Re: Yates' conviction thrown out

[Guest guest]

While I strongly believe that this conviction should be overturned and

that she was undeniably insane at the time of the deaths, I don't see

how anything will change in the long run, considering the way Texas

law is written.

Maybe the new info on ADs will help her case.

[Guest guest]

While I strongly believe that this conviction should be overturned and

that she was undeniably insane at the time of the deaths, I don't see

how anything will change in the long run, considering the way Texas

law is written.

Maybe the new info on ADs will help her case.

[Guest guest]

I'll admit that I didn't follow her case closely. Did they raise the

problem with the drugs as part of her defense?? If not, it will be

interesting to see if they do now!

>

> While I strongly believe that this conviction should be overturned

and

> that she was undeniably insane at the time of the deaths, I don't

see

> how anything will change in the long run, considering the way Texas

> law is written.

>

> Maybe the new info on ADs will help her case.

[Guest guest]

I'll admit that I didn't follow her case closely. Did they raise the

problem with the drugs as part of her defense?? If not, it will be

interesting to see if they do now!

>

> While I strongly believe that this conviction should be overturned

and

> that she was undeniably insane at the time of the deaths, I don't

see

> how anything will change in the long run, considering the way Texas

> law is written.

>

> Maybe the new info on ADs will help her case.

[Guest guest]

No, but she was taking a twice the recommeneded dose of Effexor, of

all things, and Wellburtin. The Effexor had just been cut in half (to

the recommended dose) and Remeron added, IIRC.

> >

> > While I strongly believe that this conviction should be overturned

> and

> > that she was undeniably insane at the time of the deaths, I don't

> see

> > how anything will change in the long run, considering the way

Texas

> > law is written.

> >

> > Maybe the new info on ADs will help her case.

[Guest guest]

No, but she was taking a twice the recommeneded dose of Effexor, of

all things, and Wellburtin. The Effexor had just been cut in half (to

the recommended dose) and Remeron added, IIRC.

> >

> > While I strongly believe that this conviction should be overturned

> and

> > that she was undeniably insane at the time of the deaths, I don't

> see

> > how anything will change in the long run, considering the way

Texas

> > law is written.

> >

> > Maybe the new info on ADs will help her case.

[Guest guest]

Thanks, Jim, for pointing that out. I was focused on and

missed the big picture in this. You are absolutely right.

> Psychiatrists are payed huge money to give their " expert " opinion on

> dangerousness and the mental stability of who ever is on trial.

>

> The fact that they are often wrong goes unnoticed and that their

ability

> to judge dangerousness has been proven a failure by statistic.

>

> So nothing will change much for I'm afraid but this is a rare

> situation where the psychiatrist gets his hallowed opinion busted

> wide open as just an opinion and a bad one at that since he made it

up.

>

> Jim

>

>

> While I strongly believe that this conviction should be overturned

and

> that she was undeniably insane at the time of the deaths, I don't

see

> how anything will change in the long run, considering the way Texas

> law is written.

>

> Maybe the new info on ADs will help her case.

[Guest guest]

Thanks, Jim, for pointing that out. I was focused on and

missed the big picture in this. You are absolutely right.

> Psychiatrists are payed huge money to give their " expert " opinion on

> dangerousness and the mental stability of who ever is on trial.

>

> The fact that they are often wrong goes unnoticed and that their

ability

> to judge dangerousness has been proven a failure by statistic.

>

> So nothing will change much for I'm afraid but this is a rare

> situation where the psychiatrist gets his hallowed opinion busted

> wide open as just an opinion and a bad one at that since he made it

up.

>

> Jim

>

>

> While I strongly believe that this conviction should be overturned

and

> that she was undeniably insane at the time of the deaths, I don't

see

> how anything will change in the long run, considering the way Texas

> law is written.

>

> Maybe the new info on ADs will help her case.

[Guest guest]

Thanks, Jim, for pointing that out. I was focused on and

missed the big picture in this. You are absolutely right.

> Psychiatrists are payed huge money to give their " expert " opinion on

> dangerousness and the mental stability of who ever is on trial.

>

> The fact that they are often wrong goes unnoticed and that their

ability

> to judge dangerousness has been proven a failure by statistic.

>

> So nothing will change much for I'm afraid but this is a rare

> situation where the psychiatrist gets his hallowed opinion busted

> wide open as just an opinion and a bad one at that since he made it

up.

>

> Jim

>

>

> While I strongly believe that this conviction should be overturned

and

> that she was undeniably insane at the time of the deaths, I don't

see

> how anything will change in the long run, considering the way Texas

> law is written.

>

> Maybe the new info on ADs will help her case.

[Guest guest]

Thanks, Jim, for pointing that out. I was focused on and

missed the big picture in this. You are absolutely right.

> Psychiatrists are payed huge money to give their " expert " opinion on

> dangerousness and the mental stability of who ever is on trial.

>

> The fact that they are often wrong goes unnoticed and that their

ability

> to judge dangerousness has been proven a failure by statistic.

>

> So nothing will change much for I'm afraid but this is a rare

> situation where the psychiatrist gets his hallowed opinion busted

> wide open as just an opinion and a bad one at that since he made it

up.

>

> Jim

>

>

> While I strongly believe that this conviction should be overturned

and

> that she was undeniably insane at the time of the deaths, I don't

see

> how anything will change in the long run, considering the way Texas

> law is written.

>

> Maybe the new info on ADs will help her case.

[Guest guest]

Psychiatrists are payed huge money to give their " expert " opinion on

dangerousness and the mental stability of who ever is on trial.

The fact that they are often wrong goes unnoticed and that their ability

to judge dangerousness has been proven a failure by statistic.

So nothing will change much for I'm afraid but this is a rare

situation where the psychiatrist gets his hallowed opinion busted

wide open as just an opinion and a bad one at that since he made it up.

Jim

While I strongly believe that this conviction should be overturned and

that she was undeniably insane at the time of the deaths, I don't see

how anything will change in the long run, considering the way Texas

law is written.

Maybe the new info on ADs will help her case.

[Guest guest]

Psychiatrists are payed huge money to give their " expert " opinion on

dangerousness and the mental stability of who ever is on trial.

The fact that they are often wrong goes unnoticed and that their ability

to judge dangerousness has been proven a failure by statistic.

So nothing will change much for I'm afraid but this is a rare

situation where the psychiatrist gets his hallowed opinion busted

wide open as just an opinion and a bad one at that since he made it up.

Jim

While I strongly believe that this conviction should be overturned and

that she was undeniably insane at the time of the deaths, I don't see

how anything will change in the long run, considering the way Texas

law is written.

Maybe the new info on ADs will help her case.

[Guest guest]

as far as i know they did not raise any flags as far as withdrawal or psychotic

episodes cause by the drugs she was on....or subsequently ....off.. at the time.

> >

> > While I strongly believe that this conviction should be overturned

> and

> > that she was undeniably insane at the time of the deaths, I don't

> see

> > how anything will change in the long run, considering the way Texas

> > law is written.

> >

> > Maybe the new info on ADs will help her case.

[Guest guest]

as far as i know they did not raise any flags as far as withdrawal or psychotic

episodes cause by the drugs she was on....or subsequently ....off.. at the time.

> >

> > While I strongly believe that this conviction should be overturned

> and

> > that she was undeniably insane at the time of the deaths, I don't

> see

> > how anything will change in the long run, considering the way Texas

> > law is written.

> >

> > Maybe the new info on ADs will help her case.

[Guest guest]

as far as i know they did not raise any flags as far as withdrawal or psychotic

episodes cause by the drugs she was on....or subsequently ....off.. at the time.

> >

> > While I strongly believe that this conviction should be overturned

> and

> > that she was undeniably insane at the time of the deaths, I don't

> see

> > how anything will change in the long run, considering the way Texas

> > law is written.

> >

> > Maybe the new info on ADs will help her case.

[Guest guest]

as far as i know they did not raise any flags as far as withdrawal or psychotic

episodes cause by the drugs she was on....or subsequently ....off.. at the time.

> >

> > While I strongly believe that this conviction should be overturned

> and

> > that she was undeniably insane at the time of the deaths, I don't

> see

> > how anything will change in the long run, considering the way Texas

> > law is written.

> >

> > Maybe the new info on ADs will help her case.

[Guest guest]

Just now an expert on Fox News stated that Yates has a long history of

delusions and hearing voices, from way before she drowned the children, but no

mention of whether the delusions and voices came into her life before or after

she began psychiatric " treatment. "

Re: Yates' conviction thrown out

No, but she was taking a twice the recommeneded dose of Effexor, of

all things, and Wellburtin. The Effexor had just been cut in half (to

the recommended dose) and Remeron added, IIRC.

> >

> > While I strongly believe that this conviction should be overturned

> and

> > that she was undeniably insane at the time of the deaths, I don't

> see

> > how anything will change in the long run, considering the way

Texas

> > law is written.

> >

> > Maybe the new info on ADs will help her case.

------------------------------------------------------------------------------

[Guest guest]

Just now an expert on Fox News stated that Yates has a long history of

delusions and hearing voices, from way before she drowned the children, but no

mention of whether the delusions and voices came into her life before or after

she began psychiatric " treatment. "

Re: Yates' conviction thrown out

No, but she was taking a twice the recommeneded dose of Effexor, of

all things, and Wellburtin. The Effexor had just been cut in half (to

the recommended dose) and Remeron added, IIRC.

> >

> > While I strongly believe that this conviction should be overturned

> and

> > that she was undeniably insane at the time of the deaths, I don't

> see

> > how anything will change in the long run, considering the way

Texas

> > law is written.

> >

> > Maybe the new info on ADs will help her case.

------------------------------------------------------------------------------

[Guest guest]

Just now an expert on Fox News stated that Yates has a long history of

delusions and hearing voices, from way before she drowned the children, but no

mention of whether the delusions and voices came into her life before or after

she began psychiatric " treatment. "

Re: Yates' conviction thrown out

No, but she was taking a twice the recommeneded dose of Effexor, of

all things, and Wellburtin. The Effexor had just been cut in half (to

the recommended dose) and Remeron added, IIRC.

> >

> > While I strongly believe that this conviction should be overturned

> and

> > that she was undeniably insane at the time of the deaths, I don't

> see

> > how anything will change in the long run, considering the way

Texas

> > law is written.

> >

> > Maybe the new info on ADs will help her case.

------------------------------------------------------------------------------

[Guest guest]

Just now an expert on Fox News stated that Yates has a long history of

delusions and hearing voices, from way before she drowned the children, but no

mention of whether the delusions and voices came into her life before or after

she began psychiatric " treatment. "

Re: Yates' conviction thrown out

No, but she was taking a twice the recommeneded dose of Effexor, of

all things, and Wellburtin. The Effexor had just been cut in half (to

the recommended dose) and Remeron added, IIRC.

> >

> > While I strongly believe that this conviction should be overturned

> and

> > that she was undeniably insane at the time of the deaths, I don't

> see

> > how anything will change in the long run, considering the way

Texas

> > law is written.

> >

> > Maybe the new info on ADs will help her case.

------------------------------------------------------------------------------

[Guest guest]

Does anyone who has followed this case know what caused the ssri use

in the first place? Was it the post partum depression??

> > >

> > > While I strongly believe that this conviction should be

overturned

> > and

> > > that she was undeniably insane at the time of the deaths, I

don't

> > see

> > > how anything will change in the long run, considering the way

> Texas

> > > law is written.

> > >

> > > Maybe the new info on ADs will help her case.

>

>

>

>

>

> --------------------------------------------------------------------

----------

>

[Guest guest]

Does anyone who has followed this case know what caused the ssri use

in the first place? Was it the post partum depression??

> > >

> > > While I strongly believe that this conviction should be

overturned

> > and

> > > that she was undeniably insane at the time of the deaths, I

don't

> > see

> > > how anything will change in the long run, considering the way

> Texas

> > > law is written.

> > >

> > > Maybe the new info on ADs will help her case.

>

>

>

>

>

> --------------------------------------------------------------------

----------

>

[Guest guest]

's family was living in a bus and then finally moved

to a house, she was a CPS case first, all CPS needed to provide was some

child care

so she could do something else but watch the children all day, you know a

mothers

day out on the town. She was labeled post partum depression but I feel there

was more

to it then that label.

Here is an article that gives a pretty good timeline.

http://www.wcnc.com/sharedcontent/nationworld/nationprint/010605ccjcYatesOpinion\

..81dbaae9.html

Legal opinion: Yates judgment reversal

In The Court of Appeals

For The First District of Texas

ANDREA PIA YATES, Appellant V. THE STATE OF TEXAS, Appellee

On Appeal from the 230th District Court

County, Texas

Trial Court Cause Nos. 880205 & 883590

O P I N I O N

Appellant, Pia Yates, was charged by two indictments with capital

murder for the drowning deaths of three of her five children.

Appellant was charged in cause number 880205 with intentionally and

knowingly causing the deaths of Noah Yates and Yates. See Tex. Pen.

Code Ann.§ 19.03(a)(7)(A) (Vernon Supp. 2004-2005) (providing that murder of

more than one personin same transaction is capital murder). Appellant was

charged in cause number 883590 withintentionally and knowingly causing the

death of Yates. See Tex. Pen. Code Ann.§ 19.03(a)(8) (Vernon Supp.

2004-2005) (providing that murder of an individual under sixyears of age is

capital murder).

Close Rejecting appellant's insanity defense, the jury found her guilty and,

having answered the special issue regarding appellant's continuing threat to

society " No, " assessed punishment at life in prison. Following the verdict

and before the punishment phase of the trial, appellant learned that the

State's expert witness, Dr. Park Dietz, had presented false testimony.

Appellant moved for mistrial, but the trial court denied the motion.

Appellant asserts 19 points of error in which she challenges, among other

things, the factual sufficiency of the evidence to support the verdict

rejecting the insanity defense, the denial of a motion for mistrial based on

false testimony, and the denial of her right to due process by the use of

false or perjured testimony. We reverse and remand.

BACKGROUND

Appellant and Yates (Yates) were married on April 17, 1993. Their

first child, Noah, was born in February 1994; their second child, , was

born in December 1995; and their third child, , was born in September

1997. During this time, the Yates family moved from Friendswood to Florida

and back to the Houston area, living in a recreational vehicle. In 1998,

they moved from the recreational vehicle to a converted bus and continued to

live in a trailer park. At one point, appellant told her husband she felt

depressed and overwhelmed, and he suggested that she talk to her mother and

a friend.

In February 1999, a fourth child, Luke, was born. On June 18, 1999,

appellant suffered severe depression and tried to commit suicide by taking

an overdose of an antidepressant that had been prescribed for her father.

She was admitted to the psychiatric unit of Methodist Hospital. After her

release six days later, she began seeing a psychiatrist, Dr. Eileen

Starbranch, as an outpatient. On July 20, 1999, Yates found appellant in the

bathroom, holding a knife to her neck. Dr. Starbranch recommended that

appellant be admitted to Spring Shadows Glen Hospital. Appellant was

admitted, against her wishes, the next day. At Spring Shadows Glen,

appellant told a psychologist, Dr. , that she had had visions

and had heard voices since the birth of her first child. Dr. Starbranch

ranked appellant, at the time of her admission to Spring Shadows Glen, among

the five sickest patients she had ever seen. Before discharging appellant

from the hospital, Dr. Starbranch told appellant and Yates that appellant

had a high risk of another psychotic episode if she had another baby.

In August 1999, the Yates family moved from the converted bus to a house

that Yates had bought while appellant was in the hospital. That fall,

appellant began home-schooling Noah. Appellant saw Dr. Starbranch for the

last time on January 12, 2000. She told Dr. Starbranch that she had stopped

taking her medication in November 1999. In November 2000, appellant's fifth

child, , was born. In March 2001, appellant's father died. This death

seemed to precipitate a decline in appellant's functioning, and she began to

suffer from depression. On March 28, 2001, Yates contacted Dr. Starbranch

and told her that appellant was ill again. Dr. Starbranch wanted to see

appellant immediately, but Yates said he could not bring her in until the

next Monday.

Appellant was not taken to Dr. Starbranch's office, but was admitted to

Devereux Hospital in League City on March 31, 2001. There, she was observed

as being catatonic or nearly catatonic and possibly delusional or having

bizarre thoughts. She was treated by Dr. Mohammed Saeed and was placed on a

suicide watch. Appellant was discharged on April 13, 2001 upon her own and

Yates's request. She began an outpatient program at Devereux, and Dr. Saeed

recommended that someone stay with her at all times and that she not be left

alone with her children.

On April 19, Yates's mother came for a visit. She had intended to stay for

about one week, but, when Yates told his mother that appellant was suffering

from depression, his mother decided to stay longer and moved to a nearby

extended-stay hotel.

Yates's mother went to appellant's home every day. She observed that

appellant was almost catatonic, did not respond to conversation or made a

delayed response, stared into space, trembled, scratched her head until she

created bald spots, and did not eat. On May 3, appellant filled a bathtub

with water, but could not give a good reason for doing so. When asked, she

said, " I might need it. " On May 4, appellant was re-admitted to Devereux,

and on May 14, she was discharged, seeming to be better. Dr. Saeed had

prescribed the medication, Haldol, and appellant continued to take it after

her discharge. Dr. Saeed also recommended electroconvulsive therapy, but

appellant rejected that recommendation.

After her second discharge from Devereux, appellant was able to take care of

her children, but was still uncommunicative and withdrawn. She smiled

infrequently and seemed to have no emotions, but Yates did not think it was

unsafe to leave her alone with the children. On June 4, appellant had a

follow-up appointment with Dr. Saeed, who decided to taper her off of

Haldol. Appellant denied having any suicidal or psychotic thoughts.

Appellant met with Dr. Saeed again on June 18, and she again denied having

any psychotic symptoms or suicidal thoughts. She was no longer taking

Haldol, and Dr. Saeed adjusted the dosages of her other anti-depressant

medications.

On June 20, 2001, at 9:48 a.m., appellant called 9-1-1 and told the

operator, Sylvia , that she needed the police. transferred the

call to the Houston Police Department, and appellant told the police

operator that she needed a police officer to come to her home. Appellant

also called Yates at his work and told him that he needed to come home, but

would not say why. As Yates was leaving, he called her and asked if anyone

was hurt, and she said that the kids were hurt. He asked, " Which ones? " She

responded, " All of them. "

Within minutes of appellant's 9-1-1 call, several police officers arrived at

appellant's home. They discovered four dead children, soaking wet and

covered with a sheet, lying on appellant's bed. The fifth child, Noah, was

still in the bathtub, floating face down. Appellant was quiet and

cooperative with the police officers.

At trial, ten psychiatrists and two psychologists testified regarding

appellant's mental illness. Four of the psychiatrists and one of the

psychologists had treated appellant either in a medical facility or as a

private patient before June 20, 2001. They testified regarding the symptoms,

severity, and treatment of appellant's mental illness. Five psychiatrists

and one psychologist saw appellant on or soon after June 20 for assessment

and/or treatment of her mental illness. Four of these five psychiatrists and

the psychologist testified, in addition to their observations and opinions

regarding appellant's mental illness, that appellant, on June 20, 2001, did

not know right from wrong, was incapable of knowing what she did was wrong,

or believed that her acts were right.

The fifth psychiatrist in this group, Dr. Ferguson, testified that

she had notmade a determination regarding appellants ability to know whether

her actions were wrong. However, she testified that appellant made the

statement that, in the context that the childrenwould perish in the fires of

hell, [their drowning] was the right thing to do.

Close

The tenth psychiatrist, Dr. Park Dietz, who interviewed appellant and was

the State's sole mental-health expert in the case, testified that appellant,

although psychotic on June 20, knew that what she did was wrong. Dr. Dietz

reasoned that because appellant indicated that her thoughts were coming from

Satan, she must have known they were wrong; that if she believed she was

saving the children, she would have shared her plan with others rather than

hide it as she did; that if she really believed that Satan was going to harm

the children, she would have called the police or a pastor or would have

sent the children away; and that she covered the bodies out of guilt or

shame.

On cross-examination, appellant's counsel asked Dr. Dietz about his

consulting work with the television show, " Law & Order, " which appellant was

known to watch. The testimony was as follows:

Q.Now, you are, are you not, a consultant on the television program known as

" Law & Order " ?

A.Two of them.

Q.Okay. Did either one of those deal with postpartum depression or women's

mental health?

A.As a matter of fact, there was a show of a woman with postpartum

depression who drowned her children in the bathtub and was found insane and

it was aired shortly before the crime occurred.

The second mention of " Law & Order " came during Dr. Lucy Puryear's

testimony. Dr. Puryear, a defense expert witness, was cross-examined by the

State regarding her evaluation of appellant. The State specifically asked

about her failure to inquire into whether or not appellant had seen " Law &

Order. " Dr. Puryear testified as follows:

Q.You know she watched " Law & Order " a lot; right?

A.I didn't know. No.

Q.Did you know that in the weeks before June 20th, there was a " Law & Order "

episode where a woman killed her children by drowning them in a bathtub, was

defended on the basis of whether she was sane or insane under the law, and

the diagnosis was postpartum depression and in the program the person was

found insane, not guilty by reason of insanity? Did you know that?

A.No.

Q.If you had known that and had known that Yates was subject to these

delusions, not that she was the subject of a delusion of reference, but that

she regularly watched " Law & Order " and may have seen that episode, would

you have changed the way you went about interviewing her, would you have

interviewed whether she got the idea somehow she could do this and not

suffer hell or prison?

A.I certainly wouldn't have asked her that question. No.

Q.Would you have - - you didn't have to ask her that question, but you could

have explored that?

A.If I had known she watched that show, I would have ask[ed] her about it,

yes.

In his final argument at the guilt-innocence phase of the trial, appellant's

attorney referred to Dr. Dietz's testimony by stating, " Or maybe even we

heard some evidence that she saw some show on TV and knew she could drown

her children and get away with it. "

The prosecutor, in his final argument, made the following reference to Dietz

's testimony about the " Law & Order " episode:

She gets very depressed and goes into Devereux. And at times she says these

thoughts came to her during that month. These thoughts came to her, and she

watches " Law & Order " regularly, she sees this program. There is a way out.

She tells that to Dr. Dietz. A way out.

After the jury had returned a guilty verdict, appellant's counsel discovered

that Dr. Dietz had given false testimony. The producer of " Law & Order "

spoke to counsel by telephone and said he could not recall such an episode.

An attorney representing the producer, after talking to Dr. Dietz and

researching the shows, verified to counsel that there was no show with a

plot as outlined by Dr. Dietz. Dr. Dietz acknowledged that he had made an

error in his testimony. Dr. Dietz's acknowledgment is not on the record. The

record is unclear as towhether it was made to the attorney representing the

producer or to appellant's counsel.

Close Appellant and the State entered into the following written

stipulation:

1.Dr. Park Dietz testified on cross-examination that " As a matter of fact,

there was a show of a woman with postpartum depression who drowned her

children in the bathtub and was found insane and it was aired shortly before

this crime occurred. "

2.Dr. Park Dietz would testify that he was in error and that no episode of

" Law & Order " and/or " Law & Order: Criminal Intent " as described above was

ever produced for the " Law & Order " television series.

Appellant moved for a mistrial based on Dr. Dietz's false testimony, and the

trial court denied the motion. Appellant then requested that the stipulation

be admitted into evidence and read to the jury. The trial court granted this

request. In connection with the stipulation, the trial court, in response to

appellant's request, made the following statement to the jury:

Ladies and gentlemen, during the course of this trial there have been

occasions when written stipulations have been introduced for your

consideration. . . . While those witnesses that give information which is

contained in this stipulation do not physically appear here in court to

testify, you must consider the matters which they have indicated in the

written stipulation as if they actually appeared in court and give it

whatever weight you wish to give to it. So the witness does not have to

actually appear in court, but the matters contained in the stipulation are

offered into evidence as if they had appeared.

The jury returned verdicts on both charges that at least 10 jurors had a

reasonable doubt that appellant would commit criminal acts of violence that

would constitute a continuing threat to society.

DISCUSSION

Motion for Mistrial

In her second point of error, appellant contends that the trial court abused

its discretion by denying her motion for mistrial when it was revealed that

the State's expert witness had presented false testimony. Appellant argues

that Dr. Dietz's testimony was essential to the jury's " guilty " verdict and

that his testimony relating to the " Law & Order " episode was the most

compelling testimony supporting Dr. Dietz's conclusion that appellant knew

right from wrong.

The State recognizes that the State's knowing use of perjured testimony that

is likely to materially affect the judgment violates the Due Process Clause

of the Fourteenth Amendment of the United States Constitution. See Ex parte

Castellano, 863 S.W.2d 476, 485 (Tex. Crim. App. 1993). The State argues

that it did not know that the testimony was false, did not use the false

information, and the information was not material. We agree that this case

does not involve the State's knowing use of perjured testimony. At the

hearing on appellant's motion for mistrial, appellant did not complain that

there had been prosecutorial misconduct. Rather, appellant stated,

[M]ake no mistake, the issue is not whether or not the State was aware and

we have no reason to believe the State was aware that such a program did not

exist. The issue is that the defense of insanity was rebutted by the

testimony of Dr. Dietz relative to an act of premeditation, that is a

planned and/or a deceptive act on Mrs. Yates' part, that is something that

would give her an idea, a way out of these particular allegations. And that

was relayed to this jury and we believe that the jury relied upon the

presentation of Dr. Dietz as well as the cross-examination by [the State's

attorney] of Dr. Puryear relative to this particular issue.

We review the denial of a motion for mistrial under an abuse of discretion

standard. Ladd v. State, 3 S.W.3d 547, 567 (Tex. Crim. App. 1999). In this

case, the motion for mistrial was the functional equivalent of a motion for

new trial; therefore, we look to the standards governing the review of the

granting or denial of a motion for new trial. See State v. Garza, 774 S.W.2d

724, 726 (Corpus Christi 1989, pet. ref'd) (concluding that State may appeal

order granting mistrial that is functionally indistinguishable from order

granting motion for new trial).

Generally, if a witness has testified to material, inculpatory facts against

a defendant and, after the verdict but before a motion for new trial has

been ruled upon, the witness makes an affidavit that he testified falsely, a

new trial should be granted. In our case, Dr. Dietz did not make an

affidavit that he testified falsely. However,because the State stipulated

that Dr. Dietz would testify that his testimony was in error, thereis no

credibility issue requiring an affidavit. See Dougherty v. State, 745 S.W.2d

107, 107(Tex. App.-Amarillo 1988), aff'd, 773 S.W.2d 320 (Tex. Crim. App.

1989) (stating thatState was bound by its stipulation).

Close v. State, 375 S.W.2d 449, 451 (Tex. Crim. App. 1964). The

exceptions to this rule-such as, when the recanting witness is an

accomplice, or the recantation is found to be incredible in light of the

evidence, or the recantation has been coerced-do not apply in the present

case. See Villarreal v. State, 788 S.W.2d 672, 674 (Tex. App.-Corpus Christi

1990, pet. ref'd) (applying general rule to determine that, because State

offered no evidence to controvert recantation or testimony, denial of motion

for new trial was abuse of discretion). We note that this rule does not

require that the State have knowledge that the testimony was false. We

review the record to determine whether the State used the false testimony

and, if so, whether there is a reasonable likelihood that the false

testimony could have affected the judgment of the jury. See v.

State, 96 S.W.3d 386, 394-95 (Tex. App.-Austin 2002, pet. ref'd). We

recognize that v. State involved the prosecutor's knowing use of

falsetestimony. 96 S.W.3d 386, 393 (Tex. App.-Austin 2002, pet. ref'd).

However, when falsetestimony is a factor in securing a conviction, the

effect is the same, regardless of whetherthe State used the false testimony

knowingly or not. See Trujillo v. State, 757 S.W.2d 169,172 n.1 (Tex.

App.-San 1988, no pet.) (Cadena, C.J. concurring).

Close

It is uncontested that the testimony of Dr. Dietz regarding his consultation

on a " Law & Order " television show having a plot remarkably similar to the

acts committed by appellant was untrue and that there was no " Law & Order "

television show with such a plot. The State is bound by its stipulation to

these facts. See Dougherty v. State, 745 S.W.2d 107, 107 (Tex. App.-Amarillo

1988), aff'd, 773 S.W.2d 320 (Tex. Crim. App. 1989) (stating that State was

bound by its stipulation). However, the State asserts that it is " very

questionable whether it can be said that the trial prosecutors used Dr.

Dietz' testimony on cross-examination, especially in light of the fact that

it played absolutely no role in the development of Dr. Dietz' conclusion

that the appellant knew that her conduct was wrong . . . . "

The record reflects that the State used Dr. Dietz's testimony twice. First,

the State used the testimony to cross-examine Dr. Puryear, who had seen

appellant for several months while appellant was in the county jail, asking

Dr. Puryear whether she knew that appellant watched " Law & Order " and

whether she knew that there was an episode with a plot line mirroring

appellant's acts. In so doing, the State repeated those facts that were

common to appellant's acts and the referenced episode, thus emphasizing

those facts already stated by Dr. Dietz. Second, the State connected the

dots in its final argument by juxtaposing appellant's depression, her dark

thoughts, watching " Law & Order, " and seeing " a way out. " Thus, the State

used Dr. Dietz's false testimony to suggest to the jury that appellant

patterned her actions after that " Law & Order " episode. We emphasize that

the State's use of Dr. Dietz's false testimony was not prosecutorial

misconduct. Rather, it served to give weight to that testimony.

The State argues that Dr. Dietz's testimony regarding the " Law & Order "

episode was not material. The State asserts that " there is no reasonable

likelihood " that the testimony " could have affected the judgment of the

jury, " but does not make any argument to support such a conclusory

statement. We conclude that the testimony, combined with the State's

cross-examination of Dr. Puryear and closing argument, was material. The

materiality of the testimony is further evidenced by the fact that appellant

's attorney felt compelled to address it in his own closing argument.

The State also asserts that Dr. Dietz did not suggest that appellant used

the plot of the show to plan killing her children. Although it is true that

Dr. Dietz did not make such a suggestion, the State did in its closing

argument.

Five mental health experts testified that appellant did not know right from

wrong or that she thought what she did was right. Dr. Dietz was the only

mental health expert who testified that appellant knew right from wrong.

Therefore, his testimony was critical to establish the State's case.

Although the record does not show that Dr. Dietz intentionally lied in his

testimony, his false testimony undoubtedly gave greater weight to his

opinion.

On the other hand, had the jury known prior to their deliberations in the

guilt-innocence phase of the trial, that Dr. Dietz's testimony regarding the

" Law & Order " episodewas false, the jury would likely have considered him,

the State's only mental health expert,to be less credible.

Close

We conclude that there is a reasonable likelihood that Dr. Dietz's false

testimony could have affected the judgment of the jury. We further conclude

that Dr. Dietz's false testimony affected the substantial rights of

appellant. Therefore, the trial court abused its discretion in denying

appellant's motion for mistrial.

Accordingly, we sustain appellant's second issue.

CONCLUSION

Having sustained appellant's second issue, we need not reach her other

issues. We reverse the trial court's judgment and remand the cause for

further proceedings.

Sam Nuchia

Justice

Panel consists of Chief Justice Radack and Justices Taft and Nuchia.

[Guest guest]

's family was living in a bus and then finally moved

to a house, she was a CPS case first, all CPS needed to provide was some

child care

so she could do something else but watch the children all day, you know a

mothers

day out on the town. She was labeled post partum depression but I feel there

was more

to it then that label.

Here is an article that gives a pretty good timeline.

http://www.wcnc.com/sharedcontent/nationworld/nationprint/010605ccjcYatesOpinion\

..81dbaae9.html

Legal opinion: Yates judgment reversal

In The Court of Appeals

For The First District of Texas

ANDREA PIA YATES, Appellant V. THE STATE OF TEXAS, Appellee

On Appeal from the 230th District Court

County, Texas

Trial Court Cause Nos. 880205 & 883590

O P I N I O N

Appellant, Pia Yates, was charged by two indictments with capital

murder for the drowning deaths of three of her five children.

Appellant was charged in cause number 880205 with intentionally and

knowingly causing the deaths of Noah Yates and Yates. See Tex. Pen.

Code Ann.§ 19.03(a)(7)(A) (Vernon Supp. 2004-2005) (providing that murder of

more than one personin same transaction is capital murder). Appellant was

charged in cause number 883590 withintentionally and knowingly causing the

death of Yates. See Tex. Pen. Code Ann.§ 19.03(a)(8) (Vernon Supp.

2004-2005) (providing that murder of an individual under sixyears of age is

capital murder).

Close Rejecting appellant's insanity defense, the jury found her guilty and,

having answered the special issue regarding appellant's continuing threat to

society " No, " assessed punishment at life in prison. Following the verdict

and before the punishment phase of the trial, appellant learned that the

State's expert witness, Dr. Park Dietz, had presented false testimony.

Appellant moved for mistrial, but the trial court denied the motion.

Appellant asserts 19 points of error in which she challenges, among other

things, the factual sufficiency of the evidence to support the verdict

rejecting the insanity defense, the denial of a motion for mistrial based on

false testimony, and the denial of her right to due process by the use of

false or perjured testimony. We reverse and remand.

BACKGROUND

Appellant and Yates (Yates) were married on April 17, 1993. Their

first child, Noah, was born in February 1994; their second child, , was

born in December 1995; and their third child, , was born in September

1997. During this time, the Yates family moved from Friendswood to Florida

and back to the Houston area, living in a recreational vehicle. In 1998,

they moved from the recreational vehicle to a converted bus and continued to

live in a trailer park. At one point, appellant told her husband she felt

depressed and overwhelmed, and he suggested that she talk to her mother and

a friend.

In February 1999, a fourth child, Luke, was born. On June 18, 1999,

appellant suffered severe depression and tried to commit suicide by taking

an overdose of an antidepressant that had been prescribed for her father.

She was admitted to the psychiatric unit of Methodist Hospital. After her

release six days later, she began seeing a psychiatrist, Dr. Eileen

Starbranch, as an outpatient. On July 20, 1999, Yates found appellant in the

bathroom, holding a knife to her neck. Dr. Starbranch recommended that

appellant be admitted to Spring Shadows Glen Hospital. Appellant was

admitted, against her wishes, the next day. At Spring Shadows Glen,

appellant told a psychologist, Dr. , that she had had visions

and had heard voices since the birth of her first child. Dr. Starbranch

ranked appellant, at the time of her admission to Spring Shadows Glen, among

the five sickest patients she had ever seen. Before discharging appellant

from the hospital, Dr. Starbranch told appellant and Yates that appellant

had a high risk of another psychotic episode if she had another baby.

In August 1999, the Yates family moved from the converted bus to a house

that Yates had bought while appellant was in the hospital. That fall,

appellant began home-schooling Noah. Appellant saw Dr. Starbranch for the

last time on January 12, 2000. She told Dr. Starbranch that she had stopped

taking her medication in November 1999. In November 2000, appellant's fifth

child, , was born. In March 2001, appellant's father died. This death

seemed to precipitate a decline in appellant's functioning, and she began to

suffer from depression. On March 28, 2001, Yates contacted Dr. Starbranch

and told her that appellant was ill again. Dr. Starbranch wanted to see

appellant immediately, but Yates said he could not bring her in until the

next Monday.

Appellant was not taken to Dr. Starbranch's office, but was admitted to

Devereux Hospital in League City on March 31, 2001. There, she was observed

as being catatonic or nearly catatonic and possibly delusional or having

bizarre thoughts. She was treated by Dr. Mohammed Saeed and was placed on a

suicide watch. Appellant was discharged on April 13, 2001 upon her own and

Yates's request. She began an outpatient program at Devereux, and Dr. Saeed

recommended that someone stay with her at all times and that she not be left

alone with her children.

On April 19, Yates's mother came for a visit. She had intended to stay for

about one week, but, when Yates told his mother that appellant was suffering

from depression, his mother decided to stay longer and moved to a nearby

extended-stay hotel.

Yates's mother went to appellant's home every day. She observed that

appellant was almost catatonic, did not respond to conversation or made a

delayed response, stared into space, trembled, scratched her head until she

created bald spots, and did not eat. On May 3, appellant filled a bathtub

with water, but could not give a good reason for doing so. When asked, she

said, " I might need it. " On May 4, appellant was re-admitted to Devereux,

and on May 14, she was discharged, seeming to be better. Dr. Saeed had

prescribed the medication, Haldol, and appellant continued to take it after

her discharge. Dr. Saeed also recommended electroconvulsive therapy, but

appellant rejected that recommendation.

After her second discharge from Devereux, appellant was able to take care of

her children, but was still uncommunicative and withdrawn. She smiled

infrequently and seemed to have no emotions, but Yates did not think it was

unsafe to leave her alone with the children. On June 4, appellant had a

follow-up appointment with Dr. Saeed, who decided to taper her off of

Haldol. Appellant denied having any suicidal or psychotic thoughts.

Appellant met with Dr. Saeed again on June 18, and she again denied having

any psychotic symptoms or suicidal thoughts. She was no longer taking

Haldol, and Dr. Saeed adjusted the dosages of her other anti-depressant

medications.

On June 20, 2001, at 9:48 a.m., appellant called 9-1-1 and told the

operator, Sylvia , that she needed the police. transferred the

call to the Houston Police Department, and appellant told the police

operator that she needed a police officer to come to her home. Appellant

also called Yates at his work and told him that he needed to come home, but

would not say why. As Yates was leaving, he called her and asked if anyone

was hurt, and she said that the kids were hurt. He asked, " Which ones? " She

responded, " All of them. "

Within minutes of appellant's 9-1-1 call, several police officers arrived at

appellant's home. They discovered four dead children, soaking wet and

covered with a sheet, lying on appellant's bed. The fifth child, Noah, was

still in the bathtub, floating face down. Appellant was quiet and

cooperative with the police officers.

At trial, ten psychiatrists and two psychologists testified regarding

appellant's mental illness. Four of the psychiatrists and one of the

psychologists had treated appellant either in a medical facility or as a

private patient before June 20, 2001. They testified regarding the symptoms,

severity, and treatment of appellant's mental illness. Five psychiatrists

and one psychologist saw appellant on or soon after June 20 for assessment

and/or treatment of her mental illness. Four of these five psychiatrists and

the psychologist testified, in addition to their observations and opinions

regarding appellant's mental illness, that appellant, on June 20, 2001, did

not know right from wrong, was incapable of knowing what she did was wrong,

or believed that her acts were right.

The fifth psychiatrist in this group, Dr. Ferguson, testified that

she had notmade a determination regarding appellants ability to know whether

her actions were wrong. However, she testified that appellant made the

statement that, in the context that the childrenwould perish in the fires of

hell, [their drowning] was the right thing to do.

Close

The tenth psychiatrist, Dr. Park Dietz, who interviewed appellant and was

the State's sole mental-health expert in the case, testified that appellant,

although psychotic on June 20, knew that what she did was wrong. Dr. Dietz

reasoned that because appellant indicated that her thoughts were coming from

Satan, she must have known they were wrong; that if she believed she was

saving the children, she would have shared her plan with others rather than

hide it as she did; that if she really believed that Satan was going to harm

the children, she would have called the police or a pastor or would have

sent the children away; and that she covered the bodies out of guilt or

shame.

On cross-examination, appellant's counsel asked Dr. Dietz about his

consulting work with the television show, " Law & Order, " which appellant was

known to watch. The testimony was as follows:

Q.Now, you are, are you not, a consultant on the television program known as

" Law & Order " ?

A.Two of them.

Q.Okay. Did either one of those deal with postpartum depression or women's

mental health?

A.As a matter of fact, there was a show of a woman with postpartum

depression who drowned her children in the bathtub and was found insane and

it was aired shortly before the crime occurred.

The second mention of " Law & Order " came during Dr. Lucy Puryear's

testimony. Dr. Puryear, a defense expert witness, was cross-examined by the

State regarding her evaluation of appellant. The State specifically asked

about her failure to inquire into whether or not appellant had seen " Law &

Order. " Dr. Puryear testified as follows:

Q.You know she watched " Law & Order " a lot; right?

A.I didn't know. No.

Q.Did you know that in the weeks before June 20th, there was a " Law & Order "

episode where a woman killed her children by drowning them in a bathtub, was

defended on the basis of whether she was sane or insane under the law, and

the diagnosis was postpartum depression and in the program the person was

found insane, not guilty by reason of insanity? Did you know that?

A.No.

Q.If you had known that and had known that Yates was subject to these

delusions, not that she was the subject of a delusion of reference, but that

she regularly watched " Law & Order " and may have seen that episode, would

you have changed the way you went about interviewing her, would you have

interviewed whether she got the idea somehow she could do this and not

suffer hell or prison?

A.I certainly wouldn't have asked her that question. No.

Q.Would you have - - you didn't have to ask her that question, but you could

have explored that?

A.If I had known she watched that show, I would have ask[ed] her about it,

yes.

In his final argument at the guilt-innocence phase of the trial, appellant's

attorney referred to Dr. Dietz's testimony by stating, " Or maybe even we

heard some evidence that she saw some show on TV and knew she could drown

her children and get away with it. "

The prosecutor, in his final argument, made the following reference to Dietz

's testimony about the " Law & Order " episode:

She gets very depressed and goes into Devereux. And at times she says these

thoughts came to her during that month. These thoughts came to her, and she

watches " Law & Order " regularly, she sees this program. There is a way out.

She tells that to Dr. Dietz. A way out.

After the jury had returned a guilty verdict, appellant's counsel discovered

that Dr. Dietz had given false testimony. The producer of " Law & Order "

spoke to counsel by telephone and said he could not recall such an episode.

An attorney representing the producer, after talking to Dr. Dietz and

researching the shows, verified to counsel that there was no show with a

plot as outlined by Dr. Dietz. Dr. Dietz acknowledged that he had made an

error in his testimony. Dr. Dietz's acknowledgment is not on the record. The

record is unclear as towhether it was made to the attorney representing the

producer or to appellant's counsel.

Close Appellant and the State entered into the following written

stipulation:

1.Dr. Park Dietz testified on cross-examination that " As a matter of fact,

there was a show of a woman with postpartum depression who drowned her

children in the bathtub and was found insane and it was aired shortly before

this crime occurred. "

2.Dr. Park Dietz would testify that he was in error and that no episode of

" Law & Order " and/or " Law & Order: Criminal Intent " as described above was

ever produced for the " Law & Order " television series.

Appellant moved for a mistrial based on Dr. Dietz's false testimony, and the

trial court denied the motion. Appellant then requested that the stipulation

be admitted into evidence and read to the jury. The trial court granted this

request. In connection with the stipulation, the trial court, in response to

appellant's request, made the following statement to the jury:

Ladies and gentlemen, during the course of this trial there have been

occasions when written stipulations have been introduced for your

consideration. . . . While those witnesses that give information which is

contained in this stipulation do not physically appear here in court to

testify, you must consider the matters which they have indicated in the

written stipulation as if they actually appeared in court and give it

whatever weight you wish to give to it. So the witness does not have to

actually appear in court, but the matters contained in the stipulation are

offered into evidence as if they had appeared.

The jury returned verdicts on both charges that at least 10 jurors had a

reasonable doubt that appellant would commit criminal acts of violence that

would constitute a continuing threat to society.

DISCUSSION

Motion for Mistrial

In her second point of error, appellant contends that the trial court abused

its discretion by denying her motion for mistrial when it was revealed that

the State's expert witness had presented false testimony. Appellant argues

that Dr. Dietz's testimony was essential to the jury's " guilty " verdict and

that his testimony relating to the " Law & Order " episode was the most

compelling testimony supporting Dr. Dietz's conclusion that appellant knew

right from wrong.

The State recognizes that the State's knowing use of perjured testimony that

is likely to materially affect the judgment violates the Due Process Clause

of the Fourteenth Amendment of the United States Constitution. See Ex parte

Castellano, 863 S.W.2d 476, 485 (Tex. Crim. App. 1993). The State argues

that it did not know that the testimony was false, did not use the false

information, and the information was not material. We agree that this case

does not involve the State's knowing use of perjured testimony. At the

hearing on appellant's motion for mistrial, appellant did not complain that

there had been prosecutorial misconduct. Rather, appellant stated,

[M]ake no mistake, the issue is not whether or not the State was aware and

we have no reason to believe the State was aware that such a program did not

exist. The issue is that the defense of insanity was rebutted by the

testimony of Dr. Dietz relative to an act of premeditation, that is a

planned and/or a deceptive act on Mrs. Yates' part, that is something that

would give her an idea, a way out of these particular allegations. And that

was relayed to this jury and we believe that the jury relied upon the

presentation of Dr. Dietz as well as the cross-examination by [the State's

attorney] of Dr. Puryear relative to this particular issue.

We review the denial of a motion for mistrial under an abuse of discretion

standard. Ladd v. State, 3 S.W.3d 547, 567 (Tex. Crim. App. 1999). In this

case, the motion for mistrial was the functional equivalent of a motion for

new trial; therefore, we look to the standards governing the review of the

granting or denial of a motion for new trial. See State v. Garza, 774 S.W.2d

724, 726 (Corpus Christi 1989, pet. ref'd) (concluding that State may appeal

order granting mistrial that is functionally indistinguishable from order

granting motion for new trial).

Generally, if a witness has testified to material, inculpatory facts against

a defendant and, after the verdict but before a motion for new trial has

been ruled upon, the witness makes an affidavit that he testified falsely, a

new trial should be granted. In our case, Dr. Dietz did not make an

affidavit that he testified falsely. However,because the State stipulated

that Dr. Dietz would testify that his testimony was in error, thereis no

credibility issue requiring an affidavit. See Dougherty v. State, 745 S.W.2d

107, 107(Tex. App.-Amarillo 1988), aff'd, 773 S.W.2d 320 (Tex. Crim. App.

1989) (stating thatState was bound by its stipulation).

Close v. State, 375 S.W.2d 449, 451 (Tex. Crim. App. 1964). The

exceptions to this rule-such as, when the recanting witness is an

accomplice, or the recantation is found to be incredible in light of the

evidence, or the recantation has been coerced-do not apply in the present

case. See Villarreal v. State, 788 S.W.2d 672, 674 (Tex. App.-Corpus Christi

1990, pet. ref'd) (applying general rule to determine that, because State

offered no evidence to controvert recantation or testimony, denial of motion

for new trial was abuse of discretion). We note that this rule does not

require that the State have knowledge that the testimony was false. We

review the record to determine whether the State used the false testimony

and, if so, whether there is a reasonable likelihood that the false

testimony could have affected the judgment of the jury. See v.

State, 96 S.W.3d 386, 394-95 (Tex. App.-Austin 2002, pet. ref'd). We

recognize that v. State involved the prosecutor's knowing use of

falsetestimony. 96 S.W.3d 386, 393 (Tex. App.-Austin 2002, pet. ref'd).

However, when falsetestimony is a factor in securing a conviction, the

effect is the same, regardless of whetherthe State used the false testimony

knowingly or not. See Trujillo v. State, 757 S.W.2d 169,172 n.1 (Tex.

App.-San 1988, no pet.) (Cadena, C.J. concurring).

Close

It is uncontested that the testimony of Dr. Dietz regarding his consultation

on a " Law & Order " television show having a plot remarkably similar to the

acts committed by appellant was untrue and that there was no " Law & Order "

television show with such a plot. The State is bound by its stipulation to

these facts. See Dougherty v. State, 745 S.W.2d 107, 107 (Tex. App.-Amarillo

1988), aff'd, 773 S.W.2d 320 (Tex. Crim. App. 1989) (stating that State was

bound by its stipulation). However, the State asserts that it is " very

questionable whether it can be said that the trial prosecutors used Dr.

Dietz' testimony on cross-examination, especially in light of the fact that

it played absolutely no role in the development of Dr. Dietz' conclusion

that the appellant knew that her conduct was wrong . . . . "

The record reflects that the State used Dr. Dietz's testimony twice. First,

the State used the testimony to cross-examine Dr. Puryear, who had seen

appellant for several months while appellant was in the county jail, asking

Dr. Puryear whether she knew that appellant watched " Law & Order " and

whether she knew that there was an episode with a plot line mirroring

appellant's acts. In so doing, the State repeated those facts that were

common to appellant's acts and the referenced episode, thus emphasizing

those facts already stated by Dr. Dietz. Second, the State connected the

dots in its final argument by juxtaposing appellant's depression, her dark

thoughts, watching " Law & Order, " and seeing " a way out. " Thus, the State

used Dr. Dietz's false testimony to suggest to the jury that appellant

patterned her actions after that " Law & Order " episode. We emphasize that

the State's use of Dr. Dietz's false testimony was not prosecutorial

misconduct. Rather, it served to give weight to that testimony.

The State argues that Dr. Dietz's testimony regarding the " Law & Order "

episode was not material. The State asserts that " there is no reasonable

likelihood " that the testimony " could have affected the judgment of the

jury, " but does not make any argument to support such a conclusory

statement. We conclude that the testimony, combined with the State's

cross-examination of Dr. Puryear and closing argument, was material. The

materiality of the testimony is further evidenced by the fact that appellant

's attorney felt compelled to address it in his own closing argument.

The State also asserts that Dr. Dietz did not suggest that appellant used

the plot of the show to plan killing her children. Although it is true that

Dr. Dietz did not make such a suggestion, the State did in its closing

argument.

Five mental health experts testified that appellant did not know right from

wrong or that she thought what she did was right. Dr. Dietz was the only

mental health expert who testified that appellant knew right from wrong.

Therefore, his testimony was critical to establish the State's case.

Although the record does not show that Dr. Dietz intentionally lied in his

testimony, his false testimony undoubtedly gave greater weight to his

opinion.

On the other hand, had the jury known prior to their deliberations in the

guilt-innocence phase of the trial, that Dr. Dietz's testimony regarding the

" Law & Order " episodewas false, the jury would likely have considered him,

the State's only mental health expert,to be less credible.

Close

We conclude that there is a reasonable likelihood that Dr. Dietz's false

testimony could have affected the judgment of the jury. We further conclude

that Dr. Dietz's false testimony affected the substantial rights of

appellant. Therefore, the trial court abused its discretion in denying

appellant's motion for mistrial.

Accordingly, we sustain appellant's second issue.

CONCLUSION

Having sustained appellant's second issue, we need not reach her other

issues. We reverse the trial court's judgment and remand the cause for

further proceedings.

Sam Nuchia

Justice

Panel consists of Chief Justice Radack and Justices Taft and Nuchia.

[Guest guest]

Yes, it was post-partum depression and, I believe, an overbearing, inconsiderate

husband. From following this on the news as it happened, I remember hearing or

reading that her husband had stated they received counselling from their church

leaders after the birth of her next to youngest child. She was feeling stressed

out from having 4 preschoolers - DUH!!!! But her hubby wanted to keep

fulfilling their " obligation " to have as many children as God saw fit to give

them and so the youngest was conceived and after the birth, she became so

distraught and unable to cope with the demands of having 5 children under 7 that

CPS or whatever they have in TX became involved and ordered her to see a shrink.

Then came the drugs...and the rest is sad, sad history...

Terry

lsyorke <lsyorke@...> wrote:

Does anyone who has followed this case know what caused the ssri use

in the first place? Was it the post partum depression??

> > >

> > > While I strongly believe that this conviction should be

overturned

> > and

> > > that she was undeniably insane at the time of the deaths, I

don't

> > see

> > > how anything will change in the long run, considering the way

> Texas

> > > law is written.

> > >

> > > Maybe the new info on ADs will help her case.

>

>

>

>

>

> --------------------------------------------------------------------

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>