Guest guest Posted March 11, 2005 Report Share Posted March 11, 2005 PLEASE POST TO EVERY EMAIL GROUP,LIST, CONGRESSIONAL DISTRIBUTION, SENATORIAL, FEDERAL AND STATE. CALL TO ACTION FROM DENISE NICHOLS, DSNURSE@... This is probably the best article(BELOW) that reviews the fight that Gulf War Veterans (90-91) have been in for 14 years. I am asking that all help circulate this post to every EMail List and to ALL Congressmen and Senators Federal and State Level! WE need to have THE RIGHT RESEARCH AND FOR 14 YEARS WE WERE LOSING, I BELIEVE WE HAVE TURNED THE CORNER NOW AND THAT GREAT AND FAST STRIDES CAN BE MADE! SOME THINGS THAT NEED TO BE DONE 1. VA REGULATORY CHANGE -----RESEARCH MONEY GIVEN TO VA FOR GULF WAR VETERANS MUST BE ALLOWED TO BE USED BY SCIENTISTS THAT ARE NOT 5/8 TIME WITH VA-----WE WANT THE REGULATION TO SHOW AN EXEMPTION FOR GULF WAR ILLNESS RESEARCH! THIS CAN BE DONE WITHOUT A NEW LAW----BUT WE NEED ALL US REPS AND SENATORS TO FORCE VA TO MAKE A REGULATORY CHANGE BY PUTTING IN PLACE AN EXEMPTION. I AM ASKING FOR A FULL OUT ASSAULT VETERANS! THIS MEANS EMAIL,FAX,LETTER WRITING TO THE HILL. THE VA HAD 14 YEARS AND THROUGH ALL THE HEARINGS AND RESULTS OF THEIR SPENDING WE HAVE SEEN THAT THE VA HAS NOT BEEN SUCCESSFUL IN GULF WAR RESEARCH. 2. THE PROCESS OF RESEARCH PROPOSALS REVIEWS MUST BE CHANGED NOW. WE WANTED GULF WAR RESEARCH PROPOSALS IN A SEPERATE STACK NOT MIXED IN WITH ALL RESEARCH PROPOSALS. WE WANT THE PEOPLE THAT SIT ON THAT REVIEW PROCESS TO BE THE BEST EDUCATED AND TO INCLUDE MEMBERS OF THE VA-RAC-GWI COMMITTEE ARE AT LEAST TO HAVE A BRIEFING AND SOME OVERSIGHT BY THE VA-RAC-GWI COMMITTEE. THIS AGAIN IS A DOEABLE THING AND I DONT THINK IT WILL TAKE A NEW BILL OR LAW TO DO IT BUT MAYBE A PROPOSED BILL BY LEGISLATORS WILL SHOW WE ARE ALL SERIOUS! AGAIN FULL OUT ASSAULT VETERANS WE NEED TO GET THE FAX MACHINES HUMMING! AND EMAIL BOXES FULL AND PHONES RINGING. THE ONLY THING WE CAN DO IS THE GOOD GRASSROOT RESPONSE WE ARE POWERFUL WHEN WE HAVE ACTIONABLE GOALS AND A MEANS TO GET IT DONE! WE ALSO NEED ALL LEGISLATORS AWARE TO KEEP THE FUNDING GOING AND NOT LET IT DIE AND WE ALSO WANT MONEY AVAILABLE THROUGH THE GOVERNMENT TO GO TO OTHER RESEARCH OPTIONS RE NIH/NAS. WITH THE RIGHT TARGETTED APPROACH WE CAN GET THIS JOB DONE! NEXT WE NEED THE CLAIMS ADJUDICATORS TO DO THEIR JOB AND HAVE THE RIGHT TRAINING. WE NEED VA TO ENFORCE THE FULL EXTEND OF THE LAWS THAT WERE PASSED TO HELP GULF WAR VETERANS! THE SENSE OF CONGRESS IN ALL THE BILLS PASSED WAS TO HELP GULF WAR VETERANS GET THEIR COMPENSATION AND VA HAS NOT FOLLOWED THAT DESIRE INSTEAD HIDING BEHIND THE PAST FAULTY IDEA THAT SCIENCE RESEARCH WAS NOT VALIDATING THE GULF WAR VETERANS CONCERNS. WE ALSO WANT A MEANS THAT GULF WAR VETERANS CAN GET THE TESTING NOW AND THAT MEANS MRI-RS AND ANY OTHER TEST. WE NEED THE VETERANS TO BE ABLE TO GET THE DIAGNOSTIC TESTING THAT WILL ANSWER QUESTIONS NOW AND I AM INFURIATED THAT ONLY A VERY FEW HAVE BEEN ABLE TO GET THIS TEST IN DALLAS OR CALIFORNIA. GULF WAR VETERANS LIVE IN EVERY STATE! MANY VA PHYSICIANS PROBABLY THE MAJORITY HAVE NOT READ THE FINDINGS BY THE VA-RAC-GWI! HOW CAN A DOCTOR HELP US IF THEY ARE NOT INFORMED, EDUCATED, OR BRIEFED...WE ARE IN THE CENTURY THAT DRS CAN CONNECT USING THE TELECONFERENCE ABILITIES THAT THE VA HAS! WE WANT THE RAC-GWI AND THE SCIENTIST NOW INVOLVED TO CONDUCT THIS TRAINING ASAP. AND EVERY VA DR SHOULD BE MANDATED TO VIEW SUCH TELECONFERENCE. AGAIN THIS IS A DOEABLE TASK! VSOS SHOULD DEMAND A FULL AND COMPLETE REVIEW OF ALL GULF WAR VETERAN CLAIMS PAST AND PRESENT. WE KNOW THAT FOR 14 YRS TO GET THE GWVETS COMPENSATED THAT WHEN CLAIMS WERE SUBMITTED IN ORDER TO GET THEM COMPENSATED THAT THE CLAIMS WERE SUBMITTED USING PTSD OR ANYTHING ELSE TO GET THEM RATED. THE TIME HAS COME TO GET THE FACTS STRAIGHT! IF THEY HAD SYMPTOMS AND THEIR CLAIMS WERE NOT SUBMITED UNDER UNDIAGNOSED THEN THE CLAIMS NEED TO BE RECONSIDERED NOW. WE NEED TO HAVE FULL DEATH COUNT OF GULF WAR VETERANS THAT HAVE DIED SINCE THE GULF WAR THIS MEANS A SOCIAL SECURITY NUMBER MATCH UP FOR EVERY GULF WAR VETERAN, I AM NOT SURE THAT DOING A DEATH INDICES(SS) STUDY IS GOING TO DO THAT! WE NEED A LISTING OF DEATHS BY CAUSE-UNIT(LOCATION). WE NEED TO HONOR THESE VETERANS WHO DIED THAT MAY BE RELATED TO THEIR EXPOSURES. WE NEED THE VA TO REGULATE THAT GULF WAR VETERANS CAN AT LEAST HAVE EVALUATION EXAMS FOR EYE CLINIC AND DENTAL CLINIC SO THAT WE CAN AT LEAST START A DATA COLLECTION ON WHAT IS HAPPENING WITH OUR EYE SIGHT AND DENTAL DETERIORIATION. RIGHT NOW YOU CAN NOT EVEN GET SEEN IN EYE/DENTAL CLINIC UNLESS YOU ARE RATED 100%! SO THEREFORE THEY HAVE NO DATA ON THAT AREA TO EVEN HELP US WITH RESEARCH BEGINNING POINT. I HAVE HEARD FROM ENOUGH VETS INCLUDING MYSELF OF TEETH BREAKING OFF AT GUM LINE, MORE RAPID DETERIORIATION THAN SHOULD BE REASONABLY OCCURRING. ALSO EYES AND REPORTS OF VISION DIFFICULTIES AND REPORTS OF CATARACTS AND GLAUCOMA FROM THE GULF WAR VETERANS. THE OLD ADAGE OF IF YOU DONT LOOK YOU DONT FIND APPLIES. EYE AND DENTAL CARE IS EXPENSIVE AND SOMEHOW NEGLECTED IN TOTAL BODY HEALTH APPROACH AT VA! BUT THESE RELATE TO NEURO DAMAGE AND IMMUNE SYSTEM DAMAGE. GULF WAR VETERANS ARE HURTING FINANCIALLY AND THESE TWO AREAS CAN NOT BE NEGLECTED! I ALSO ASK ALL VETS TO GET IN TOUCH WITH ME IF YOU ARE HAVING THESE PROBLEMS....CALL ME OR EMAIL ME ASAP. I WILL BE SETTING UP FOR THESE CONCERNS JUST LIKE WE HAVE WITH GWVETS EXPERIENCING MS! ALSO HEADS UP WILL HAVE MORE INFO ON THIS OUT SHORTLY. WILL ALL I THINK THAT GIVES YOU SOME GUIDANCE. EVENTUALLY WE ARE GOING TO HAVE TO READDRESSED A BILL/LAW TO GIVE SOME KIND OF BLANKET PRESUMED COVERAGE FOR GWVETS! THIS WAS INITIALLY MENTIONED AT THE SENATE VA HEARINGS WHEN STORMIN NORM TESTIFIED. AGENT ORANGE LEGISLATION TOOK 30 YEARS AND HAPPENED IN 91. WILL GWVETS ARE AT 14YRS AND COUNTING! READ THE ARTICLE BELOW. ALSO I REQUEST THAT EACH AND EVERY ONE OF YOU PASS THIS EMAIL TO EVERY SOURCE YOU HAVE! After $247 Million, What Is There to Show? CHAPTER 4: THE BATTLEFIELD AT HOME http://www.dailypress.com/news/specials/dp-du4,0,4816042.story?coll=dp-break ing-news For 20 years and two days, Steve was a soldier. He jumped from airplanes, trained to fight and prepared to die for his country. He was tough and resourceful enough to win the beret of an Army Ranger. Now he fights in Washington, D.C. Often against the same outfit that trained him. For the past few years, has been executive director of the Gulf War Resource Center Inc., a small-budget nonprofit group devoted to working on issues important to veterans of the 1991 war and active-duty troops in the ongoing wars in Iraq and Afghanistan. The center operates out of the offices of the Vietnam Veterans of America organization near Washington. 's last assignment in the Army was at the Pentagon, working for the officials in charge of looking out for the veterans of the 1991 war. He says their willingness to put the Pentagon's public-relations ratings ahead of veterans' health prompted his career switch. For the past few years, he's been one of the most public and persistent critics of the Pentagon's insistence that depleted uranium weapons are not a significant health risk to troops on the battlefield. says he doesn't know whether depleted uranium weapons should be banned. But he says the Pentagon is so enamored with them and so concerned about its image, officials won't pay attention to the mounting evidence that they might be more harm than good. The ultra-effective anti-tank weapons are crucial aspects of the U.S. arsenal, and Pentagon officials say it would be a huge loss if they were deemed too dangerous. Every time that the weapons hit a hard target, they create thousands of particles of mildly radioactive toxic dust, small enough to be inhaled. A growing number of scientists are finding that the dust - even in small quantities - can cause genetic damage that they think might lead to cancer and other problems. Early research also indicates that the dust can migrate to the brain of rats forced to breathe small quantities of the dust, raising the possibility that some veterans' neurological problems are linked to the weapons. says one of the most important ways that the Pentagon has tried to sweep the issue out of sight involves its handling of millions of dollars used to investigate the cause of the illnesses suffered by Gulf War vets. Instead of pursuing the cause of the veterans' health problems, he says, Pentagon officials have put the bulk of their efforts and money on studies that would discount the problem or show that the illnesses are mental, not physical. isn't alone in that criticism. AFTER $247 MILLION, A CAUSE HAS YET TO BE FOUND According to Congress' Government Accountability Office, $247 million has been spent in the past 12 years to research the causes and possible cures of Gulf War vets' illnesses. Most was spent on work that would demonstrate or augment the Pentagon's original theory - that stress and people unable to handle it are the problem, not any of the weapons, pills or chemicals that the Pentagon produced, according to congressional testimony in June. The Pentagon has controlled 74 percent of that $247 million, with the Department of Veterans Affairs and other federal agencies spending the rest, says the accountability office, commonly known as the GAO. The military and U.S. government also controls the availability of depleted uranium for use in experiments by outside researchers, though there are chemical substitutes that can be used. Pentagon officials have rebuffed attempts to give experts at the federal Centers for Disease Control and Prevention, or CDC, and other agencies a bigger role in researching the possible effects of depleted uranium, even though those agencies are more experienced in that work, according to congressional testimony. Several Nobel Prize winners have told Congress that researchers who might be interested in getting involved have been discouraged by the military's stranglehold over the money to finance the work and the way it controls other information about Gulf War veterans. Some of the $247 million went to explore legitimate theories that proved invalid - a natural and unavoidable result of that kind of work, many researchers say. For instance, government officials in July ended years of research into whether a bacterial infection could be causing the neurological problems the veterans suffer. Other expensive efforts were doomed from the beginning because they were poorly designed or set out to do the impossible, the GAO says. POOR PLANNING, EXECUTION MEANS $13.7 MILLION WASTED One recent example is an investigation into how many troops were possibly exposed to chemical weapons and other dangers as a result of a fire at an Iraqi munitions depot in Khamisiyah in 1991. According to the most recent official government account of the incident, the CIA warned the military before the war that chemical weapons were stored there, but the word never filtered to commanders in the field. Military officials ordered the depot destroyed, and a potentially lethal cloud of debilitating chemicals might have been launched into the air. In 1993, the Pentagon and CIA said no one was exposed. In 1996, after news-media and congressional investigations, they acknowledged that there might be a problem, albeit a small one. At first, the two government agencies said hundreds of troops might be affected and that the amount of chemical poison was so small as to be inconsequential. Then a copy of a classified document was leaked, and the government called a news conference and announced that it was really thousands of troops, congressional testimony said. Finally, in 2000, the government's official estimate was upped to 101,752 troops, the GAO says. But even that number was suspect. So to get a better handle on the facts, the Pentagon paid consultants $13.7 million to develop computer models and do other work. It also spent untold dollars and man-hours on the project with its own staff, so the true cost of this study can't be established, the GAO reported in June. What resulted was a study so poorly conceived and done, it's worthless, the GAO says. Part of the problem is that some of the data necessary to do it right just isn't obtainable because no one was keeping reliable records on weather and wind conditions in Iraq at the time of the explosion. As a result, no one can say how far - or in what direction - the windborne chemicals might have gone. And there's no reliable information on exactly what was in the depot when it was blown up. A similar incident occurred at the Blackhorse Army base in Doha, Kuwait, on July 11, 1991. In that case, more than 7,000 pounds of depleted uranium weapons were destroyed in smoke and flames, along with four Abrams tanks and millions of dollars of other equipment and armaments. The heater for a munitions truck malfunctioned, caught fire and caused a series of explosions and fires in the base motor pool, the Pentagon's report on the incident says. As recently as last year, microscopic bits of depleted uranium could be found in the sand and debris there, other studies found. TROOPS HAD NO WARNING OF DANGER AFTER 1991 FIRE Pentagon records show that within hours of the fire, officers in the chain of command at Doha received the first of several notices about potential health hazards from the burning depleted uranium. The warnings contained specific directions about precautions that should be taken in the cleanup. None of those precautions were taken. The soldiers on the ground weren't told about the problem until 1998. The Army says the commanding officer didn't recall getting the warnings. The Pentagon offered no explanation for why soldiers involved in the four-month cleanup after the fire were allowed to handle materials with their bare hands and no precautions. After 1998, a government-maintained laboratory studied the situation. Despite the lack of adequate data and that " large uncertainties exist, " it concluded none of the troops incurred a significant health problem by inhaling the depleted uranium dust created by the fire. That lab used many of the same techniques employed in the Khamisiyah analysis. No GAO examination of Doha has been requested. The Doha base is still used by U.S. troops today, though the site of the fire is a restricted area. Troops from Fort Eustis deployed to the region visit there frequently. Doha is one of the major embarkation points for U.S. troops entering the Iraqi theater of war. It also has an amusement park and post exchange, making it a popular spot for off-duty troops to visit when they have a day off. The Army says the site, which is near a refinery, is safe. BASIC FACT-FINDING WASN'T DONE, EPIDEMIOLOGIST SAYS Critics of the government's efforts to find the cause of Persian Gulf War veterans' health problems say these examples aren't the most important oversights or missteps. Despite all the research spending, the military and government have yet to do a responsible epidemiological study that includes some of the fundamental data necessary to unravel the problem, says Haley, a former CDC official. Haley is now chief of the department of epidemiology at the University of Texas Southwestern Medical Center in Dallas and author of important studies on Gulf War veterans' health problems. A good epidemiological study would give researchers a handle on how many veterans are ill with undiagnosed problems, where they were during the war, what vaccinations they were given, what they did while deployed and other data, Haley says. It should have been done more than a decade ago as one of the first steps after they realized a problem existed, he says. Haley's criticisms are echoed by a number of scientists, but his background in tracking down the causes of high-profile illnesses sets him apart. At the CDC, he helped lead the investigation into toxic shock syndrome in the late 1970s, showing how women were getting critically ill because of the new generation of tampons they were using. He got involved in looking at Gulf War veterans' illnesses in the mid-1990s, after Texas businessman Ross Perot asked the dean of the Dallas medical center how much money it would take to start looking at reasons for the maladies that so many veterans were suffering. Perot said he'd been hiring former military personnel for years and just wasn't buying the Pentagon's line that these men and women were merely weak of body, will or mind, Haley recalls. The first thing that Haley did was look at the available data on the disease. He says he was surprised to find out that the basics of figuring out an epidemiological puzzle hadn't been done, despite all the money and time the government had spent. Instead of starting by spending a lot of money to prove one or two possible theories for the cause, he says, a good epidemiologist will start gathering some basic facts. Those facts would include who's involved (the sick people and people just like them who aren't sick), what they did during the war, where they were and other factors. That way, the epidemiologist can see what's common among the people who are sick and the people who aren't. Usually, he says, there will be only one or two things that the sick people have in common that turn out to be statistically significant and worth pursuing with research money. EPIDEMIOLOGY 101: THE CASE OF SUSPICIOUS POTATO SALAD A classic example is figuring out why some people got sick at a church picnic, he says. A good epidemiologist would interview the people who went to the picnic (those who got sick and those who didn't). She'd find out what games they played, what food they ate and where they were at the picnic. Then all that data would be compared, and you'd typically find a common thread - for instance, all the sick people ate potato salad and none of the well people ate it. Only then would you spend the money to take the potato salad to the lab to examine it, he says. But the government didn't do that - and still hasn't done it - Haley says. Instead, it did three studies that said the vets weren't really sick or, at least, they were no worse off than most people their age. The only difference it found was a slight increase in accidental deaths among the Gulf War vets. " They were so convinced that they would find nothing that they found nothing and published the data, " he says. Haley took the numbers the government-sponsored epidemiologists used in those studies to demonstrate just the opposite. He showed where researchers made questionable assumptions and how the same data could point in the opposite direction if other, more logical assumptions were used. A big mistake here, he says, is the government studies assumed that military personnel deployed for the war were just as healthy as anyone else in the military or the general public. So after the war, when they were found to be just as likely to die or get sick as other people, the government concluded that there was no problem. But the deployed soldiers were probably much healthier than those other groups to start with because they had to pass a rigorous physical exam to be considered for deployment overseas, Haley says. In that war, many troops were deemed not deployable because they were HIV-positive, were injured or otherwise in questionable health. Well before the Gulf War, epidemiologists had a stock phrase to describe this phenomenon: the " healthy warrior effect. " The government's researchers should have been familiar with it, Haley says. There were other problems, too. Haley and others noted that the data the government used in claiming only normal rates of death, cancer, infant deformities and other problems among Gulf War veterans came solely from military and VA hospitals. That left out most of the people who'd served in the war, Haley says - people who were reservists or got out of the military and weren't eligible for treatment in government hospitals. It wasn't surprising that data collected about active-duty military personnel using military hospitals showed they weren't sick; the sick ones had been forced out of uniform, Haley says. Members of Congress and others have latched onto that work and similar studies to force changes in the way the Defense Department, VA and other government agencies handle research, Haley and others say. SOME NEW FACES, SOME OLD PROBLEMS In 2002, Haley, and other critics of the government's handling of the research were appointed to a new panel of experts that advises the head of the VA on the research that should be conducted to find the cause of the vets' illnesses. Haley says he's encouraged that the government is slowly turning around to face the problem. In the past couple of years, he says, meaningful research has begun to trickle in, and the research is becoming better focused. A proper epidemiological study is scheduled to begin in January, he notes. There are still problems from within government agencies that have fought an honest approach to the problem, Haley, and others on the advisory panel say. Some of the bureaucrats who have thwarted progress are gone or shunted aside, they say, but others remain. The GAO reported in June that the advisory panel was having problems getting reliable information from the Pentagon and even from officials within the VA. Panel members aren't consistently being told about research being considered for financing, so they can help ensure that money is directed to the greatest needs, the GAO said. The panel also wasn't even being told about research when it was finished, the agency said. As of Sept. 23, 2003, about 80 percent of the 240 federally financed medical research projects for Gulf War illnesses had been completed, the GAO said in June. Yet the last time the VA reviewed this research to determine whether there were gaps and where there were opportunities that needed to be pursued was in 2001, the report said. The VA's inaction is important because it's responsible for coordinating the government's Gulf War illness research, even though it's not been given the bulk of the money to do that work. The VA has also been slow to act in other ways. In June, VA officials admitted to Congress that they had allocated only $450,000 of the $20 million budgeted for Gulf War illness research for the year. By then, three-fourths of the budget year was over. VA officials acknowledge that they need to do a better job. The government's Gulf War research coordinating group (a separate panel from the advisory committee) hadn't met since August 2003, the GAO said in its June report. The GAO said that when it checked with the coordinating group in April 2004, it found that there were no plans to meet again. Jim Binns, chairman of the VA secretary's Gulf War advisory committee, told Congress in June that he was concerned that the Defense Department had no plans to spend money on new Gulf War illness research in coming years. He said that meant total government research spending on Gulf War illnesses would drop from $35 million a year to $11 million, just as promising developments in research needed to be followed up. Most of the $11 million will have limited scope, too, because VA administrators can't spend money for research that isn't directly related to VA patients. The work on depleted uranium research that many scientists say is necessary thus isn't eligible. E. Kilpatrick, the Pentagon's deputy director for health issues involving deployed forces, says that doesn't mean the Pentagon is putting a halt to all this research. He says the military will continue to pursue the studies that are underway until they're concluded. With money tight, he says, the Pentagon must use more of its healthcare budget to benefit soldiers fighting current and future wars, not those of the past. RESEARCH MONEY BECOMING HARDER TO FIND THESE DAYS That decision was made in 2002, Kilpatrick says, when only one in six vets of the 1991 war was still in uniform. None of the active-duty troops from the 1991 war have the health problems targeted by Gulf War illness research. With a war on, members of Congress pushing veterans' issues say it will be hard to beef up money for research in the VA or other budgets. VA medical centers are starting to feel the effects of caring for troops from the continued fighting overseas. Binns notes that the VA, even in recent years, hasn't been very good about making sure that the money it has for research in this area is well spent. " As recently as 2003, the VA budget in that year - according to the most recent report to Congress - provided for about $4.1 million in Gulf War illness research. Of that amount, 57 percent went to study stress and other psychological causes, 17 percent went to study things like Web-based training for VA physicians and bioterrorism events, " he says. Only 17 percent of the money went to things that the advisory committee thinks are directly linked to the soldiers' suffering, Binns says. andra is a government scientist who's carried out some of the most important research into the health effects of depleted uranium. She says Pentagon money for pursuing the results of that work has started to dry up in recent years. " There's not enough money to complete the research, " she says, just as science is close to closing the loop on whether depleted uranium is dangerous. She and Vernon - a cancer biologist in New Mexico who's conducted experiments linking inhaled uranium to cellular mutations in rats - say completing the research would take only $5 million if the right projects were financed. That could truly determine whether, once and for all, inhaled depleted uranium is a hazard on the battlefield, they say. " We could be answering these questions, and we wouldn't have to have these kinds of conversations four years from now, " says. Albertini, one of the nation's leading cancer researchers, says access to money isn't the only thing that hampers research. He's one of more than a dozen doctors and scientists involved in a continuing medical study assessing the effect of depleted uranium shrapnel in veterans of the 1991 war. The Pentagon has called this study " the gold standard " of whether adverse health can result from exposure to depleted uranium on the battlefield and frequently points to its findings as support for its arguments that the weapons are safe. In the most recently published version of the study, Albertini says, three veterans showed an increased rate of mutations in a gene that doctors think is a " marker " for cancer. A marker for cancer isn't cancer itself but a warning signal that something might be wrong. In this case, the genes were in the white blood cells of the soldiers. Based on that finding, exposed rats to air with very small particles of depleted uranium, to see whether the same kind of mutations would develop. The rats did develop these mutations, which supports the idea that inhaling depleted uranium dust can cause cancer, Albertini and say. The mutations in the marker become less pronounced over time, Albertini says, so it's important to have blood samples from veterans of the more recent war to see whether these mutations continue and to do more research. So far, he says, the military and VA say samples aren't available, even though obtaining them isn't difficult and costs less than $100 apiece, he says. This isn't an idle academic exercise, Albertini says: Researchers might be close to finding a chemical that can halt the mutations, which might mean development of a pill or drug soldiers could take on the battlefield to reverse or arrest the mutations soon after their exposure. Experiments using chickens have been successful in halting the mutations in a test tube, Albertini says. He and say that work could lead to antidotes to " dirty bombs, " - explosives made of low-grade nuclear materials such as depleted uranium. Government officials have repeatedly said the nation's urban areas are vulnerable to such attacks if terrorists can obtain a sufficient quantity of the right radioactive materials. A LEGACY OF MISTRUST FROM PREVIOUS WARS and other veterans' advocates say they're afraid that the Pentagon's attitude toward soldiers' health and the failure to properly address illnesses from the 1991 Gulf War will be equaled in the new war. They say a pattern has developed that will make it difficult for any veteran to believe what the government says. Soldiers, sailors and civilians were often used as guinea pigs in experiments of how nuclear blasts might affect human beings in the years after World War II. The government never told them what was happening, then denied it - then denied that they were at risk until recently. " It took 40 years for them to get treatment and care, " says. Then came the Vietnam War and Agent Orange, a chemical used to kill acres and acres of jungle foliage, to make it easier for U.S. troops to find and kill the enemy. The government insisted for years that the chemical wasn't a problem, then finally admitted it was. Documents show that U.S. leaders knew the truth in 1972 - maybe earlier - but continued using it anyway, says. He says the same thing might be happening with depleted uranium and other possible causes of the Gulf War vets' ill health. Part of the problem of getting to the truth of Gulf War veterans' illnesses is that too many people use the issue for ideological purposes, he says. Critics of the weapon on the left use the radiological properties of depleted uranium " to scare people: Depleted uranium is the holocaust, " says. " Then you have the Department of Defense on the right, " saying there's no problem and questioning the motives and patriotism of critics, he says. A week before launching Operation Iraqi Freedom in 2003, the Pentagon briefed reporters to reiterate the safety of depleted uranium weapons and note the failure of anyone to conclusively link them to any of the health problems from the Persian Gulf War. Col. Naughton, then the Army's director of munitions, was brought out to speak. According to a transcript issued by the Pentagon, he talked about how much of a battlefield advantage the weapon is. " So we don't want to give that up, " he said, " and that's why we use it. " One of the reporters asked him why giving up the weapon was even being raised, if the weapon was so safe. " Well, you need to look at the environment of the context where people are asking us questions - who's asking the question? " Naughton replied. " The Iraqis tell us, 'Terrible things happened to our people because you used it last time.' " Why do they want it to go away? They want it to go away because we kicked the crap out of them - OK? " Later in the briefing, Naughton made it clear he thought that Iraq " and other countries that are not friendly to the United States " were behind criticism of the weapon. With those kinds of extremes, not much has happened in the middle, says. " In the middle, " he says, " is the science that has not been conducted. " Quote Link to comment Share on other sites More sharing options...
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