced with the uncertainties that accompany

>an epidemic (e.g., whom will it claim and when

>and how will it end), people need a way to

>measure and describe it. Health officials and

>clinicians need the means to judge the efficacy

>of interventions. Communities must have a way to

>make sense of individual and collective losses.

>An effective medical and public health response

>to bioterrorism would include the capacity to

>count cases and deaths accurately and promptly,

>measure the success of epidemic controls, and

>communicate with the public as the epidemic unfolds.

>

> Earn public confidence in emergency

>measures. Some community members embraced

>public health measures to control Spanish flu;

>others resisted orders seen as inconsistent,

>burdensome, or contrary to common sense or deeply

>held values. At the US Surgeon General's October

>behest, state and local health officials

>suspended public gatherings: entertainment

>centers, schools, and churches were closed,

>meetings were postponed, funerals were banned,

>and retail hours were curtailed

>[<http://www.journals.uchicago.edu/CID/journal/issues/v31n6/000949/#rf3>3,

><http://www.journals.uchicago.edu/CID/journal/issues/v31n6/000949/#rf4>4,

><http://www.journals.uchicago.edu/CID/journal/issues/v31n6/000949/#rf27>27].

>Gauze masks and sanitation ordinances (e.g.,

>hosing of walkways and prohibition of spitting)

>complemented closures

>[<http://www.journals.uchicago.edu/CID/journal/issues/v31n6/000949/#rf4>4,

><http://www.journals.uchicago.edu/CID/journal/issues/v31n6/000949/#rf27>27].

>Health department directives evoked strong

>criticism in Baltimore. The public argued that

>the order to keep streetcar windows open in the

>cold fall weather was promoting disease and not

>preventing it. Closed churches and open saloons

>revealed the arbitrariness of closures. Lay and

>religious observers loudly protested church

>closures, arguing that an exclusively medical

>perspective of human suffering ignored a more

>spiritual one, depriving residents of solace

>(author's unpublished data). Most San Franciscans

>ignored a mandate to redon masks during the

>winter/spring wave: civil libertarians railed

>against the tyranny of compulsory behavior;

>business owners, about a veiled public afraid to

>shop; and Christian Scientists, about trampled

>personal liberties

>[<http://www.journals.uchicago.edu/CID/journal/issues/v31n6/000949/#rf3>3].

>

> Neither support nor resistance to public

>health recommendations by the community, a

>critical ally, should be taken for granted. A

>successful plan for managing an epidemic would

>convey consistent and meaningful messages, serve

>audiences with diverse beliefs and languages, and

>acknowledge citizen concerns and grievances.

>

> Guard against discrimination and allocate

>resources fairly. Spanish flu fostered both

>social cohesion and distance. Through a common

>enemy and shared sacrifices of war, many

>Americans had a well-developed sense of

>fellowship when the epidemic struck

>[<http://www.journals.uchicago.edu/CID/journal/issues/v31n6/000949/#rf3>3].

>At risk to themselves, neighbors nursed one

>another, fed the sick, helped with daily tasks,

>and joined the volunteer ranks

>[<http://www.journals.uchicago.edu/CID/journal/issues/v31n6/000949/#rf4>4].

>Nonetheless, fear of contagion interrupted normal

>displays of intimacy (e.g., kissing, shaking

>hands, and huddling to gossip)

>[<http://www.journals.uchicago.edu/CID/journal/issues/v31n6/000949/#rf4>4]

>and pitted groups against one another in an

>effort to assign blame or to protect access to

>limited resources. Rumors circulated in the

>United States that German spies, some disguised

>as doctors and nurses, were spreading flu and

>that Bayer aspirin, a German product, was

>infected with flu germs

>[<http://www.journals.uchicago.edu/CID/journal/issues/v31n6/000949/#rf3>3,

><http://www.journals.uchicago.edu/CID/journal/issues/v31n6/000949/#rf27>27].

>Baltimore hospitals, during Jim Crow segregation,

>were closed to blacks at their moment of dire

>need, and once the epidemic passed, an official

>defended the city's poor public health record by

>attributing high mortality rates to the number of

>black residents (author's unpublished data).

>

> As evident during Spanish flu and other

>historic outbreaks, explanations of disease often

>convey prejudice and serve to reinforce existing

>social schisms and inequalities. In a

>bioterrorist scenario, medical, public health,

>and political leaders should protect against

>social discrimination and assure fair allocation of resources.

>

>Conclusion: Signs of Unpreparedness in 2000

>

> Influenza's lessons for bioterrorism

>planners do not end with an 80-year-old crisis. The 1999

>

>2000 flu season, which the Centers for Disease

>Control and Prevention did not consider unusually

>severe, stymied US hospitals in ways that

>parallel 1918. At the season's peak, hospitals

>faced acute shortages of staff, beds, and

>equipment; patients confronted long delays in

>care. The disruption was the result, not of an

>especially virulent virus, but a health care

>system unable to cope with a nominal upswing in

>demand [30]. Hospitals have had to employ

>strategies (e.g., fewer staffed acute beds) to

>assure survival in a harsh fiscal climate (e.g.,

>slim profit margins, managed care demands for

>cost reduction, and mandated yet uncompensated

>care for the uninsured), leaving the country

>ill-prepared to deal with a mass casualty scenario [31, 32].

>

> Research and development needs in the

>control of influenza virus, a familiar if elusive

>pathogen, are substantial (e.g., accelerated

>manufacturing processes and development of

>alternate vaccines and antivirals)

>[<http://www.journals.uchicago.edu/CID/journal/issues/v31n6/000949/#rf6>6,

><http://www.journals.uchicago.edu/CID/journal/issues/v31n6/000949/#rf8>8],

>raising the question as to the vast research and

>development challenges posed by the more unusual

>pathogens identified as likely bioterrorist

>agents [33]. The logistics and time frame for

>manufacture and administration of the

>conventional killed influenza virus vaccine (6

>months from identification of a strain to vaccine

>production and distribution and 1

>

>2 months for delivery en masse) would inhibit the

>availability of vaccine before the first wave of

>a pandemic

>[<http://www.journals.uchicago.edu/CID/journal/issues/v31n6/000949/#rf2>2,

><http://www.journals.uchicago.edu/CID/journal/issues/v31n6/000949/#rf6>6,

><http://www.journals.uchicago.edu/CID/journal/issues/v31n6/000949/#rf8>8].

>A comparably long production timetable

>characterizes the new live attenuated virus

>vaccines, which nonetheless promise broader

>immune response as well as easier administration

>and social acceptance through intranasal delivery

>[<http://www.journals.uchicago.edu/CID/journal/issues/v31n6/000949/#rf9>9].

>Antiviral compounds may have limited value amidst

>pandemic conditions due to costs associated with

>prolonged use, the potential for drug resistance,

>and the short time in which demand would exceed

>supply

>[<http://www.journals.uchicago.edu/CID/journal/issues/v31n6/000949/#rf6>6,

><http://www.journals.uchicago.edu/CID/journal/issues/v31n6/000949/#rf8>8].

>

> Medical, public health, and policy

>communities should attend to the warnings of

>influenza, in its pandemic form and during

>interpandemic years, about the potential frailty

>of populations and institutions in the face of an

>infectious disease emergency, particularly one

>initiated by a deliberately released pathogen.

>

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>

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>2. Glezen WP. Emerging infections: pandemic

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>

[Guest guest]

Hi ,

Then read this. Why ask if you didn't want an answer?

>THERE WAS NO WAY TO MANUFACTURE AND DELIVER 20,000,000 vaccines in 1918!

That was the statement made on this thread that 20,000,000 deaths

were caused by vaccines in 1918.... NOT!

Steve

I haven't the time or inclination to read such verbosity

[Guest guest]

Steve:

I haven't the time to read St. 's Epistle to the Ephesians. Keep it

short and pithy.

Steve Culpepper wrote:

>Hi ,

>

>Then read this. Why ask if you didn't want an answer?

>

>

>

[Guest guest]

Pity

At 09:37 PM 11/9/2005 -0700, you wrote:

>Steve:

>I haven't the time to read St. 's Epistle to the Ephesians. Keep it

>short and pithy.

>

>

>

>

>Steve Culpepper wrote:

>

> >Hi ,

> >

> >Then read this. Why ask if you didn't want an answer?

> >

> >

> >

>

>

>

>

>

>Note: This forum is for discussion of health related subjects but

>under no circumstances should any information published here be

>considered a substitute for personal medical advice from a qualified

>physician. -the owner

>

[Guest guest]

Irene:

In psychological cases I don't rely on Homeopathy let alone Bach Flower.

Homeopathy can't replace a fearful or say a panic state with a positive

state or states as the process as it too is idiosyncratic. The patient

doesn't even know which states to choose. There are so many to choose

from and a particular state or states might not be the optimal ones. The

patient needs the opportunity to try out several different ones and

maybe stack them. For example what state or states do you need to be in

to learn optimally?

Irene de Villiers wrote:

> B. Monier- wrote:

>

>

>>There is an answer that involves possibly using a number of different

>>things. Certainly a part of the answer lies within ourselves and yet we

>>don't know how to activate it because we were never taught.

>>

>>

>

>The predisposition to be fearful can be addressed with appropriate

>homeopathy :-)

>Aconitum napellus as first aid for example - and/or other remedies

>matched to the individual and their fear/s.

>

>Namaste,

> IRene

>

>

[Guest guest]

a1thighmaster wrote:

> Says who? Polio is showing up only in the unvaccinated.

Again - Says who:-))

We have been through this discussion already.

There are too many claims by vaccine manufacturers, FDA, WHO etc -

what's real are the records of the people vaccinated or unvaccinated who

get/got polio, not the skewed info from the WHO or FDA, or the odd

anecdotal case.

...Irene

--

Irene de Villiers, B.Sc AASCA MCSSA D.I.Hom.

[Guest guest]

a1thighmaster wrote:

> What they didn't know back then was that immunizations should be done

> at least 30 days prior to the flu season.

That does not change the fact that vaccinated people died and

unvaccinated ones lived.

VAccines are not safe.

> It was not

> inactivated as today's vaccines are. It's like comparing apples and

> oranges.

Makes no difference - live virus was a problem and dead virus was a

different problem - both kill; neither works:

Even in the sixties the attenuated live virus was causing polio:

Comparing stats in USA between the dead Salk vaccine used 1955 to 1961

in USA to the live Sabin one used 1961 to 1964 - for the latter they

concluded that of the 87 cases of paralytic polio reported in the United

States since 1961, 57 were judged " compatible " with having been caused

by the attenuated poliovirus.

Lotta good that did :-)

It's hard to get around the *fact* that vaccinated people die and

unvaccinated ones do not.

With inactivated virus at least the manufacturers admit it is pretty

useless for developing antibody titer, and so they add adjuvants -

mercury, formalin etc - which cause worse problems, and claiming an

increased antibody titer as they do - does NOT prove effectiveness or

immunity.

Back ion the days you are discussing, if they did not learn what

vaccines did or did not need as conditions to be useful - up front

before using them - it begs the question of why they used such a

dangerous idea at all.

Big cover-up of the useless nature of vaccines by political groups with

an axe to grind - drug companies, FDA, the WHO.....

There is no proof that vaccines are effective. Antibody titer proves

nothing. In actual epidemics the vaccinated die. In modern life the

vaccinated die too.

Just check out the kitten upper respiratory infection rate (which is

about 100%) after a kitten is vaccinated in a shelter. That's one

statistically significant number of vaccinated individuals for a

" modern " vaccine example of ineffectiveness, easy to verify.

It's all historical fact, old and new, attenuated or live vaccine, makes

no difference to the dangerous nature of the thing - and in both cases

it predisposes chronic disease whether it induces acute disease at the

time or not. The skewed imune system with precedence of TH-2 cytokine

activity and thus lack of defence against chronic diseasew, is proved in

research and there is no contrary research to gainsay it.

The damage to the thymus by vaccines is so taken for granted nowadays

that most vets you ask will tell you cats do not have a thymus to speak

of as adults. Of course the unvaccinated ones (who never get chronic

disease) *do* have a normal (hence functioning) thymus.

.....Irene

--

Irene de Villiers, B.Sc AASCA MCSSA D.I.Hom. Box 4703 Spokane WA 99220.

www.angelfire.com/fl/furryboots/clickhere.html (Veterinary Homeopath.)

Proverb:Man who say it cannot be done should not interrupt one doing it.

[Guest guest]

Steve Culpepper wrote:

> Then read this. Why ask if you didn't want an answer?

>>THERE WAS NO WAY TO MANUFACTURE AND DELIVER 20,000,000 vaccines in 1918!

>

> That was the statement made on this thread that 20,000,000 deaths

> were caused by vaccines in 1918.... NOT!

YOU made that statement.

Now you do not like what you posted?

I did not read the detail as frankly I do not trust what you post

based on past experience on this list.

I posted a link to what n Winston wrote - he has credibility.

You had no comment on what he wrote:-))

.....Irene

--

Irene de Villiers, B.Sc AASCA MCSSA D.I.Hom. Box 4703 Spokane WA 99220.

www.angelfire.com/fl/furryboots/clickhere.html (Veterinary Homeopath.)

Proverb:Man who say it cannot be done should not interrupt one doing it.

[Guest guest]

B. Monier- wrote:

> Irene:

> In psychological cases I don't rely on Homeopathy let alone Bach Flower.

It's a choice.

Both systems work, and there are right ways and places to use Homeopathy

and BAch flower essences.

> Homeopathy can't replace a fearful or say a panic state with a positive

> state

Oh but it sure can:-)) And does. I use it all the time that way as do

all good homeopaths. It's a specific strength of homeopathy that it will

repair emotional or " mind " issues well.

> or states as the process as it too is idiosyncratic. The patient

> doesn't even know which states to choose.

It's not a matter of the patient choosing a state.

It's a matter of restoring normal healthy condition.

For example in an individual who is a social butterfly type, and who is

ill and fearful and hiding, you will not restore a shy introvert type

when you select the matching remedy - it will be a remedy to restore the

individual's normal extrovert socially active personality.

Put another way - Homeopathy can not turn oranges into apples, but it

can make an unhealthy orange into a healthy orange and an unhealthy

apple into a healthy apple.

Bach remedies can not act as deeply to reverse pathology as homeopathy

can, but they are very effective at balancing emotional levels and also

to some extent restoring physical health. The have the advantage that

they are few (only 38 to study where homeopathy has thousands of

remedies) and that they will help the individual to balance from EITHER

side of off-balance.

So for example excessive dominance behaviour will be tempered by BAch

Vine - as will lack of dominance behaviour - in either case restoring a

normal situation.

> There are so many to choose

> from

In homeopathy yes - but that's why training in homeopathy is lengthy and

involves techniques for remedy selection. That ability to correctly

select a remedy, is the key to being a good homeopath.

> and a particular state or states might not be the optimal ones.

Again - there is only one optimal state for any individual and it is the

one his normal constitution was born to have.

> The

> patient needs the opportunity to try out several different ones and

> maybe stack them.

No. There is no such thing as a choice of constitutions. We are born

with a specific one which might not be in good shape on arrival - but

which is predestined to be the one that belongs to that individual - it

is inherently so. You can't make an apple out of an orange with a remedy:-)

You can restore the best optimal state for the way the individual was

designed to be.

> For example what state or states do you need to be in

> to learn optimally?

You are designed a specific way - if that is optimum you will perform

YOUR life function optimally - but you will not be able to become

someone else with a different life purpose, nor would you want tot do

that if you were " in your right mind " as homeopathy will achieve. In our

optimum state, we are happy with that state - it feels right - it's how

we are designed to be - and it is good.

You only need to learn optimally, those things that enable you to

perform your specific life goal/function optimally. You will come with

that potential already available.

Namaste,

Irene

--

Irene de Villiers, B.Sc AASCA MCSSA D.I.Hom. Box 4703 Spokane WA 99220.

www.angelfire.com/fl/furryboots/clickhere.html (Veterinary Homeopath.)

Proverb:Man who say it cannot be done should not interrupt one doing it.

[Guest guest]

Irene,

The fact is I did not make that post. See for yourself it was posted

by cbwillis9 on Date: Wed, 02 Nov 2005 00:29:51 -0000

It was in fact the first post with this title in the thread......

I responded to the post and cbwillis9 posted the first mention

and link to n Winston.....not you.... I am not promoting Flu vaccines

as they still have Hg in them..... The other vaccines no longer have

Hg as an issue.

Regarding the rest it seems you like to make everything personal....

not my intent,

but we radically disagree on everything.... isn't life fun... Chill.

Steve

At 09:28 AM 11/10/2005 -0800, you wrote:

>Steve Culpepper wrote:

> > Then read this. Why ask if you didn't want an answer?

> >>THERE WAS NO WAY TO MANUFACTURE AND DELIVER 20,000,000 vaccines in 1918!

> >

> > That was the statement made on this thread that 20,000,000 deaths

> > were caused by vaccines in 1918.... NOT!

>

>YOU made that statement.

>Now you do not like what you posted?

> I did not read the detail as frankly I do not trust what you post

>based on past experience on this list.

>

>I posted a link to what n Winston wrote - he has credibility.

>You had no comment on what he wrote:-))

>

>....Irene

>--

>Irene de Villiers, B.Sc AASCA MCSSA D.I.Hom. Box 4703 Spokane WA 99220.

>www.angelfire.com/fl/furryboots/clickhere.html (Veterinary Homeopath.)

>Proverb:Man who say it cannot be done should not interrupt one doing it.

>

>

>

>

>

>Note: This forum is for discussion of health related subjects but

>under no circumstances should any information published here be

>considered a substitute for personal medical advice from a qualified

>physician. -the owner

>

[Guest guest]

Irene:

You're still speaking " ex cathedra, " that's a euphemism for your

Enneagramatic archetype. I'm not sure you understand what is meant by a

" state. "

There was a question at the end of my email to paraphrase, " What are

the optimal states for learning? " What are they and how would Homeopathy

address this producing the desired permanent result within two hours?

Blessings,

Irene de Villiers wrote:

> B. Monier- wrote:

>

>

>>Irene:

>>In psychological cases I don't rely on Homeopathy let alone Bach Flower.

>>

>>

>

>It's a choice.

>Both systems work, and there are right ways and places to use Homeopathy

>and BAch flower essences.

>

>

>

>>Homeopathy can't replace a fearful or say a panic state with a positive

>>state

>>

>>

>

>Oh but it sure can:-)) And does. I use it all the time that way as do

>all good homeopaths. It's a specific strength of homeopathy that it will

>repair emotional or " mind " issues well.

>

>

>

>>or states as the process as it too is idiosyncratic. The patient

>>doesn't even know which states to choose.

>>

>>

>

>It's not a matter of the patient choosing a state.

>It's a matter of restoring normal healthy condition.

>

>For example in an individual who is a social butterfly type, and who is

>ill and fearful and hiding, you will not restore a shy introvert type

>when you select the matching remedy - it will be a remedy to restore the

>individual's normal extrovert socially active personality.

>

>Put another way - Homeopathy can not turn oranges into apples, but it

>can make an unhealthy orange into a healthy orange and an unhealthy

>apple into a healthy apple.

>

>Bach remedies can not act as deeply to reverse pathology as homeopathy

>can, but they are very effective at balancing emotional levels and also

>to some extent restoring physical health. The have the advantage that

>they are few (only 38 to study where homeopathy has thousands of

>remedies) and that they will help the individual to balance from EITHER

>side of off-balance.

>So for example excessive dominance behaviour will be tempered by BAch

>Vine - as will lack of dominance behaviour - in either case restoring a

>normal situation.

>

>

>

>>There are so many to choose

>>from

>>

>>

>

>In homeopathy yes - but that's why training in homeopathy is lengthy and

>involves techniques for remedy selection. That ability to correctly

>select a remedy, is the key to being a good homeopath.

>

>

>

>>and a particular state or states might not be the optimal ones.

>>

>>

>

>Again - there is only one optimal state for any individual and it is the

>one his normal constitution was born to have.

>

>

>

>>The

>>patient needs the opportunity to try out several different ones and

>>maybe stack them.

>>

>>

>

>No. There is no such thing as a choice of constitutions. We are born

>with a specific one which might not be in good shape on arrival - but

>which is predestined to be the one that belongs to that individual - it

>is inherently so. You can't make an apple out of an orange with a remedy:-)

>You can restore the best optimal state for the way the individual was

>designed to be.

>

>

>

>>For example what state or states do you need to be in

>>to learn optimally?

>>

>>

>

>You are designed a specific way - if that is optimum you will perform

>YOUR life function optimally - but you will not be able to become

>someone else with a different life purpose, nor would you want tot do

>that if you were " in your right mind " as homeopathy will achieve. In our

>optimum state, we are happy with that state - it feels right - it's how

>we are designed to be - and it is good.

>

>You only need to learn optimally, those things that enable you to

>perform your specific life goal/function optimally. You will come with

>that potential already available.

>

>Namaste,

> Irene

>

>

[Guest guest]

Steve Culpepper wrote:

> Irene,

>

> The fact is I did not make that post.

You quoted it.

Same idea.

--

Irene de Villiers, B.Sc AASCA MCSSA D.I.Hom.